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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 
Several years ago, I attended a small conference for 
women in philosophy. One week before the conference, 
I learned that I was pregnant with my second child. Given 
that I had an almost two-year-old, another on the way, and 
that I had just completed my first year in a tenure-track 
job, I was excited to see a panel on the program called 
(something like) “Philosophy and Motherhood.” I showed 
up enthusiastically, pen in hand, notebook splayed, eager 
to write down all of the tips that were going to be offered 
on how to manage and balance children and a promising 
career (not to mention everything else). 
But I was not so excited to learn that the unanimous— 
and, quite frankly, surprising—conclusion from all of the 
participants on the panel was that it was more or less 
impossible to achieve the trifecta of success in philosophy, 
parenthood, and (even minimal) happiness. One panelist 
spoke about how she’d had children well before beginning 
graduate school and how she was more or less absent 
during their early childhood in order to finish her degree in a 
timely manner and to be taken seriously in her department. 
Another panelist said that she’d had children soon after 
securing a tenure-track job, and that it was so expensive 
to afford childcare (in the NY area), and so difficult to 
balance her job and her family life while scrambling to deal 
with childcare, that even though she didn’t regret having 
children per se, she certainly didn’t seem to be happy 
about everything she’d had to sacrifice in order to have 
them. A third panelist who’d had children during graduate 
school said, outright, that she regretted that decision, if not 
the decision to have children at all. 
The conclusion I drew was that if you have children as an 
academic, you regret it, either entirely, or for having them 
before tenure. But even if you don’t come to regret your 
decision, it’s still impossible to succeed at research, have 
a family, and be happy. Needless to say, as someone 
who had one child, was newly pregnant, and was already 
nervous about bringing a second child into our family, I 
left the panel and the conference feeling downtrodden, 
disappointed, and fearful for what my future had in store 
for me and my partner. 
But, as I’ve come to see six years later, what the panelists 
described on that day is not the only outcome of being 
a parent and a philosopher, nor should it be the only or 
the dominant narrative floating around. In retrospect, it was 
this panel, and the very negative picture it painted, that 
was the initial impetus for conceiving of the current issue. 
So far, my own experience as a parent has been positive. 
I say this with full acknowledgment and awareness of all 
of my many privileges. I had my son (who is now almost 
eight) while I was just about to begin the third of a three-
year limited-term teaching job in Montreal, Quebec, in 
Canada. Even though it was not a permanent job, because 
Quebec has the most generous parental leave policy of any 
province in Canada, I still received a full year of parental 
leave along with 100 percent of my salary (which, as far as 
I’m concerned, should be the norm everywhere). Because 
of this, we were able to move as a family to the city where 
my partner had secured a job for the year. It was during this 
year that I landed a tenure-track job after four years on the 
market. (Note: doing a series of more than five on-campus 
interviews while nursing, and leaving a six-month-old at 
home with his dad (who was working full time, during the 
winter of several “Snowpocalypses” on the east coast which 
caused many flight delays and some canceled flights which 
caused me to stay away from them for longer than planned) 
required lots of juggling, lots of paid childcare, lots of 
requested accommodations from search committees, and 
several embarrassing and awkward moments pumping milk 
during my campus visits. Though being on the job market 
while nursing an infant is not ideal, it is certainly possible 
and I am happy to report that all of the departments where 
I interviewed were as understanding and accommodating 
of all of my requests as they possibly could have been. This 
is a point that needs to be broadcasted loudly, since every 
department far exceeded my expectations. 
When my daughter was born a year and a half into my 
tenure-track job, not surprisingly, things were not as easy 
parental-leave wise as they were in Canada, since I was 
then living in the United States and working at a large state 
school with no good parental leave policy of which to speak. 
But with tremendous and relentless effort and negotiation, 
I did manage to secure a leave with which I was completely 
happy. With the input and savviness of colleagues who had 
successfully navigated this terrain before and who served 
as invaluable mentors (thanks, Tracy K.!) and a remarkable 
amount of creative thinking on the part of my chair at the 
time (thanks, Bob K.!), I ended up tweaking my annual 
work plan by ramping up my research and service duties 
so that I did not have to teach for an entire semester. With 
this time off teaching, combined with the summer months 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
 
following that semester, I did not go back to teaching until 
my daughter was eight months old. Another ingredient 
in the mix then and now is a family-friendly department 
and current chair (shout out to David O.!), which makes an 
enormous difference when scheduling classes, department 
meetings, and other obligations. 
Though we live in a city with no family anywhere close by, 
my parents and my partner’s parents are still very involved 
in the lives of our children and help us in whatever ways 
they can. But the geographic distance means that we 
have no family on whom we can rely or depend for extra 
or emergency childcare—for snow days, sick days, or 
children’s (countless) school breaks that do not align with 
our work calendars. This means that we’ve spent and 
continue to spend rather alarming amounts of money on 
extra childcare. But, as seems to be common in the lives 
of working parents in general, and of philosophers in 
particular—see the narratives in this issue by Samantha 
Brennan and Amy Allen—this is often a necessary tactic in 
order to get it all done (again, a huge privilege that we are 
able to afford this extra childcare—thanks to Kristen, Grace, 
Rachel, and Gabby for saving us more times than I can 
count!). Most of all, and in addition to the other privileges 
I’ve just mentioned, what has been a necessary ingredient 
in being able to juggle it all is that I have an incredibly 
devoted and involved partner (also a philosophy professor) 
who is also entirely committed to feminist ideals of child-
raising and to an equal division of household and family 
responsibilities. 
The topic of parenting and philosophy is not discussed 
enough in any formal way. As an antidote to the panel I 
mentioned above—which painted a rather grim picture of 
motherhood/parenthood and philosophy, to say the least—I 
conceived of this issue as a way of broadcasting a variety of 
diverse narratives of success. In the early stages of thinking 
about the issue, I made an interesting observation, namely, 
that when I approached several potential contributors, there 
was a real and explicit reluctance (a) to think of themselves 
as successes (though the people I have in mind are all 
full professors and/or deans, and all have three or more 
children) and (b) to tell their stories in a way that centers 
their success. In varying ways, they all feared, in the words 
of one of the philosophers who I asked to contribute, 
“coming across as an asshole.” The fact that narratives 
of success in parenting and philosophy are not the norm 
in the field, combined with the fact that people who are 
successful are hesitant and sometimes even ashamed 
to tell their stories, made me even more persistent in 
convincing them to contribute. 
Some did, some did not. 
Before giving a sneak preview of what you’ll find in this 
issue, a few caveats are in order. First, I intentionally did 
not want to call this issue “Motherhood and Philosophy.” 
Many issues surrounding children and careers focus on 
women, and there are good reasons for this—reasons that 
are rooted in systemic misogyny, sexism, patriarchy, and 
the myriad ways in which women have been and continue 
to be systematically discriminated against with regards to 
their reproductive choices (or, lack thereof), pregnancy, 
childbirth, raising children, and doubly so when these 
issues are combined with their choice to pursue careers. 
In this issue, I wanted to feature diverse philosophers who 
are mothers, but also fathers, and parents of all sexes and 
genders and to provide them with a venue in which to share 
their stories. Focusing on women can be helpful, but it can 
also eclipse the stories of other primary caregivers who 
do not identify as women. Focusing on parenting more 
generally acknowledges that trans and non-binary folks 
also face specific barriers in their parenting journeys. Saray 
Ayala-Lopez’s contribution, for example, is not only written 
from the perspective of someone raising a child as a non-
binary person and parent, but it also defends the choice of 
raising a gender-open child. 
Second, and more specifically, fatherhood and success 
in philosophy is not spoken of nearly enough (if at all) in 
the way that it should be, by which I mean fathers who are 
explicitly committed to feminist ideals of parenting. I am 
sorry that I do not have more contributions from fathers, 
but I am very grateful for the words and stories of Joseph 
A. Stramondo and Matthew Lindauer (Lindauer co-wrote his 
contribution to the issue with his partner, Serene Khader). 
Both of these contributions underscore what Khader and 
Lindauer call the “daddy dividend,” namely, the ways in 
which even in relationships committed to feminist ideals 
of parenting and equal division of household labor, 
fathers are still benefiting from having to do far less than 
their partners (in the eyes of the public) to be considered 
superlative parents. 
This volume is robust, but not comprehensive. I hope that 
you enjoy the many voices, perspectives, and stories that 
you read in what follows. Let me give you a small taste of 
what’s to come. 
Serene Khader and Matthew Lindauer’s contribution, 
“The ‘Daddy Dividend’: The Gender Division of Labor and 
Regression Towards Patriarchy,” articulates something that, 
I think, so many of us have experienced and spoken about 
with one another, yet that I’ve never seen articulated so 
perfectly and eloquently. They begin with an observation, 
namely, that many well-meaning gestures, comments, and 
responses to their goal of egalitarian, feminist-informed 
parenting have ended up reinforcing the very habits that 
they’ve wanted to guard against. In order to explain this 
phenomenon, they coin the term “daddy dividend,” which 
refers to the following phenomenon: while fathers tend to 
be praised for doing, minimally, what any parent would 
be expected to do (i.e., for changing a diaper, talking to 
their baby, or even just holding their baby), mothers are 
regularly scolded in public by strangers who point out, 
unsolicited, for example, that their baby is hungry, cold, 
gassy, or has a runny nose. Khader and Lindauer show how 
the daddy dividend is pernicious, both in the short- and in 
the long-term. They argue, “[i]n praising fathers for doing 
what is simply required of mothers, strangers reinforce the 
attitude in men that the fatherly duties assigned to them by 
the traditional gender division of labor are all that should 
be expected of them.” Khader and Lindauer’s essay goes 
on to focus on three lessons about distributing household 
work that they’ve learned from conceptualizing the gender 
division of labor in parenting: (i) that social rewards for 
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fathers can exacerbate the tendency of women to engage 
in shadow labor, (ii) that gender socialization faces would-
be egalitarian households with significant startup and 
maintenance costs, and (iii) that striving for equality may 
not actually be the best way to achieve equality. 
Joseph A. Stramondo’s narrative essay, “Gender, Disability, 
and the Violent Undercurrents of Parenting Inspiration 
Porn,” illustrates how the daddy dividend carries over into 
the experience of parenting while disabled. Specifically, 
he brings an intersectional lens to the discussion by 
considering how the daddy dividend is combined, in his 
experience, with being objectified as “inspiration porn,” 
a term coined by Stella Young, to designate instances 
when disabled people are framed as inspirational merely 
because of the presence of disability. Stramondo explains: 
“The problem of inspiration porn is that it gives voice to the 
very low expectations the world has for disabled people. 
By treating the completion of ordinary tasks as if they 
were monumental accomplishments, it shows just how 
incompetent people assume we are. For most disabled 
people, this experience is pervasive.” Yet, as Stramondo 
goes on to discuss, experiencing the objectification of 
inspiration porn is not universal. For example, his partner, 
Leah, a cisgender disabled woman, has never had to contend 
with it. Whereas Stramondo is often considered to be father 
of the year by strangers, simply for existing as a disabled 
father, Leah is disparaged for being a disabled mother. His 
essay goes on to consider the ableist presumption that 
disabled parents are inherently inadequate parents and 
some of the ways in which this presumption is not only 
offensive, but dangerous. 
Saray Ayala-López’s essay, “(Philosophizing about) Gender-
Open Children,” considers another kind of non-normative 
parenting, namely, the decision to raise a gender-open 
child. Raising a gender-open child means that parents do 
not reveal the gender of their child, or better, reject the 
assumption that their baby/child already has a gender. This 
means that when caring for a gender-open baby, parents 
don’t use binary gender pronouns (like “she” or “he”) to 
refer to their child; rather, you use “they” singular; and 
when introducing their baby, they do so as a human who 
doesn’t have a gender yet. It also means that they don’t 
reveal their baby’s genital status, which most people 
assume to be straightforwardly associated with gender
and the only factor in determining one’s sex (both false). 
To some, raising a gender-open child might seem like an 
odd (or even a harmful) move. But Ayala-López questions 
these assumptions. In order to do so, they envision three 
conceptual spaces in which to philosophize on this matter. 
The first is the space of parents, in which they respond to 
what they’ve called the Activism Olympics objection, which 
questions whether gender-open parenting is just a way 
for parents to expand their activism, perhaps even at the 
expense of their child. The second space is the space of 
children, where Ayala-López responds to the questions of 
how we can be sure that being raised gender open is good 
for the child; how not being assigned a (binary) gender can 
also be good for the child; and whether the absence of an 
assigned gender at birth has its own set of problems: taken 
together, what they call the Missing Identity objection. 
Third, they engage the space of those who theorize about 
gender-open children. There, they are forthright about the 
ways in which their decision to raise their child gender-
open is not alien to the academic work they’ve done on 
sex and gender. While being related to their work seems 
to give their parenting decision a kind of academic street 
cred, they nevertheless want to keep their theorizing in 
check. Ayala-López firmly believes that when theorizing 
about other people’s identities, there are certain ethical 
guidelines which must be made clear to ourselves, both 
as individual researchers and as a society. One of these 
guidelines requires us to answer the question of why we 
are interested in researching the questions we do. They 
conclude by developing some of the ethical considerations 
that should guide our philosophizing about other peoples’ 
identities. Given various debacles that have plagued our 
discipline in the past few years surrounding theorizing 
about people’s identities, we ought to take seriously Ayala­
López’s guidance on this matter, for these ethical guides 
can be generalized beyond the specific question of raising 
gender-open children. I hope that more people take heed 
and recognize that philosophizing about identities is a very 
different matter—with profoundly different consequences— 
than philosophizing about abstract concepts. People’s lives 
are on the line. I very much look forward to Ayala-López’s 
future work on this topic, since there is clearly far more to 
be said on this matter. 
Quill Rebecca Kukla’s paper, “Taking Children’s Autonomy 
Seriously as a Parent,” considers the culture of parenting 
older children as they transition into adulthood. This paper 
is an important follow-up to their 2005 book, Mass Hysteria, 
which argued that we exist within the strong grip of a 
damaging cultural myth that dictates that being a good 
mother requires us to remove the boundaries between 
mother and infant. This myth still seems to be just as true 
today as it was fifteen years ago. Within the context of 
their own eighteen-year-old child (who is also a contributor 
to this issue!), Kukla has become interested in another 
agency- and boundary-obliterating parenting mythology. 
As a point of departure for their project, they assert that 
“we fundamentally fail to respect the basic autonomy rights 
that children have as people, and indeed that we equate 
‘good parenting’ with severe violations of these autonomy 
rights. We accept and even approve of subjugating children 
to their parents’ will in ways that would be shocking if 
enacted against other sorts of people.” Within this context, 
they argue for “a radical reorientation of how we think 
about children’s autonomy and parents’ duties to enable 
and respect it” with the goal of underscoring what they 
take to be profoundly wrong with the way that we tend to 
generally understand parenting and its goals. 
Kukla calls attention to a myriad of ways in which we as 
a society systematically undermine children, in ways that 
tend to be sidestepped, denied, or outright ignored in 
mainstream discussions about parenting: for example, that 
we tend not to actually see children as people (as in, they 
are considered only to be partial people, or on-their-way­
to-being people); that we tend to gaslight children and not 
think that this is morally wrong; that as parents, we often 
restrict where children can go and what they can do even 
when there is no evidence-based argument for doing so. 
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In sum, as they write, “we violate all of the ground-level 
rules we normally recognize for how to treat people as 
self-determining agents with dignity.” Kukla concludes by 
introducing a very different framework for engaging with 
children, one guided by the idea that insofar as children are 
people, we have a moral duty to inhibit their autonomy and 
invade their privacy as little as possible. 
In her essay “Parenting in Trauma,” Melissa Burchard takes as
her point of departure the claim that if we believe and continue
to assert that philosophy is important for understanding
reality, the world we live in, and our experiences within it,
then serious discussions and engagement with issues of
parenting and childrearing is important for philosophy as a
discipline. She has come to believe this based on her own
very difficult experience of parenting, which began fifteen
years ago when she and her partner adopted a four- and
nine-year-old from foster care, both of whom had been
traumatized in multiple ways, by various people in their
lives, over an extended period of time. Burchard’s parenting
and philosophical interests have informed one another:
as a philosopher-mother, she realized that she needed a
philosophy of trauma—and more specifically, one that paid
attention to the developmental trauma of children who have
been traumatized under circumstances like her children— 
but that such a thing was almost entirely lacking in the
philosophical literature. Burchard has recently published a
book on this topic, Philosophical Reflections on Mother in
Trauma (Routledge 2018), which is a more comprehensive
account of the issues she considers here. What she offers
here are some implications of trauma for parenting and
philosophical understanding. 
Specifically, Burchard discusses the ways that trauma 
affects basic interactions of children in various stages of 
development, both psychologically and physiologically 
and the various implications of trauma that philosophy 
needs to take seriously. Her argument is this: “if infants 
and children do not get the proper kinds of interactions, 
they do not develop certain relational abilities, which may 
prevent them from forming satisfying, mutually trusting 
relationships throughout their lives.” Generally, such a line 
of thinking is something feminist philosophers have taken 
seriously for a while, though focus has not been directed to 
children. But Burchard wants uptake for this claim beyond 
feminist circles. She goes on to discuss trauma’s effects 
on children’s ability to play—what she calls “post-trauma 
play”—and some of the surprising and difficult things she 
learned from her own kids that cast into relief what we 
tend to take for granted. For instance, she questions the 
assumption that it is always easy for children to engage 
in imaginative and free play and considers how trauma in 
early childhood compromises this capacity. Burchard also 
discusses trauma’s effect on children’s sense of reality and 
the various ways in which her children were not living in 
the same world or inhabiting the same reality as her and 
her partner: in the world of her children and of so many 
children who have endured early childhood trauma, parents 
are not people to whom to turn for love and nurturing; 
rather, parents are people, first and foremost, to be feared 
(in addition to be loved and depended upon). Before 
concluding, Burchard considers some of the implications 
that parenting children who have experienced trauma has 
for social, political, and moral philosophy, among others, 
in particular that it can help us articulate the wrongs of 
oppressions or oppressive actions. Finally, she considers 
the upshot of her discussion for considering the good life 
and how even a basic conception of a good life may be 
challenging when children have been severely traumatized, 
especially if that trauma has affected or disrupted their 
developmental processes. 
Amy Allen’s narrative, “On Muddling Through,” chronicles 
how she found success both as an academic and as a 
mother. I do not want to downplay the success part of her 
narrative; Amy, on the other hand, would like to focus on all 
of the ways that the stars have aligned throughout her career 
to make her decision to have four children commensurate 
with eventually becoming a full professor and now chair of 
a robust department with a PhD program, in addition to the 
author and editor of many books. One of the ways in which 
Allen’s and Samantha Brennan’s narratives overlap nicely 
is that while not ignoring the daily difficulties of parenting 
(young and older children) while working full time, they 
both recognize that of all careers, academia is probably 
one of the friendliest toward parents, in the sense that for 
the most part, as a full-time tenure-track or tenured faculty 
member, it offers us greater autonomy (and oftentimes 
flexibility) over one’s work schedule (this is obviously 
not so for adjunct teaching). Allen still underscores the 
myriad structural problems that make it difficult to juggle 
everything, including, but not limited to the fact that there 
is no mandatory paid parental leave in the United States; 
no universal, affordable daycare system; and the fact that 
many people live far away from their extended family. As 
a result, her words of wisdom are that until the structural 
problems (of oppression) are resolved, at best we can 
hope to muddle through it all, where admittedly, having 
more privilege helps. But in this muddling through, Allen 
shares some of the strategies that have been particularly 
helpful to her over the years and still. 
As is clear from the title of Samantha Brennan’s narrative, 
“Parenting, Feminism, and Academic Life: My Happy 
Story,” her decision to have three children toward the very 
beginning of her career (beginning, that is, in graduate 
school) has resulted in a happy story (though obviously the 
story is still evolving). Brennan is the Dean of the College 
of Arts and Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Guelph in Canada. In the last few years, she co-founded 
and co-edited Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, an online, 
open access journal; she also founded a very successful 
fitness blog that she still runs and that also resulted in a 
popular book called Fit at Mid-Life: A Feminist Fitness 
Journey (https://greystonebooks.com/products/fit-at-mid­
life). Last year, she ended her three-year term as a member 
of the Canadian Philosophical Association executive (Vice-
President, President, and Past President). While not doing 
academic things, she also rides her bike long distances, 
goes back country canoe camping, and races small 
sailboats. Within the context of such a rich life in which she 
also has close relationships with her three adult children 
(ages twenty-one, twenty-three, and twenty-seven), she 
provides the reader with ten thoughts on what has worked 
for her and has enabled her to achieve all of her many 
successes. 
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Carol Gray’s contribution, “Bridging the Divide: Thoughts 
on Parenting as a Grad Student,” shares some important 
insights about parenting while a grad student. Gray had a 
career as a lawyer before deciding to do a PhD in political 
science. At that time, her son was nine; he’s now fifteen. 
She discusses how she has managed to find the time to be 
with him (even if it means combining work and play); how 
bringing him to school with her has been a rewarding and 
enriching experience for both of them (even if it was done 
out of necessity); how she has always prioritized family 
activities and has scheduled classes around family time 
(even if it’s meant that she has not always taken the classes 
that most interested her); and, importantly, how she always 
makes it up to her son when her school conflicts with a 
family commitment. A perspective on parenting while a 
grad student is one that I really wanted to include in this 
issue, since it is fairly common and, again, one that is not 
discussed nearly enough. 
Leigh Viner’s contribution, “Anthropologists from Mars,” 
discusses her experiences single-parenting her now grown 
son (who, maybe not coincidentally, was a philosophy 
major in university). She thinks of this experience as being 
like an anthropologist from Mars, with him as her assistant. 
She tells us how the philosophers who have had the biggest 
impact on her—philosophers who value art, play, freedom, 
dignity, and openness—have also been the ones that have 
shaped her parenting and how it was, in fact, her son who 
led her to feminism. Her message is simple, namely, that if 
we are doing it right, then “we learn at least as much from 
our children and from our students as they do from us.” 
Speaking of philosophy-parents and philosophy-sons, 
the penultimate contribution to the issue is by the son of 
another philosopher included in the newsletter, namely, 
Eli Kukla (Quill Rebecca Kukla’s son), who discusses what 
it’s been like to be raised by philosophers. I’m excited 
to be including in this issue the perspective of a child of 
philosophers—one that we definitely don’t hear enough 
of. What excites me most about including these two 
contributions side-by-side is that much of what Quill Kukla 
discusses in their article from a theoretical and normative 
perspective (i.e., how we should treat children, the virtues 
of actually respecting the autonomy of children, even if our 
society fails to see them as full people) is exemplified in 
Eli Kukla’s thoughts and is visible in his achievements and 
robust philosophical outlook and perspectives. What I mean 
is that Quill Kukla has not only presented an argument in 
favor of a certain type of parenting; in Eli Kukla, we have 
proof, in the flesh, that the type of parenting they are 
advocating works! 
“Raised in Philosophy” discusses what it’s like to be what 
Eli Kukla calls a “pure-bred philosophers’ kid,” meaning that 
both of his parents and his grandfather are philosophers. Eli 
Kukla gives us a number of examples of the ways in which 
his philosophical upbringing has shaped who he is today 
and how having been immersed in philosophy “has affected 
seemingly every aspect of [his] life and personality.” As 
Eli Kukla writes and, later, expands upon, “Most people, at
some point in their lives, reach a point where they question
many of their assumptions about life. People question
religion, sexuality, monogamy, traditional family structures,
gender, et cetera. But for me, being raised by philosophers,
I never started out with any of these assumptions to begin
with.” Ultimately, seeing the profession through the eyes of
someone who has grown up immersed within it, Eli Kukla’s
essay reminds us of many of the wonderful things about the
profession, which (depending on the day, the scandal, etc.)
tend to be easy to forget. 
Finally, I wrote a short narrative piece for this issue, entitled 
“Children, Parenting, and the Nature of Work,” where I share 
some feminist observations from my recent experience of 
doing philosophy with children. 
In addition to the contributions just mentioned, in this 
issue you will find the following book reviews: Lisa 
Tessman’s review of Eva Feder Kittay’s Learning from My 
Daughter: The Value and Care of Disabled Minds, Claire A. 
Lockard’s review of Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social 
and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Benjamin R. 
Sherman and Stacey Goguen, Jina Fast’s review of Sophie 
Lewis’s Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against Family, and 
Kathryn Lafferty-Danner’s review of Loretta Ross and Rickie 
Solinger’s Reproductive Justice: An Introduction. 
I am so grateful to all of the authors in this issue. It’s been a 
really fun, fulfilling, and illuminating issue to put together. 
I’m also grateful to Brian Robinson and Sabrina Little for 
their help reviewing articles. Finally, I am forever grateful to 
my mentor and friend (and also Chair of the APA Committee 
on the Status of Women) Kate Norlock for her editorial 
advice on this issue. 
I hope that you enjoy this issue! 
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored 
by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The 
newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent 
philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None 
of the varied philosophical views presented by authors 
of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any 
or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of 
Women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does 
the committee advocate any particular type of feminist 
philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical 
attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of 
gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND
INFORMATION 
1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish 
information about the status of women in philosophy 
and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more 
widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of 
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 recent developments in feminist philosophy and related 
work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book 
reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the 
traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on 
feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about 
the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. 
Articles submitted to the newsletter should be around ten 
double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines 
for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays 
electronically to the editor or send four copies of essays 
via regular mail. All manuscripts should be prepared for 
anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago 
Manual of Style. 
2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published 
a book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, 
please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. 
We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer 
to review books (or some particular book), please send the 
editor, Lauren Freeman (lauren.freeman@louisville.edu), a 
CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of 
research and teaching. 
3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, 
suggestions, books, and other communications to the 
editor: Dr. Lauren Freeman, University of Louisville, lauren. 
freeman@louisville.edu. 
4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for spring issues 
are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall 
issues are due by the preceding February 1. 
ESSAYS 
The “Daddy Dividend:” The Gender 
Division of Labor and Regression Towards 
Patriarchy 
Serene Khader and Matthew Lindauer 
CUNY GRADUATE CENTER AND BROOKLYN COLLEGE 
When we welcomed our baby last winter, there were 
some things everyone seemed to want to know. Was she 
sleeping? How were we feeding her? What kind of casserole 
did we want? But, really, was she sleeping? 
One of the biggest challenges we faced was one that no 
one asked about: deciding how we would divide parenting 
and household labor. That no one asked about it, of course, 
did not mean that our division of labor was wholly private. 
We knew from feminist scholarship, and from the surprising 
amount of work it had taken to divide household labor in an 
egalitarian way when we were childless, that entrenched 
social inequalities would rear their heads in our home. We 
were less prepared, however, for the extent to which many 
well-meaning gestures, including ones that are intended to 
promote egalitarianism, on later reflection, would turn out 
to reinforce habits we wanted to guard against. 
We coined the term “daddy dividend”1 on one of the many 
days a stranger on the subway told Matt (a white man) that 
he was the “best daddy ever.” The thing he had done to 
receive this accolade was to wear his baby in a carrier, and 
perhaps not seem utterly miserable doing so. By contrast, 
Serene (a brown woman) has never been told by a stranger 
that she’s the best mom ever, or even a decent one. It’s 
difficult to disaggregate the effects of race and gender 
in our case, as we know that women of color are widely 
perceived as inferior mothers.2 In fact, because our baby 
has lighter skin than Serene does, sometimes people do 
not perceive Serene as her mother at all. 
The daddy dividend is a cluster of gestures––again, 
well-meaning in many cases––that negatively tax the 
social esteem of men when they publicly perform basic 
parental duties: taking their children places, feeding them, 
changing their diapers, talking to them, and so on. It is 
the corollary of the positive tax on moms for their public 
parenting; moms are regularly scolded by strangers stating 
confidently (sometimes indignantly!) that their baby is 
hungry, cold, gassy, or has a runny nose. Of course, this 
scolding may take on different tones, intensities, and 
social meanings depending on the mother’s race, class, 
sexuality, ability, and other social inequalities, and so may 
the compliments given to fathers.3 But our experience has 
been that momming in public carries a cost; dadding in 
public carries a benefit. 
We do not wish to suggest that the gender division of 
childcare is sustained entirely, or even primarily, by such 
microcompliments and microaggressions.4 However, we 
have found it helpful to think of the traditional gender 
division of labor in parenting as a social practice that is 
supported, in part, by norms governing the assignment of 
esteem, visibility, and value. In what follows, we will focus 
on three further lessons about distributing household 
work that we have learned from conceptualizing the 
gender division of labor in this way: that social rewards for 
fathers can exacerbate the tendency of women to engage 
in shadow labor, that gender socialization faces would-
be egalitarian households with significant startup and 
maintenance costs, and that striving for equality may not 
be the best way to achieve equality. 
Dividing childcare and household labor is not a snapshot 
in time, even if selfies with the kids claim otherwise. It 
is an ongoing practice that is impacted by our society’s 
preexisting norms and expectations around what fathers 
and mothers are expected to do. To borrow H. L. A. Hart’s 
term, it is possible to take the “internal point of view”5 on 
the traditional gender division of labor, wherein participants 
accept these norms and govern their behavior accordingly. 
This can be done through direct, self-conscious action–– 
openly declaring “I will not wash the dishes, it’s not a 
man’s job!”––or through more subtle means––thinking to 
oneself, “I played with the baby for twenty minutes, so 
that counts for at least twenty minutes of cleaning the 
dishes. Back to reading.” The internal point of view on 
the traditional gender division of labor has it that mothers 
and fathers bear distinct parenting and household duties. 
Any engagement by fathers in the duties associated with 
mothering is therefore supererogatory—beyond the call of 
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fatherly duty. Hence, the same behavior is praiseworthy for 
one in virtue of being more than what they are required 
to do—for the other, it is middling at best. For a mother 
answering a work call while pushing the stroller, negative 
comments are required to remind her of the duties the 
practice prescribes her. She had better not be getting the 
idea that she should instead adopt the external point of 
view on the practice, the position of an observer that does 
not accept or even rejects its norms. 
One might be forgiven for thinking that in offering Matt 
the daddy dividend strangers encourage him to engage 
more in the activities associated with mothering. But this 
misses the centrality of obligation and supererogation to 
the gender division of labor. In praising fathers for doing 
what is simply required of mothers, strangers reinforce 
the attitude in men that the fatherly duties assigned to 
them by the traditional gender division of labor are all 
that should be expected of them. Picking out an action for 
praise expresses the judgment that it is not just what you 
should be doing—it would be weird to praise someone 
for brushing their teeth, or wearing shoes in public. But it 
is common to give men the daddy dividend, in the form 
of public praise, for performing actions that are just as 
common and expected for mothers. 
By seeing the gender division of labor as a practice, the 
further insight follows that any egalitarian revision to 
it will also be a practice, and one that is affected by its 
predecessor. That is to say, we cannot ignore the fact that 
partners trying to set up an egalitarian gender division 
of labor need vigilance and ongoing carefulness if they 
wish to avoid slipping back into the package of patriarchal 
norms that the inherited practice entailed. As the daddy 
dividend illustrates, there are signs all around pulling us 
back towards the old way of doing things. 
Moreover, rewarding men for engaging in high-visibility 
parenting encourages women to engage in low-visibility 
parenting, or, as it is often called “shadow labor.”6 As most 
parents know, most of the important labor of parenting 
is not done in public. Much of the most physically and 
cognitively demanding labor associated with parenting is 
done outside of the jaunt in the park or down the street for 
coffee—it’s in the middle of the night, or in one’s vanishingly 
small leisure time. The daddy dividend encourages men 
to invest in public parenting. Since they are likely to take 
other men’s behavior and not equality as the relevant 
baseline,7 and they know that men who engage in high-
visibility parenting are doing more than other men,8 the 
daddy dividend encourages women to shift to less visible, 
and often more taxing, labor that still needs to be done.9 
This includes the more mundane, or even yucky, elements 
of parenting (cleaning up the food the baby has thrown all 
over the kitchen) and the much-discussed “cognitive load,” 
which is typically code for the managerial tasks associated 
with mothering (making sure that a baby has her next size 
of clothing, ensuring that paid childcare arrangements are 
made, keeping the household’s schedule, making doctor’s 
appointments, and so on). 
Of course, the perception that men’s engagement in 
feminized parenting tasks is supererogatory does not 
begin with the daddy dividend. It begins in childhood 
socialization, and thinking of parenting as a practice 
through which value is assigned to tasks has also helped us 
to think through what it means to directly address the role 
of this socialization. Boys are generally socially habituated 
not just not to think about planning for the care work of 
babies, but also not to learn the skills associated with doing 
so. The perception that women are naturally better at this 
work also works to invisibilize the mechanisms by which 
women and boys acquire these skills, and to discourage 
men and boys from bothering to acquire them—or parents 
from bothering to teach them. This means that the gender 
division of labor in parenting in a mixed-gender couple is 
usually one where women have an advantage with respect 
to the relevant skills. 
Thinking of socialization as producing specialization rather 
than just stereotypes has helped us think more concretely 
about what is involved in changing its inegalitarian effects. 
We know that it is easy and efficient (in some sense, at 
least) to do what we already specialize in. This means that 
there are startup costs for mixed-gender couples trying 
to achieve equality. Some of these costs fall on men, who 
need to learn, but it is important to recognize that the costs 
are often borne by women who have to teach them. For 
instance, Matt has taken up the task of contacting relatives 
for used clothing and tracking whether our daughter’s 
current clothing fits her. But for this to happen, Serene had 
to schedule a lesson on arranging and sorting clothing and 
anticipating future clothing needs. 
Our third and last point here follows from the fact that, given 
all of this, the ongoing influence of the gender division of 
labor is more likely to produce inegalitarian than egalitarian 
outcomes. For this reason, aiming at equality may not be the 
appropriate framing to guide men’s action. Like any form of 
praise, the daddy dividend can be seductive, and we aren’t 
recommending confronting well-meaning individuals when 
such praise is being offered (they mean well, and there 
are a lot of people who might feel threatened—not good, 
especially when your kids are around). If you are a dad who 
really wants to do something about the daddy dividend, 
it’s probably also a bad idea to heap further internal praise 
on yourself for noticing it. When you’re faced with such a 
system of social rewards, the better strategy, we believe, 
is to overcompensate in some domains of household 
labor. Perhaps egalitarian men should do “more” of the 
cleaning, diaper-changing, laundry, clothing turnover and 
organization, and other unappealing tasks in the household. 
Because the perception that a man is doing “more,” when 
so much in our society is telling him that he has done more 
than his share already, is likely to just be a reflection that 
things are a little bit closer to equality. 
Just as people’s selfies tell us little about whether they’re 
actually happy and living well, men’s selfies with their 
children tell us little about whether they are parenting 
and partnering well. By shifting our focus on snapshots to 
sustained parenting practices, we may just be less likely to 
confuse the two. And as a final note, if you are worried that 
what we have said seems too justice-oriented or juridical 
for such a personal area of one’s life, we’d like to invite you 
to think about our points in terms of love. If you love your 
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partner, what do you really owe to them? It’s probably not 
what an outmoded, patriarchal social practice says you do. 
NOTES 
1.	 The phrase “daddy dividend” has, unsurprisingly, been used 
by others, but not in the way that we do here, and sometimes 
in ways that are at odds with our commitments. For instance, 
Douglas Abrams describes a “daddy dividend” that children 
supposedly receive for having an involved father’s presence in 
their lives (“The Daddy Dividend,” Psychology Today, March/April 
2002). As feminists and egalitarians, we have concerns about this 
sort of argument, but discussing them is beyond the scope of 
this brief article. Others use the term to describe a career boost 
that fathers seem to receive relative to fatherless men (see, e.g., 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/01/the­
daddy-track/355746/). 
2.	 This stereotyping is particularly pronounced and well 
documented in the case of Black women. For a discussion of 
stereotypes of Black motherhood, such as the association of 
Black women with unwed motherhood, excessive sexual desire 
that prevents virtue, and “welfare queens,” see Dorothy Roberts, 
“Racism and Patriarchy and the Meaning of Black Motherhood,” 
ht tps : / /scholarsh ip . law.upenn.edu/cgi/v iewcontent.  
cgi?article=1594&context=faculty_scholarship. 
3.	 See Joe Stramondo’s piece in this newsletter, “Gender, Disability, 
and the Violent Undercurrents of Parenting Inspiration Porn,” for 
a discussion of how a context of disability oppression transforms 
the daddy dividend into an occasion for inspiration porn when 
the dads in question have visible disabilities. 
4.	 See Ann Cudd’s Analyzing Oppression (Oxford University Press, 
2002) for an analysis of how social structures work to force 
women to “choose” to engage in disproportionate caregiving. 
5.	 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
We are borrowing and using this term, as well as the “external 
point of view,” for our distinctive purposes here, which vary 
considerably from Hart’s own in developing a theory of law. 
6.	 Ivan Illich, Shadow Work (New York: Maryon Boyers, 2016). 
7.	 Deborah Rhode, Speaking of Sex (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999). 
8.	 This could be a form of moral self-licensing. See Benoît Monin 
and Dale T. Miller, “Moral Credentials and the Expression of 
Prejudice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 1 
(2001): 33–43. 
9.	 A recent study by Musick, Meier, and Flood finds that men 
disproportionately participate in the “fun” parenting tasks, like 
playing sports and reading books. “How Parents Fare,” American 
Sociological Review 81, no. 5 (2016): 1061–95. 
Gender, Disability, and the Violent 
Undercurrents of Parenting Inspiration 
Porn 
Joseph A. Stramondo 
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY 
Her bright purple jacket, pink tights, silver tutu, and honey-
colored hair present a sharp contrast to my black coat, black 
pants, black beard, and black power wheelchair, as we 
zoom down the sidewalk together, chatting away. She first 
learned to ride on my chair when she was eighteen months 
old. We started in the safety of the manicured grounds of 
our apartment complex and slowly expanded our range to 
the shopping center down the block and, eventually, the 
trolley system that opened nearly the entire city to our 
adventures. At first, I kept a bag of fruit snacks in my pocket 
to use for bribes when something was just too interesting to 
keep her toddler hands off of, but I haven’t had to use that 
trick in several months now. Having her constant stream 
of questions answered seems reward enough to keep her 
perched on my lap. She is my companion nearly every time 
I leave the house with a destination other than my office, 
my classroom, or the airport. 
This Saturday morning, we are running an errand: picking 
up some items her mom needs from the pharmacy. There is 
a small group of people loitering by the entrance and I can 
immediately tell they want to say something to us. “Hey 
man, look at you! Is that your little girl? You’re a great dad! 
You’re father of the year!” One of them tries to give me a 
high five as we roll past, but my hands are occupied; one is 
on my chair’s joystick and the other clutches Hazel loosely 
to help her balance. She ignores them completely and I 
mutter some nicety. Neither of us want to interrupt our 
trajectory into the store. I’m thinking I might want a bottled 
ice coffee to help me keep up with her and her brother all 
day and she has already been practicing the tone she will 
use to convince me to buy her some chocolate at 10 a.m. 
Maybe we appear rude to an outsider, spurning their 
words of encouragement in our haste to acquire a jar of 
acetaminophen. The truth is that I’m quite proud of Hazel’s 
intuitive ability to recognize and, when appropriate, shrug 
off ableism. It was, in fact, ableism we were encountering. 
In particular, we were being used as real life “inspiration 
porn.” Stella Young coined this term to designate instances 
when disabled people are framed as inspirational merely 
because of the presence of disability: “I use the term porn 
deliberately, because they objectify one group of people 
for the benefit of another group of people. So, in this 
case, we’re objectifying disabled people for the benefit of 
non-disabled people. The purpose of these images is to 
inspire you, to motivate you, so that we can look at them 
and think, ‘Well, however bad my life is, it could be worse. 
I could be that person.’” She speaks freely of her own 
frequent experiences with this phenomenon, and I’d guess 
her words hit home with many, if not all, visibly disabled 
people: “I’ve lost count of the number of times that I’ve 
been approached by strangers wanting to tell me that they 
think I’m brave or inspirational, and this was long before 
my work had any kind of public profile. They were just kind 
of congratulating me for managing to get up in the morning 
and remember my own name. And it is objectifying.”1 
The problem with inspiration porn is that it gives voice 
to the very low expectations the world has for disabled 
people. By treating the completion of ordinary tasks as if 
they were monumental accomplishments, it shows just 
how incompetent people assume we are. For most disabled 
people, this experience is pervasive. 
However, experiencing the objectification of inspiration 
porn isn’t universal when it comes to parenting. In fact, 
it is an experience that my partner, a cisgender disabled 
woman, has never had. To be sure, many people still regard 
her parenting with what Silvers calls the presumption of 
incompetence.2 However, it is not expressed in the same 
way. Rather than being told that she is mother of the year, 
she is asked why her toddler isn’t wearing a coat. 
PAGE 8	 SPRING 2020 | VOLUME 19  | NUMBER 2 









Of course, this difference has everything to do with gender. 
When I am celebrated as a disabled father and Leah is 
disparaged as a disabled mother, I am being rewarded by 
what Serene Khader and Matthew Lindauer refer to in this 
same newsletter issue as the Daddy Dividend, “a cluster of 
gestures . . . that negatively tax the social esteem on men 
when they publicly do what they simply should do as basic 
parental duties.”3 
Yet, at their root, these experiences are not so different. 
In both cases, there is this presumption that the disabled 
parent is inherently an inadequate parent. In both cases, 
the stakes are incredibly high. How long would it take for 
me to lose father of the year status, for example, if one of 
my kids were to be even minorly injured while under my 
care in public? 
From our very first conversations about starting a family, 
Leah and I discussed the need to ensure our children’s 
health and safety to a much greater degree than what would 
be required of non-disabled parents. I practiced changing 
diapers on stuffed animals and lifting bags of flour in and 
out of our adapted crib because we believed that it was 
not a question of if child services would be called on us, 
but when. We knew that all of our racial, educational, and 
economic privilege would not protect us from the hostility 
directed toward disabled parents. 
While this fear has not yet been realized almost four years 
into our parenting journey, it was certainly not unfounded. 
In the United States, there is a long history of violence 
against disabled parents, especially disabled mothers, 
beginning with the eugenics movement and its emphasis 
on forced sterilization to prevent disabled people from 
becoming parents in the first place.4 These same attitudes 
toward parenting with a disability are now expressed 
via discrimination in access to advanced reproductive 
technologies and child custody,5 which has been our 
greatest fear. 
In a way, an analysis of the inspiration porn associated with 
parenting, specifically, may be what is needed to illuminate 
exactly what is so problematic about inspiration porn 
more generally. In my view, inspiration porn is not merely 
offensive, but it is dangerous. As Stella Young suggests, it 
is an expression of the statement, “Well, however bad my 
life is, it could be worse. I could be that person.” However, 
it seems to be more than that. It is also an expression of 
the statement, “If you fail to accomplish this mundane 
task in a way that we approve of, you will be subject to 
disproportionate ridicule, censure, control, and, if the 
stakes are high enough, punishment.” 
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NOTES 
1.	 Stella Young, “Why the Lie We’ve Been Sold about Disability Is 
the Greatest Injustice,” https://ollibean.com/the-lie/ (accessed 
January 13, 2020). 
2.	 Anita Silvers, “Formal Justice,” in Disability, Difference, 
Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and 
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Carolina: Duke University Press, 2017). 
5.	 For a detailed discussion that situates current discrimination 
against disabled parents in historical precedent, see National 
Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of 
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(Philosophizing about) Gender-Open 
Children 
Saray Ayala-López 
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO 
I’m at the playground with my baby, and a smiling adult 
inquires, “Is it a boy or a girl?” Scientific studies show 
that if I say X, they will see my baby as doing A, being A, 
feeling A—versus if I say Y.1 They’ll likely make different 
assumptions about whether my baby is able to climb up the 
playground structures and sit without support, and they’ll 
encourage my baby to engage in different activities.2 And 
of course, they’ll respond to them differently depending 
on whether they think the baby is a boy or a girl. What do 
I do if I don’t want that to happen? One way to respond 
to the question is not to reveal the gender, or rather, to 
reject the assumption that my baby already has a gender, 
which is arguably a weird move, breaking out of a smoothly 
functioning, well-oiled social exchange. Here I want to talk 
about this weird move: How weird it is? What are some of 
the reasons to make the move anyway, and what are some 
of the concerns? 
Gender-open children are children who are not assigned 
a specific gender at birth. When caring for a gender-open 
baby, you don’t use binary gender pronouns (like “she” or 
“he”) to refer to them (you can use, for example, “they” 
singular), and you introduce your baby as a human who 
doesn’t have a gender yet. The best way to protect the 
baby from being treated and perceived according to the 
gender binary (as either a girl or a boy) is not to reveal 
their genital status, which is commonly taken to be critical 
in the determination of sex and to be straightforwardly 
associated with their gender. This can be done to different 
degrees, depending on the specific family and social 
context. When thinking about gender-open children, I see 
three conceptual spaces to philosophize: the space of 
parents; the space of children; and, finally, the space of 
those who theorize about gender-open children. Let’s start 
with the parents. 
1. PARENTS 
In this section I explore three different questions around 
the decision to raise a gender-open child. 
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1.1. ACTIVISM OLYMPICS 
When I first put together my plan of having a baby and 
thought about the issue of gender, my first thought was 
“I would like gender to have no role in the baby’s life— 
to the extent that I can control this—until they themselves 
can decide how much gender they want in their life, and 
what kind of gender.” Later, I discovered that gender-open 
parenting is actually a thing. Just like attachment parenting, 
and many other parenting styles that surround any parent, 
like a nightmare landscape full of high-stakes choices. And 
pretty much any choice brings about social judgments and 
the accompanying consequences. 
On the one hand, gender-open parenting being a thing 
makes it easier to explain it to relatives, friends, and 
strangers, as you constantly face the question, “Is it a 
boy or a girl?” When I respond: “I’m doing gender-open 
parenting” people assent, often with a poker face, and the 
conversation ends there. The power of a label! Whether or 
not they understand what it means, they understand that it 
is a thing, and its metaphysical, if totally mysterious, weight 
gives everyone at least a sense that the question about the 
baby’s gender has been answered, even if not in the way 
that they had expected. When I try the long explanation 
instead, it almost never works out, and we all leave the 
conversation frustrated. An additional merit of gender-
open parenting is the very fact of naming this practice. 
After learning the notion of hermeneutical injustice, and/or 
experiencing hermeneutical injustice yourself, you come to 
very much appreciate new concepts that fill the conceptual 
gaps around marginalized identities, their experiences, 
and the practices that are relevant for them. Instead of the 
perhaps vague thought I mentioned above (“I would like 
gender to have no role in the baby’s life—to the extent 
that I can control this—until they themselves can decide 
how much gender they want in their life, and what kind of 
gender”), I can straightforwardly say, “I’m doing gender-
open parenting. This is what I want for my child,” perhaps 
modifying with this labeling my own understanding of what 
I’m doing.3 This label also makes it easier to find other 
parents and caregivers who are approaching their child’s 
gender in a similar way. 
On the other hand, however, this label makes me cautious, 
because it puts the focus on the parents. And even though 
this couldn’t be otherwise (the baby is not the one who can 
decide whether or not to be assigned a gender at birth), I 
want to make sure this doesn’t become one of my lifestyle 
garments, like the fair-trade organic tea I consume, or 
the rainbow pin button I wear on my blazer. The specific 
question that concerns me is this: Is gender-open parenting 
a way for parents to expand their activism (perhaps, at the 
expense of their children)? 
According to what I will call the Activism Olympics 
objection, gender-open parenting is yet another way, 
a pretty fashionable one, for someone to exercise their 
activism. While activism is okay, it seems that in this case, 
there might be something objectionable: Are we using our 
children as part of our activism gear? Are we doing this not 
for their own good, but for our own personal betterment 
and/or virtue signaling? My decision to raise my child 
gender open is not alien to my ideas about what makes 
a better society, in particular, the ideas I have developed 
about gender and sex after several years of researching 
them. These ideas are the result of roughly four elements: 
first, the many empirical studies I’ve read and discussed 
about how the gender binary influences (often in very 
negative ways) our treatment of babies and children; 
second, my following the debates on the sad history (and 
present!) of the “science of sex differences”; third, the 
discussions and brainstorming sessions I have shared with 
philosophers and non-philosophers on the two elements 
above; and, finally, my own personal experience of gender 
identity. 
It seems that having spent time thinking about gender 
and having strong ideas (and feelings) about it makes 
my parenting decision more vulnerable to the Activism 
Olympics objection. I do object to the gender binary, and 
I believe that people would be happier if freed from it. 
Raising a gender-open child sounds like a practical way 
of fighting against the gender binary, more eloquent than 
any paper I could ever write. But would the opposite (i.e., 
not having spent time thinking about gender, not having 
strong ideas about it) make my parenting decision less 
objectionable? It seems like an absurd result: the less 
involved you are intellectually, morally, and politically in 
this parenting decision, the less controversial it would be. 
To avoid the Activism Olympics objection, we need to find 
a different avenue: a possible way out of this objection is 
finding a place where we can raise our children according 
to our values, and this is not necessarily using them as 
instruments for our own betterment. 
By taking this route, we are then confronted with the 
general question of whether it is ok to instill your values 
in your children. Raising my child gender open does not 
only consist of not assigning them a binary gender at 
birth. It is also about how I’ll talk to them about gender as 
they grow up, or how the characters in the tales I read to 
them interact and are referred to. That is, my child is being 
exposed to a set of ideas around gender, and in general, 
to a view of personal identity and personal relationships 
that is not determined and ruled by the dominant binary 
gender schema. Thus, I’m definitely trying to instill this 
more flexible view of gender and identity in my child. 
If we decide that instilling your own values in your children 
is not a good practice, or needs independent justification 
(e.g., an argument that those values are good), then gender 
open parenting would need an additional defense, but 
the same could be said of raising children in the gender 
binary, which people commonly do. Being the default 
option doesn’t make binary-gender parenting value-
neutral. Assigning babies a binary gender at birth and 
treating them, more or less intentionally, according to that 
gender, reveals a specific set of values (e.g., about what 
gender is and should be, what is best for the child, and 
how society is best organized). Someone could say that the 
fact that most people endorse those values and instill them 
into their children is already a good reason in favor of this 
default practice. But default options, as tempting as they 
are to our often lazy minds, need not be the best. They 
can even be detrimental to our well-being (there are plenty 
of examples in our history of default options that we now 
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acknowledge as detrimental to everyone involved, such 
as embracing slavery or opposing interracial marriage). 
In order to conclude anything about the goodness of the 
set of values surrounding the default practice of gender 
assignment at birth, we need independent reasons other 
than the sheer number of people doing it. I leave it for a 
different place to discuss what set of values is preferable. 
1.2. FREE THE CHILDREN 
We could say that when someone decides to raise their 
child gender open, they are doing it for the child’s benefit, 
so that the child can flourish without the limitations 
imposed by the dominant gender norms. But can we be 
sure that being raised gender open is good for the child? 
How is not being assigned a (binary) gender good? One 
quick answer is that at a minimum, it doesn’t have the 
negative consequences that assigning a binary gender has. 
You just need to glance at the studies on how the assigned 
(binary) gender of children mediates our perception of 
them (and their perceptions of themselves), to the extent 
of making us see different things depending on the gender 
we believe a child has (see references above). If you look 
at teenagers, and at your own teenage years, it’s easy 
to see how expectations for the specific gender you are 
assigned (whether or not you identify with it) can make you 
miserable, from not having the perfect body shape, to not 
having the right talents. 
However, this response leaves unanswered the question 
of whether the absence of an assigned gender at birth 
has problems of its own. One common objection in 
this regard is what I call the Missing Identity objection, 
according to which gender-open children are missing a 
critical element to build their identities.4 Gender is very 
important to developing our identity, the reasoning goes, 
and gender-open children are being deprived of that. This 
objection has several problems. First of all, it misinterprets 
what raising a child gender open is: gender-open children 
are not being deprived of a gender identity. Rather, they 
simply do not have one imposed upon them, and are left 
free to pick one whenever they are ready, and change it as 
many times as they feel like. Moreover, it might be the case 
that eventually they do choose a gender within the binary. 
The difference is that it was a choice and specifically, their
choice. Second, it assumes several problematic things: (i) 
that the gender binary is universal, as if all societies are 
organized according to this Western binary; (ii) that identity 
has to be necessarily mediated by this binary gender; and 
(iii) that reproductive capacities determine our identity, 
via determining our gender. Gender is essential to our 
identity, the reasoning goes, because it connects us to our 
communities by placing us in specific social roles, it gives 
us a place within that society, one that has to do with our 
anatomy, in particular our reproductive capacities. In sum, 
this reasoning assumes a Western, binary and cis status 
quo, spiced up with an essentialist view of gender. I won’t 
argue against any of those assumptions here; there are 
wonderful works out there doing that already. The take-
home message I would like to underscore is that gender-
open parenting does not deny the importance of gender 
as a dimension of identity, nor does it deprive children of 
it (or foreclose the possibility that one day the child might 
choose to embrace a gender within the binary); but rather, 
it calls into question those specific assumptions mentioned 
above. It contests the idea that in order to flourish as a 
person you need to give a very specific value to the 
dimension of gender, according to a strict, binary and very 
old set of norms. 
Besides the above-mentioned problems, behind the Missing 
Identity objection seems to lurk the fear that if children are 
not assigned a gender at birth, then they might not grow 
into a stable binary gender identity. Instead, they might 
identify as non-binary, or who knows what. In response to 
this concern, first, another clarification is in order: raising a 
child gender open is not imposing upon them a non-binary 
gender identity. Rather, the idea is to free them from any 
imposed gender identity, until they have the knowledge 
and experiences to decide for themselves, in the same 
way they decide about other features of their identities. 
These children will grow up to identify in whatever way 
works for them, within or outside the binary, in a more 
or less fluid way. Second, this concern betrays a plain 
rejection of non-binary identities: Why are we assuming 
that only a stable binary gender identity is the right kind of 
identity? A different argument is needed here to arrive at 
the conclusion that non-binary identities are problematic. 
There are some arguments out there concluding that non-
binary identities are not real.5 For example, someone might 
have a social-position account of gender and conclude that 
there is no non-binariness, for when you look at how our 
societies are structured and normed, the reasoning goes, 
there is no place for non-binariness; that is, non-binariness 
is not a social position in the way that binary genders are; 
therefore, by definition, it doesn’t exist. 
There are at least three ways to respond to this reasoning. 
First, we can advocate for an account of gender that is not 
exclusively based on social position, but which also includes 
self-identification.6 With this other account in hand, a lack 
of nonbinariness as a social location does not invalidate 
non-binary gender identities, as the latter does not hinge 
on the former. Second, we can argue, with Bettcher, that 
mainstream social practices around gender are not the only 
ones in town.7 Instead, there are what she calls subaltern 
cultural practices around sex and gender that validate non-
mainstream gender identity claims. In Bettcher’s proposal, 
as long as there are cultural practices around gender, even 
if in minority, resistant spaces, gender identity claims get 
validated. Third, we can expand Bettcher’s proposal and 
say that in order to validate a gender identity, established 
(even if in minority spaces) cultural practices are not 
necessary. While a (subaltern) cultural practice expands 
and supports individual patterns of resistance and efforts at 
identity-construction, a wholesale culture (e.g., practices, 
collectively shared concepts), even if subaltern, is not 
necessary to validate experiences that build identities.8 
For example, someone might develop inchoate resistant 
concepts for their experiences in conversations with a 
close friend, in the absence of a collectively acknowledged 
space for those experiences. An interlocutor who listens 
and makes the effort to understand9 in the way prescribed 
by Medina could be enough to validate those experiences 
as identity-building.10 
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In this section, I explore the following question: How are 
gender-open children contesting dominant gender norms? 
I think gender-open children are contesting the gender 
binary, and dominant gender norms more generally, in a 
new way. Although I identified the space of children as 
a separate space to reflect upon, when thinking about 
how gender-open children might contest dominant 
gender norms it is clear that at least for their first years, 
if we require some sort of intention for contestation to 
happen, then it is the child’s parents and/or caregivers who 
contest these norms, not the child themselves. Perhaps a 
better way to articulate this inquiry into how gender-open 
children contest dominant gender norms would be this: 
What are gender-open children inviting us to do differently 
(in relation to dominant gender norms)? 
Gender-open children invite us to rethink dominant ideas 
and practices about gender. Here I focus on one of them, 
the Gender Disclosure norm. According to this norm, we 
owe it to society to disclose our gender. Not doing so 
means failing to play by the rules. It’s like not respecting 
the turn taking in a conversation or randomly changing the 
topic: you are breaking norms that help coordinate social 
behavior. Not disclosing your gender prevents others from 
treating you appropriately, for they won’t know how. It 
causes confusion. Moreover, the expectation is not only 
that everyone discloses their gender, but also, that we do 
it correctly, unless we want to deceive others. Trans folks 
are often accused of deceiving, because they might signal 
a gender that is, according to dominant gender norms, 
not the correct one. For Talia Bettcher, the normalized 
practice is about disclosing your sex (or rather, your genital 
status, which plays a crucial role in determining one’s sex 
in our cultural practices), and this disclosure happens by 
marking your gender appropriately (“appropriately” here 
works under the assumption that there is a straightforward 
relationship between one’s sex and one’s gender). In her 
words, “Gender presentation literally signifies physical 
sex.”11 
Marilyn Frye writes that this compulsory disclosure comes 
with an associated urgent need “to know or be able to 
guess the sex of every single person with whom one has 
the slightest or most remote contact or interaction.”12 This 
need to know becomes intensely apparent when you care 
for a gender-open baby. I remember a friend expressing 
their frustration with exactly those words after repeatedly 
asking for the baby’s gender: “But I need to know.” This 
need might start fading as soon as you make the effort to 
pause and reflect on what you need that information for. In 
the case of babies, this pause should be enough to realize 
you actually don’t need that information. 
There is a decision tree guide cartoon, “How to tell if a toy is 
for boys or girls: A guide.”13 It consists of only one question: 
“Do you operate the toy with your genitalia?” If yes, it’s not 
for kids. If no, it’s for either boys or girls. And, I would add, 
for those who are neither. Somehow, this simplicity ends up 
lost on us. We panic, as did the owner of a shoe store in my 
hometown. An old family friend, the store owner decided 
to give my baby a gift: a pair of sandals. The owner headed 
for the shelves but stopped dead in tracks: “But . . . I don’t 
know which color.” The owner stared at us, paralyzed in the 
middle of the shop, with shelves of sparkling pink shoes 
shining in the background, as if desperately trying to entice 
all of us away from our resistant attitude. My sibling came to 
the rescue, casual and effective: “What about yellow, white, 
red, green, orange, or black? There are many colors.” The 
shoe store owner came back to life from what had looked 
like a spell: “Oh, of course.” With contented expression, the 
owner handed us a pair of tiny white sandals.14 The shoes 
were for the feet—baby girls’ feet, baby boys’ feet, or 
gender-open-babies’ feet, and be they white, yellow, blue, 
or green, they all get pulled off, chewed on, and thrown out 
of the stroller for the fun of watching your parent pick them 
up, over and over again—but that’s a whole other story. 
The shoe store owner was not an outlier in feeling at a loss 
for a moment. In societies like the one I’m writing from, 
there are two different scripts that track perceived sex/ 
gender. “[I]n everything one does,” Frye writes, “one has 
two complete repertoires of behavior, one for interactions 
with women and one for interactions with men. Greeting, 
storytelling, order-giving and order-receiving, negotiating, 
gesturing deference or dominance, encouraging, 
challenging, asking for information: one does all of these 
things differently depending upon whether the relevant 
others are male of female.”15 
Gender-open children do not conform to the Gender 
Disclosure norm, providing an opportunity to reflect on 
it. And they invite us to embrace the dissonance of not 
knowing what script to follow, and to be creative. However, 
gender-open children are not necessarily promises of 
annihilation of the gender binary. When they grow up 
and start making decisions about their gender identity, 
they might contest the gender binary and other dominant 
gender norms, or they might end up endorsing (some or 
maybe even all of) them. If my child ends up embracing a 
binary gender identity, and one that has been traditionally 
associated with the way the hospital sexed their body when 
they were born, I will not take that as a defeat. Any outcome 
that stems from my child’s freedom will be a success and 
the very goal of this entire endeavor. 
3. THOSE WHO PHILOSOPHIZE ABOUT GENDER­
OPEN CHILDREN 
As a feminist philosopher who has worked on sex and 
gender, raising a gender-open child is a tasty topic to 
philosophize about. Here I am, after all, writing this piece 
on gender-open children. 
As I wrote above, my decision to raise my child gender 
open is not alien to the work I’ve done on sex and gender. 
While being related to my work seems to give my parenting 
decision a sort of academic halo, I want to make sure this 
halo doesn’t reach too far. I want to make sure that I keep 
my theorizing in check. Let me explain my concerns. 
When philosophizing about gender-open children, I set a 
warning to myself: I should make sure my mental gymnastics 
take into account that I’m talking about a specific person 
(my child) and real people in general, people who, in this 
case, are not in a position to speak for themselves, but 
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who will be at some point. When theorizing about other 
people’s identities, I see that an ethical commitment is 
required. They are not tables, propositions, or hypothetical 
aliens. This ethical commitment is, interestingly, nothing 
extraordinary to ask for. 
Having a research ethics is not, at least it is not intended 
to be, a limit on the sort of conclusions we can arrive at, 
given the facts. It’s rather about the way we proceed in our 
research, the values that guide our inquiry, and the goals 
we set for it. This is just the paraphernalia that accompanies 
any scientific inquiry. A research ethics for theorizing about 
other people’s identities invites us to reflect, as individual 
researchers and as a society, on why we are interested in 
researching the questions we do. This applies to science 
generally. We don’t do science on everything. Not all 
possible questions are investigated, not even all reasonable 
questions. Only those that bear on something we are 
worried about, something we are interested. For example, 
there are many scientific studies comparing cognitive 
capacities of humans and chimpanzees, but we are a lot 
less concerned with comparing cognitive lives of turtles 
and tortoises. The same happens in philosophy. It’s only 
the overly optimistic or, perhaps rather, vain philosophers 
who think that there is no actual limit to the questions that 
philosophy can explore. There are limits to philosophy: 
the limit is set by our interests, our concerns, our desires, 
and available resources. Every once in a while, we should 
wonder why we inquire into the questions we do (again, as 
individuals and as a society). This meta-inquiry can reveal a 
lot about the very issues we are investigating. 
Take, for example, the so-called “science of sex differences”: 
Why does it never lose its sexiness? Why do we keep 
producing studies about sex differences? Asking this 
question can tell us more interesting things than perhaps 
any single study within it. Perhaps we are obsessed with 
sex differences for reasons that are independent of how 
many differences there actually are and what their origin 
is. Similar things can be said about studies on racial 
differences. There are those who see in this meta-question 
a threat to freedom, and a desperate attempt at hiding ugly 
truths. “Let science be science,” they say as a response. 
But, as feminist philosophers of science have been arguing 
for decades, science is not something that happens 
independently of (communities of) scientists who work 
within specific social contexts. Whatever the “science” in 
“let science be science” is, it is already inevitably shaped 
by interests, values, and fears of our society. So we are 
letting it be science, while also being mindful of the 
choices that shape it, typically hidden beyond awareness 
of the scientific community and the consumers of science. 
A healthy reflection on our interest in sex and race can go a 
long way in helping us understand those very notions, and 
provide us with some perspective on our inquiries. Why 
are we interested? What is our goal when pursuing those 
studies? 
Interestingly, philosophical debates always include 
some self-reference questioning, for example, about 
the importance of the debate at issue. So philosophy is 
plagued with questions about the significance of the very 
philosophical inquiries we engage in, and about the goals 
and purposes of our inquiry. Thus, it is far from radical to 
ask philosophers, when engaging in philosophizing about 
other people’s identities, to take the time to reflect about 
the interests guiding their theorizing, and the purposes 
of their inquiry. This reflection can be humbling, as you 
might come to realize that what you thought was pure, 
neutral, and objective theorizing (whatever that means), 
stems from very specific commitments about what those 
identities must be; that it is not by natural law that only 
certain identities are up for questioning, but by our own 
contingent social norms. That what you thought was a 
purely innocent and definitely enriching new addition 
to the marketplace of ideas is actually another way of 
enforcing, if in new elaborate jargon, the same old ideas 
about how things should be. Would there be gender wars 
if our societies had different values about what gender 
should be? It’s not a war about the facts, it’s about values. 
Summing up: I call for a research ethics when philosophizing, 
especially when philosophizing about other peoples’ 
identities. First, this does not mean putting a limit to an 
actual limitless philosophy. Philosophy has limits. It is not, 
and never was, free of our values and fears, and these set 
the limits. Second, a research ethics keeps us in touch with 
those values and fears, and this will enrich our inquiry and 
make us more responsible researchers. Thus, I propose the 
following ethical avowal: 
when philosophizing about other people’s
identities, I will have ethical principles guiding my
inquiry, and I will use these principles as I reflect on
my interest on the subject matter, the goals of my
inquiry (e.g., Why am I interested in this? What do
I want to attain with my research?), and the way I
proceed in my research. This does not imply that my
philosophizing will be spoiled or coerced towards
specific positions. It means I will examine my
subject matter not from an impossibly abstract and
supposedly neutral armchair, but acknowledging
and being transparent about the values that are
guiding my inquiry in more or less implicit ways. 
I commit to philosophize about gender-open children 
guided by this research ethics. 
My child will grow up, and I hope they won’t have to see me 
engaged in philosophical debates about the authenticity of 
their gender identity. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Both the theory and practice of gender-open parenting 
are complicated. Lots of awkwardness in playgrounds and 
shoe stores, but also lots of wonderful discoveries as you 
see yourself and others creating new ways of interacting 
and categorizing. And definitely a very attractive topic for 
discussion for those of us professionally and personally 
interested in gender. The well-being of real human 
individuals is at stake, sometimes clashing against the 
value of uprooting problematic social patterns. We can 
tread through it in a sensitive and reasonable manner, 
keeping in check our biases and self-promoting needs, 
and embracing the challenge to both our theories and our 
imagination. 
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Thank you, Nadya Vasilyeva, for this learning and loving adventure. I’m 
grateful to Lauren Freeman for encouraging me to write this piece, and 
for making that process easier with her comments and suggestions. 
NOTES 
1.	 See Condry and Condry, “Sex Differences: A Study of the Eye of 
the Beholder”; Burnham and Harris, “Effects of Real Gender and 
Labeled Gender on Adults’ Perceptions of Infants.” 
2.	 See Fausto-Sterling, Lamarre, and Coll, Sexing the Baby: Part 1— 
What Do We Really Know about Sex Differentiation in the First 
Three Years of Life?” for a review of relevant research. 
3.	 Hacking, “Making Up People.” 
4.	 See, for example, the opinion expressed here by psychotherapist 
Fran Walfish: https://www.parents.com/parenting/should-you­
raise-a-gender-neutral-baby/. 
5.	 See Ayala-López, “Gender Hallucinations: Non-Binary Identities 
and Social Positions,” for references. 
6.	 Jenkins, “Towards an Account of Gender Identity.” 
7.	 Bettcher, “Trans Identities and First-Person Authority.” 
8.	 Ayala-López, “Gender Hallucinations.” 
9.	 By having an open mind and utilizing hermeneutical resources to 
interpret the speaker alternative to the mainstream structurally 
prejudiced ones, this interlocutor would avoid committing what 
Dotson calls contributory injustice (Dotson, “A Cautionary Tale: 
On Limiting Epistemic Oppression”). 
10. Medina, 	The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial 
Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination. 
11. Bettcher, “Trans Identities and First-Person Authority,” 105. 
12. Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, 22. 
13.	 From Jezebel: A Supposedly Feminist Website. https://jezebel. 
com/how-to-tell-if-a-toy-is-for-boys-or-for-girls-494034840. 
14.	 In relation to this paralysis when meeting a person of whom you
cannot guess their sex, Frye writes: “Of course the paralysis does
not last. One is rescued by one’s ingenuity and good will; one can
invent a way to behave as one says ‘How do you do?’ to a human
being. But the habitual ways are not for humans: they are one way
for women and another for men” (The Politics of Reality, 20). 
15. Frye, The Politics of Reality, 20. 
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Taking Children’s Autonomy Seriously as 
a Parent 
Quill Rebecca Kukla 
KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 
My research tends to be rather egocentric; I write about
what I am experiencing and passionate about in the
moment. Fifteen to twenty years ago, my research revolved
around the culture of pregnancy and infant care. Now, with
my eighteen-year-old child having freshly moved away
from home to launch their adult life, I spend a lot of time
thinking about the culture of parenting older children as
they transition into adult people. I argued in Mass Hysteria
(2005) that we labored under a damaging cultural myth that
equated good mothering with an erasure of the boundaries
between mother and infant. Lately I’ve been thinking about
a different kind of agency- and boundary-obliterating
parenting mythology. I think that we fundamentally fail to
respect the basic autonomy rights that children have as
people, and indeed that we equate “good parenting” with
severe violations of these autonomy rights. We accept and
even approve of subjugating children to their parents’ will
in ways that would be shocking if enacted against other
sorts of people. Here I want to argue—in provisional, overly
sweeping terms—for a radical reorientation of how we think
about children’s autonomy and parents’ duties to enable
and respect it. This essay has a bit of a manifesto-like feel
to it, and I recognize that each of my claims requires more
argument, and that I’ve left a great number of important
details unaddressed. My goal is to display what I take to
be something deeply morally wrong with how we picture
parenting and its goals, and to offer up a different framework. 
My moral starting point is that children are people. Not 
partial people, or on-their-way-to-being people, but people. 
Like many people, their competence and skills are limited, 
and they are dependent on others in various distinctive 
ways, but this is no compromise of their moral personhood 
whatsoever. And yet it is routine that we disregard the 
basic personhood and moral dignity of children in ways 
that would be clearly unacceptable for almost any other 
group. For instance, it is common for well-educated, 
progressive people to say, almost proudly, that they “don’t 
like children,” which we would simply never say about any 
other category of people. These same people would be 
horrified by someone claiming that they just “don’t like 
Hispanics” or “don’t like lesbians” or whatever it may be. 
Children are people; how could it be acceptable to dislike 
them based on their demographic group membership? 
Moreover, there is good evidence that children’s testimony 
is routinely discounted, and that they are treated as less 
reliable reporters than they are, without anyone feeling the 
need to give evidence for this discounting.1 We gaslight 
children by insisting that incomprehensible things such 
as Santa Claus are real and then lie directly when they 
question us, and think it’s cute when they believe our lies. 
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More directly to the point, we restrict where children can 
go and what they can do even when there is no evidence-
based argument for doing so. We make decisions about 
which hobbies they will have, which friends they can have, 
which relatives they will hug. Basically, we violate all of the 
ground-level rules we normally recognize for how to treat 
people as self-determining agents with dignity. 
As people, children’s autonomy rights—which for my 
purposes broadly include their rights to self-determination, 
privacy, dignity, and freedom from subjugation—are as 
strong and as central to their flourishing as anyone else’s. 
I want to take it as a starting point that, especially given 
our position of power and children’s vulnerability, one of 
our core moral tasks as a parent is to enhance and protect 
our children’s autonomy as much as possible. But in fact, 
cultural parenting norms push in almost the opposite 
direction. Not only do we routinely and grotesquely violate 
children’s self-determination and privacy—restricting their 
mobility, their choices of activity, their speech, their dress, 
and much more—but we associate “good parenting” with 
these kinds of violations, judging other parents who refrain 
from them as irresponsible or uncaring. What justifies 
these violations? I think that there are two undergirding 
ideologies here, both of which are deeply morally wrong. 
The first is the idea that children are not full people with 
normal autonomy rights because they are less competent 
and more dependent on others for care and support than 
are (most) adults. But surely if we have learned anything 
from listening to disability theorists and bioethicists who 
think about competence, it is that independence is not a 
requirement for moral personhood; indeed, fluctuating 
dependency is a part of the human condition. The moral ideal 
is that we scaffold the agency of those who are dependent, 
and support those with less than full competence, so that 
they can express their autonomy as much as possible. 
Certainly, outside of the domain of childhood, we do 
not think that we have the right to subjugate, coerce, or 
gaslight those who are dependent on us or those who 
need help with competence. Our moral task, as Hilde 
Lindemann so beautifully puts it in Holding and Letting Go, 
is to hold others in personhood when they are vulnerable 
and dependent, not to co-opt their personhood.2 
Parents have immense power over children, because 
children cannot afford basic necessities or protect their 
safety without us. Many parents think that it is obvious that 
with this power comes the right to restrict our children’s 
mobility and their choices, and to subjugate them to our 
will and vision. But quite the opposite seems right to me. 
Precisely because children are vulnerable and dependent 
on us in this way, we should be extra careful not to abuse our 
power. Just as a dissertation adviser needs to go especially 
out of her way to protect the autonomy of her student 
because of the power differential between them, the power 
imbalance gives parents extra reasons to be careful not to 
violate their children’s autonomy. Similarly, decent people 
think that it’s especially demeaning and violating to tell 
those who depend on government assistance programs 
how to spend their money or their time, or to subject them 
to special surveillance. Children’s economic dependence 
on their parents in no way licenses us using our economic 
power against them as a tool of lifestyle control. Our 
children’s dependence on us is something that ought to 
make us more concerned about protecting and enabling 
their fragile autonomy, privacy, and dignity, not less. 
The second undergirding ideology is that it’s parents’ right, 
and indeed their responsibility, to create a specific kind 
of person. Indeed, it is deeply woven into our productivity 
culture that we treat children as products—as things that 
we craft—and that we measure our own success by how 
well we create what we set out to create, regardless of 
how we got there. Coercion, regulation, and surveillance 
are acceptable and even expected as tools for creating 
these products. I think this idea penetrates deeply into our 
imagination of what reproduction is all about. When we 
reproduce, we are not just creating a biological entity, but 
also reproducing families, communities, and generations. 
It makes sense that we want to create good people who 
live by values and make contributions that we admire. It is 
a small step from there to feeling like we have the right to 
demand that our child turns into a certain kind of person, 
or to take coercive and manipulative steps to make them 
be one. When it comes to parenting, the ends are almost 
always used to justify the means: We almost axiomatically 
treat a parenting method as “good” and worth emulating 
if it contributes to creating “successful” people (whatever 
our standards are for that). 
For example, arguments against physically assaulting 
children (or “corporal punishment,” as it is euphemistically 
known) generally proceed without pause by arguing that 
assaulting them makes them turn out less well in the 
end. It seems to me, though, that the argument against 
corporal punishment is that assaulting people is wrong. 
It is completely unnecessary for me to know anything at 
all about the long-term outcomes from assaulting children 
in order for me to condemn the morality of the practice. 
This is an extreme case, but similarly, as a culture we push 
back (rather gently) against “tiger moms” and “helicopter 
parents” by arguing that they supposedly produce adults 
with insufficient grit or creativity or whatever, not by 
directly saying that controlling other people and invading 
their privacy is wrong. But children are not products; their 
quality is not a measure of our parenting success. They 
are people. We don’t get to use force or manipulation 
or autonomy restrictions to help determine what kind of 
people they will be, because doing that to other people is 
wrong, simpliciter. 
In contrast to these two ideologies, I think that we ought 
to enable and protect children’s autonomy however we 
can, and to make incursions into it only when absolutely 
necessary, and then only in ways driven by good-quality 
reasons and evidence. We are, I think, morally obliged to 
parent by way of what I think of as a “minimal restriction” 
and a “minimum invasion” principle, according to which we 
curtail children’s self-determination and invade their privacy 
to the minimum extent possible. The two legitimate reasons 
why as parents we do sometimes need to compromise our 
children’s autonomy are:(1) when we are directly protecting 
them from a clear and present danger, because they are 
not able to keep themselves safe, and (2) when exercising 
their autonomy would directly and substantially diminish 
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the autonomy or the well-being of other people, notably 
including other people with whom they are living and must 
coordinate and cooperate (we parents included).3 
Of course, when children are very young, these two 
conditions will kick in a lot, and there will have to be many 
incursions into their autonomy indeed. A three-year-old is 
routinely not in a good position to make safe choices about 
where to go and what to do, and they are typically terrible at 
cooperating, taking others’ needs into account, and making 
reasonable demands. All the same, my least-restriction and 
minimum-invasion principles apply to young children as 
well; it’s just that the “least” and the “minimum” will be 
quite high. Though we will often have to compromise their 
autonomy or privacy, we are not justified in doing so just 
because it is more convenient for us, or because we want 
them to be a certain kind of person, or because we wish 
they had different desires than they have. For instance, the 
principles definitively rule out ever making a young child 
kiss or hug a relative (or anyone else) they don’t want to, 
regardless of whether it hurts the person’s feelings not to, 
and regardless of whether it is socially expected that they 
will. It rules out making them play any game, or have any 
friend, or pursue any hobby against their will. It rules out 
forced audience participation and forced birthday party 
attendance. It definitely rules out forced food consumption, 
unless there is a present medical danger that necessitates 
that they ingest something. These are all routine coercions 
that we enact upon the bodies of young children, which 
neither protect their safety in an evidence-based way nor 
protect the substantive autonomy or well-being of other 
people. That we think that a child will turn out better in the 
long run if they do these things cannot speak against moral 
principles as serious as those of respecting the autonomy 
and privacy of other people. 
The situation becomes more interesting, I think, when we 
turn to older children—pre-teens and teens, who are able to 
go places on their own, and can form sophisticated goals, 
relationships, tastes, and preferences, and who understand 
the basic rules of how to stay safe, and the basic principles 
of what is and isn’t a viable plan (that is, they are unlikely to 
demand that you turn them into a dinosaur). At this point, 
it seems to me, coercively restricting, monitoring, and 
controlling children beyond what is needed to keep them 
safe and to ensure that they are not harming others is both 
extraordinarily common, and wrong. People should have 
basic rights of mobility and of self-determination when 
it comes to where they go; which avocational skills they 
develop; how they dress; who they spend their time with; 
what they play, watch, and read;4 who they touch and how; 
what they eat; and more. These rights are core components 
of people’s autonomy and privacy. 
It is parents’ responsibility to teach their children early 
about how to stay safe, how to reason about risk, and 
generally how to make good choices, through discussion 
and example. But once a child has these competencies, it 
is a violation of their privacy and autonomy to monitor and 
restrict their movements and relations. For example, once 
children are competent at finding their way home and at 
using a phone to get help if needed, it is, I believe, none 
of parents’ business where they go or who they spend 
their time with, when they are not at school or meeting 
family responsibilities. Parents widely and unquestioningly 
assume that they have the right to this information, but 
I simply don’t understand what the basis of that right 
could be. Controlling and surveilling people’s motion and 
relationships is a deep form of subjugation, and children 
are people. Some parents will object that it would be awful 
to be completely cut off from their child’s life in this way. 
But this betrays the assumption that your child will talk to 
you about their life and their day only under coercive threat, 
and if that is true, then parenting has already derailed. 
Normal, free people who live together and are intimately 
connected voluntarily keep one another reasonably 
informed about their lives, but they don’t get to coercively 
control or monitor one another’s comings and goings. 
Similarly, and I am sure contentiously, I insist that once 
a parent is reasonably sure that their child has a good 
understanding of sexual safety and consent and the 
importance of each, it is none of parents’ business when 
or with whom their child decides to have sex. Precisely 
because we are responsible for enabling and protecting 
their autonomy, we are responsible for making sure they 
have this understanding as soon and as thoroughly as 
possible. But once they do, our role in their sexual decision-
making is over.5 People’s sexual lives and preferences are 
deeply private, and controlling or insisting upon surveilling 
someone’s sexual choices is seriously invasive, and 
children are people. 
I have acknowledged that parents can impose restrictions 
on adolescent and preadolescent children if they have 
good reasons to think that these restrictions are required 
to keep them safe, or if the restrictions are needed so that 
no one else is seriously harmed or restricted. In contrast, 
one factor that does not count as a morally legitimate 
reason to impose a restriction is that it will make the 
parent feel better or more comfortable, albeit not for 
any evidence-based reason. For example, many parents 
do not allow their children—especially girls—to be out 
alone after dark, because of fears of kidnapping or rape. 
But street kidnapping is an extraordinarily rare crime, and 
stranger rape is rare as well; in the United States, girls are 
at dramatically less risk of assault on the street than they 
are at school or at home. But we’ve created a moral panic 
that has served the specific purpose of restricting the 
mobility of girls and women. Parents who have internalized 
this panic, when confronted with the actual statistics, will 
often tell me that they know I am right about the objective 
risks, but that they will just “feel more comfortable” if their 
daughter isn’t out alone, perhaps because they don’t want 
to “imagine” what might happen. It seems to me like a 
paradigmatic example of a morally unjustified autonomy 
violation to restrict and control another person’s movement 
through public space for the sake of one’s own (admittedly 
irrational) psychological comfort. 
To a large extent, one person’s authority to restrict and 
surveille the basic mobility of another person always relies 
on implicit threats and fear. I think that by the time my 
child was in middle school, I had lost—or, better, divested 
myself of—the authority to tell them where to be, even if I 
had wanted to. If I had told them that they were grounded, 
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they would have just calmly disagreed. My child knew that 
I would never hurt them or stop supporting or protecting 
them even if they did something I did not want them to do, 
so there was no implicit threat to back up such a ruling on 
my part, and I am glad of that; this was an important sign of 
my child’s trust in me. 
Of course we do, in fact, have a legitimate interest in 
our children turning out to be good, happy people who 
contribute to the world in interesting and worthwhile 
ways. Many people also have an interest in raising children 
who will share their culture, be part of their community, 
and carry on their traditions. We raise our children in 
specific communities, surrounded by specific ways of 
life, modeling specific values and engaging in specific 
traditions. In the normal course of events, children will 
grow up at least somewhat identified with and shaped by 
these experiences. It is not only morally permissible but 
generally laudatory to expose our children to our values, 
inviting them to participate in our ways of life, and using 
rational persuasion to get them to make choices we think 
they should make as best we can. These are ways of 
showing respect for them as people and valued community 
members. 
But it is always possible that our children, given the freedom 
to do so, will reject part or all of their communities of origin 
and their values. (Of course, we run the risk that they will 
reject values and ways of life we care about eventually 
even if we do coerce them into conforming while they are 
children.) They may do this for reasons of personal taste, 
or because they have genuinely good reasons to critique 
these communities (for their homophobia, ethnocentrism, 
sex-shaming, or whatever it may be). This is just a risk we 
are stuck with accepting, as parents. One cannot morally 
impose an identity on someone by compulsion. In general, 
we find it morally abhorrent to keep people in a community 
and a way of life by force, and I see no reason why children 
should be an exception. We need to shape our children 
into people we are proud of, to the extent we can, via 
engagement, persuasion, collaboration, and presenting 
them with a way of life that is valuable and fulfilling, not by 
instituting a totalitarian regime in the home. 
Children differ widely in temperament, needs, skills 
development, and risk reasoning. The minimum necessary 
restrictions and incursions required by one child in one 
context may be very different from those required for 
another child in another context. But none of that variation 
defeats the fundamental moral principle for which I am 
urging here: Since children are people, it is our moral duty 
to restrict their autonomy and invade their privacy as little 
as possible. Just as we’ve built it into law that children are 
owed an education in a “least restrictive environment,” 
regardless of their needs and abilities, they have a moral 
right to no less in the home. Neither their dependence 
on us, nor their nascent competence, nor our power over 
them, nor our desire to “produce” a certain kind of person 
can undercut that duty. 
NOTES 
1.	 Tollefsen and Burroughs, “Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice 
and the Child.” 
2.	 Lindemann, Holding and Letting Go: The Social Practice of 
Personal Identities. 
3.	 Notice that I am only talking about parents’ incursions into 
their children’s autonomy and privacy; my focus on this paper 
is entirely on parenting. It is, of course, also true that children, 
like all people, are subject to laws and restrictions imposed 
by the state. I could write a separate paper on whether our 
laws regulating and restricting what children do are just and 
legitimate, but that issue is not my topic here. 
4.	 I do think there’s some complexity here if a child wants to 
consume something that is hateful, like a racist or misogynist 
game, because it is reasonable to not want actively hateful 
material in one’s house. I’m not sure exactly how to negotiate 
the line here. I always erred on the side of not restricting or 
disallowing anything and instead being very vocal in my critiques 
and encouraging a lot of discussion about why I objected to the 
thing and why my child enjoyed the thing. But I feel like my 
tolerance limits could have been reached if my child had picked 
awful enough material. 
5.	 Certainly, fathers don’t get to play the creepy culturally 
sanctioned game of delaying their daughter’s dating altogether 
via threats of violence against potential dates. 
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Parenting in Trauma 
Melissa Burchard 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ASHEVILLE 
The call for papers for this issue of the APA Newsletter on 
Feminism and Philosophy includes the hope that discussion 
on the many facets of parenting will be “important for many 
philosophers who have and who are thinking about having 
children.”1 I hope this too, and agree that it is likely that 
more discussion on parenting and childrearing is important 
for those engaged in these activities. However, I want 
to make a more ambitious claim than that—I want to say 
that serious discussion and engagement with issues of 
parenting and childrearing is important for philosophy, if 
we want to continue to assert that philosophy is important 
for understanding reality, the world we live in, and our 
experience. This is not a wholly original statement, of 
course, as a wealth of scholarly, philosophical engagement 
(including my own) with these topics over the last several 
decades shows.2 But my contention is perhaps more 
pointed than that the discussion is important: what I am 
saying is that for the sake of philosophy’s claims to be 
able to explain the world, philosophy needs to spend more 
time and effort thinking about the work of parenting, and 
understanding the development of children. 
I have arrived at this belief through a very difficult experience 
of childrearing. About fifteen years ago, my partner and I 
adopted two children from foster care, and over about the 
first year and a half with them, we began to understand just 
how much we did not know about the kind of parenting that 
we were going to have to do. As they began to feel safer, 
they began to disclose more of the effects of the neglect 
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and abuse they had experienced in their birth home and 
in the foster placements they had been in subsequent to 
being removed from that birth home. Although we do not 
know with certainty what that experience was, we know 
with significant clarity what many of the effects are, and 
they are severe. My experience in parenting, then, is the 
specific experience of parenting children who have been 
traumatized in multiple ways over an extended period of 
time. They were traumatized through the neglect of birth 
parents who were drug addicted, thus often under the 
influence of those drugs (and the evidence is clear that 
neglect has significant effects on infants and children), as 
well as through domestic violence in their birth home and 
direct physical and sexual abuse. They were nine and four 
years old when they came to live with us, which means 
that their formative years were spent in trauma-producing 
circumstances, such that whatever sense of self they had 
at that point had been, as trauma therapist Judith Herman 
puts it, “formed in and through trauma.”3 
As a parent, such an experience is generally not one that is 
hoped for. Although we had had extensive training through 
our adoption agency, and we understood (intellectually, at 
least) that the likelihood was very high that any children 
coming through the foster care system would have some 
level of traumatic effects to work through, we were still at 
times overwhelmed by the level and kinds of difficulties 
inherent in the task of parenting children with severe 
developmental trauma, as it is coming to be called.4 As 
a parent, I needed to do everything I could to try to help 
my wonderful, beloved, undeservedly harmed children 
recover. As a philosopher, my sense of needing to 
understand drove me to immerse myself in the study of 
trauma and trauma therapies. What I realized I needed, as 
a philosopher-mother, was a philosophy of trauma; what I 
discovered, of course, was that there was very little to be 
had. Although quite a lot was to be found in cultural studies, 
literary studies, and psychology, of course, only a very few 
brave pioneers in philosophy, such as Susan Brison,5 had 
published work on trauma. Under the impulse of necessity, 
I began to cobble together what I could of a philosophy of 
trauma, especially with regard to the developmental trauma 
of children who have been traumatized under circumstances 
like my children had: the prolonged and chronic trauma 
of having to live with the abusers; the betrayal trauma of 
being harmed by those who have the responsibility of 
your care and are supposed to love you; the loss of being 
forcibly removed from the only home you have ever known, 
together with the contradictory relief of escaping from that 
abusive home. In hopes that it will prove useful to other 
parents who might find themselves in somewhat similar 
circumstances (which, of course, can be created in many 
ways; trauma is not only produced by abusive situations but 
also by, for example, divorce, accidents, natural disasters, 
and oppressions), and in hopes that philosophers more 
generally will begin to realize that we need to understand 
these things, I offer some of what I believe are implications 
of trauma for parenting and philosophical understanding. 
TRAUMA AFFECTS BASIC INTERACTIONS 
If we didn’t have other ways of knowing this, new 
developments and trends in neuroscience and brain 
imaging would still provide us with overwhelming evidence 
that trauma affects the development of the brain in infants 
and young children and the working of the brain in older 
children and adults. One of the major effects of this in 
infants and young children is that trauma changes their 
ability to form the basic attachments that are required for 
the creation of what is referred to as an internal model of 
safe relationship.6 The optimal kind of attachment ability,
which is called secure attachment, is created through the
experience of being attended to and cared for appropriately
as an infant and very young child. In simple terms, infants
get hungry, or wet, or frightened, so they cry. If all is going
well, a familiar caretaker (usually a primary caretaker or one
of a small set of caretakers) appears to comfort them and
provide whatever it is that they need. In good circumstances,
this happens over and over again, reliably, throughout the
child’s formative years, and the result of this is that the child
learns to trust, and to believe that their world is relatively
safe. That is, this experience creates for the child an internal
image of relationship in which their needs are reliably met,
and they are consistently cared for appropriately, with
stability and affection. This internal model then remains
active throughout their lives (unless it is disrupted), allowing
them to form new relationships in the expectation that each
relationship will work in the same way, and with a sense
of appropriate interactions that enables them to reject
relationships which do not in fact live up to the expectation.
In ordinary development, they learn that they also should
live up to such an expectation for others. 
Traumatic experience during the formative years makes it 
impossible for infants and young children to develop and/ 
or sustain such a model of interaction, because, obviously, 
it is not the interaction they are having. Neglect creates 
traumatic effects precisely for this reason: it means that no 
one is in fact responding to the needs of the infant or child, 
no one is consistently appearing to comfort and care for 
them. The development of the above described internal 
model is not possible, then, and the child develops an 
insecure model of attachment, which affects their ability 
to form relationships throughout their life if no intervention 
occurs. Severe neglect may lead to conditions in which a 
child fails to thrive (a technical term in pediatrics) in which 
case they suffer malnutrition and attendant problems, and 
which if extreme, leads to death.7 
Here, then, is an implication of trauma that philosophy needs
to take seriously: the kinds and quality of interactions that
we have with others is essential to the development of a
sense of self. For most feminist philosophers, I take it that
this will come as no surprise; we have been working for
decades with the belief that humans are interdependent,
relationally autonomous creatures8 rather than the separate
and totally (almost ferociously) autonomous beings of liberal
individualism. But here is a different kind of evidence that
seems to me utterly undeniable: if infants and children do
not get the proper kinds of interactions, they do not develop
certain relational abilities, which may prevent them from
forming satisfying, mutually trusting relationships throughout
their lives. That is, one’s ability to function as a successfully
(relationally) autonomous individual depends on one’s
having the basic interactions of stable, consistent caretaking
in one’s infancy and early childhood. Having a “good” sense
of self depends, ordinarily, on having these experiences. 
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I do not mean to say that one absolutely cannot create a 
good sense of self if one was traumatized as a child, but 
the level of difficulty in doing so is very high, and it is a 
different project from that early developmental one. Our 
children, traumatized through neglect and through direct 
abuse, came to us with “bad” senses of self. Their senses of 
self were bad in that they believed they were bad children, 
having been told they were, but also in that their senses of 
self were incapable of doing the kinds of thing that a good 
sense of self can do. They could not form healthy, secure 
attachments, but rather sought to get their needs met 
mainly through deception and manipulation, as they had 
had to do in their birth home. They could not trust anyone 
because no one in their important relationship schemas had 
been consistently trustworthy. They could not be friends or 
accept ordinary friendship because they had been taught 
that they were for the use of others, and that others, in turn, 
were for their use. And it is important to realize that these 
were not casual lessons that could easily be set aside once 
they were presented with better alternatives; these were 
formative lessons, part of their identities, and as such very 
resistant to change, even if they could come to see that 
those changes would be for the better. 
TRAUMA AFFECTS ABILITY TO PLAY 
Given the above effects on interactions, it seems obvious 
that play would be affected as well, although I confess it 
wasn’t obvious to us and we were sometimes baffled, at 
first, by our children’s playing and lack of playing. Some 
games seemed perfectly ordinary. A perennial favorite, the 
“chase me” game, was one we played endlessly (or at least 
it seemed endless to me, as running was never my strong 
suit!). They knew many games already, and we taught them 
many of our favorite games, both indoor and outdoor: 
board games indoors, frisbee, badminton, ring toss, bocce, 
and croquet for outdoors. 
We realized fairly quickly, though, that the instructions “go 
play x” were never sufficient, even if they knew the game. 
Either they did not want to play that, or it would last for 
about five minutes and then they would be back asking 
what they could do. We also began to observe that they did 
not engage in imaginative play—they would not, on their 
own, create a game or a scenario for playing in. Even with 
toys like Legos, which tend to enable imaginative play as 
kids put them together in a variety of ways and make up 
things to use them for, our children did not play the same 
way as others. If we said “make something up,” it was as 
though they just did not understand the project. 
But that was odd because they seemed to have sufficient 
imagination in some ways. Ask them to talk about monsters, 
for example, and they had plenty of things to say, and plenty 
of ideas about how to fight them and how you needed to 
protect yourself from them. Gradually, through observing 
them, playing with them, and learning about traumatic 
effects, we came to understand a couple of things about 
post-trauma playing. 
One thing we came to realize was that they did not like to 
play without our direct participation. One reason for this 
might have been that they wanted our attention, and that 
is certainly likely, as they did want our attention. But it is 
also probable that their lack of security and inability to 
trust made it difficult for them to play without our “help,” 
because they were not secure about whether they were 
doing it “right.” If we were there, guiding the interactions, 
then they could be relatively sure it was going ok, and that 
they were not going to do something wrong and get into 
trouble for it, be punished for it. That is, any adopted kids 
(if they were adopted as older than infants) are likely to 
have a fairly long period of adjustment in a new family, in 
which they have to learn how to “do things right” in that 
family; this includes learning how to play properly. They are 
likely to be anxious until they have figured out what playing 
properly is like. 
For traumatized kids, this anxiety is exponentially greater 
because they have been in unstable circumstances in 
which punishments and outbursts of anger could not 
be either reliably predicted or understood (and certainly 
not avoided). One of the common effects of trauma, 
hyperarousal, refers to the survivor’s need to remain on 
“high alert” to watch for the signs of impending danger 
at all times. This survival strategy is necessary in order to 
allow the survivor to bring to bear any and all possible 
counter-tactics if danger seems imminent. For example, 
being able to detect early signs of an impending episode 
of violence makes it possible to try distracting or soothing 
tactics in hopes of preventing or mitigating the outburst. 
Consider, then, what it might be like to try to play while 
maintaining the constant awareness of the environment 
and especially the moods and emotional indicators of the 
parents or other caretakers/adults, the ones who are most 
likely to be the source of such danger. If “getting it right” 
means avoiding a beating, or being allowed to eat, then 
a significant amount of a child’s attention and mental and 
emotional energies must be directed at getting it right. 
In the absence of certainty (or as much as can be had) of 
getting it right, it may seem better to the child simply not 
to take a chance; that is, it may be better not to play at all. 
So here is another implication for philosophy: even 
something like play cannot be taken for granted as an 
obvious, universal feature of experience; styles of play 
actually can tell us something about the people who 
engage in it. Again, this is not a totally new observation. 
María Lugones, for example, wrote about this in her well-
known article on “world-traveling” and playfulness.9 What 
it is like to be playful is not simply the same for everyone; 
it depends on one’s socialization, one’s ability to feel 
comfortable and “at home” in one’s circumstances, one’s 
gender training, and, I would add, one’s experiences with 
trauma. 
TRAUMA AFFECTS SENSE OF REALITY 
One of the most dramatic realizations we had as we came 
to understand more about our children was that in some 
incredibly important ways they were not living in the 
same world, the same reality, that we were. In our world, 
parents are people who provide for the needs of children: 
they make sure that there is enough food (hopefully of 
healthy types), appropriate and clean clothing, and a 
home in which children are safe (except, of course, for the 
occurrence of ordinary pains or injuries). When anything 
bad happens, parents are not the ones who cause it, but 
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are the ones who provide comfort and remedy. Parents 
impose consequences for choices, but do not arbitrarily or 
unreasonably or unpredictably punish, or punish in hurtful 
or harmful ways. 
This is perhaps an idealized picture, but again, we had
had professional training and we had professional support
in constructing our parenting and ourselves as parents,
such that we were able to structure our parenting pretty
intentionally right from the beginning. We were also older
parents, and had taken a lot of time to think about what we
believed parenting should be/do. And it is certainly not the
case that we never made mistakes, or bad choices, with
regard to parenting—I wish! But ultimately, in our world,
parents were not people that children needed to be afraid of. 
In our children’s reality, and the reality of so many children, 
parents are exactly the people to be afraid of, as well as
the people who must be loved and depended on. When 
parents abuse children, they create a reality in which what 
children learn is that some people have the power to do 
to you whatever they want whenever they want, and you 
cannot escape it or prevent it (although you may learn 
to manipulate it or postpone it). What we had to learn to 
understand was that this was not simply their “picture” of 
the world; this was what was real, and they understood it 
to carry over into our home, the new home we had created 
for them. To put it differently, for children abused by their 
own parents, the monster in the room at night, under the 
bed, or in the closet, is absolutely, terrifyingly real, and it 
is also a person who has responsibility for their care. It is a 
person/monster, a creature with a dual nature, which may 
be loving at one moment and terrifying the next, inflicting 
pain and humiliation in the night and dropping them off at 
school the next morning, cheerfully waving at the teacher. 
This also gives the world a dual nature, as abusers will 
also require that that part of the reality be kept secret. So 
abused children have to function in a secret reality as well 
as the “normal” one, in which no one knows (or admits 
to knowing) what is actually happening in the other. The 
requirement to repress that secret reality, coming from 
the abuser(s), is reinforced by the child’s own “internal 
necessities,” so to speak. That is, if a child is in an abusive 
situation they cannot escape from, in which they have to 
continue living with their abuser on a long-term basis, their 
own psychology will compel them to “compartmentalize” 
the abuse in ways that allow them to hide it, at least 
part of the time, from themselves as well as others. It is 
psychologically and emotionally extremely difficult for a 
child to live with the actual knowledge of ongoing abuse; 
Roland Summit, developer of the Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome model, says that the most 
healthy reaction a child can have to ongoing abuse is to 
block their own knowledge of it, as that knowing would 
be too difficult to live with.10 In extreme cases, having to 
live in a dual reality compels dissociation; there is evidence 
that the majority of cases of multiple personality disorder 
stem from childhood sexual abuse at the hands of parents 
or other very close family members.11 
Learning to understand the traumatic double reality of 
abused children is a staggering task, as it challenges 
a parent’s own conceptions of the real and forces us to 
expand those conceptions in order to be able to accept 
and respond to our children’s pain, injuries, and needs. In 
some ways, the most difficult task of parenting traumatized 
children, especially those who have been traumatized in 
ways that are taken to be so forbidden that they are nearly 
unthinkable, is simply to accept that it has happened. So 
one implication of trauma for parents, and philosophers, 
is that it requires us to open ourselves to a reality that we 
do not want to admit; we do not want to admit that it is 
true, and we do not want to admit it into our lives. But the 
realities that abused children are experiencing must be 
admitted, must be validated, if anything about their lives 
is to change. If—when—the unimaginable does happen to 
children (or to adults), we must learn to believe in its reality. 
Perhaps we must say something even stronger: perhaps 
we must learn that the “unimaginable” is already the real, 
and it is our ideals about reality (that it is safe, that children 
are never hurt, that no one would do such things) that are, 
in fact, the not-real. 
This discussion also has implications, I believe, for social 
and political (and moral) philosophy because it can help us 
articulate the wrongs of oppressions or oppressive actions. 
I take it to be uncontroversial that the abuse of children, 
in general and in particular by parents, is morally wrong, 
and that the wrongness of it is at least partially laid out in 
the foregoing discussion of how it requires the distortion 
of reality (only one feature of that wrongness, of course). 
If this is the case, we should be able to draw analogies 
with other forms of abusive control, such as the oppression 
and subjugation of specific groups of people under racism, 
sexism, heterosexism, etc. Consider, for example, the 
phenomenon of “double consciousness” articulated in 
the work of W.E.B. du Bois12 and used since then by many 
other critical theorists. Du Bois talks about the experience 
of coming to know oneself as black in a world ruled by anti-
black racism as creating the sense of being forced to live 
a doubled life, with doubled thoughts and double duties, 
and presents this as harmful, as a “wrenching of the soul.”13 
He names among the effects of this doubling “a painful 
self-consciousness, an almost morbid sense of personality, 
and a moral hesitancy which is fatal to self-confidence.”14 
These effects are very much what we see in the traumatized 
behavior of many who were abused as children, usually in 
an even stronger form. What that suggests is that we are 
looking at similarly abusive phenomena in various forms of 
oppression. This could gain us some added force for the 
condemnation of such phenomena, and although it would 
be wonderful to be able to say that we don’t need any such 
reinforcement because we are already in the post-race(ist), 
post-sex(ist) era, it seems to me that we have far too much 
evidence to the contrary. Thus I welcome any arguments 
that enable a more emphatic condemnation of oppression 
and oppressive practices. 
TRAUMA AFFECTS UNDERSTANDING OF “THE
GOOD LIFE” 
Although conceptions of “the good life” vary significantly 
from culture to culture, and even from person to person, 
what parents tend to hope for their children include 
things like finding ways of making life meaningful, having 
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enough at the very least (whatever that means), having 
relationships that are supportive and fulfilling, and being 
able and willing to act in ways that are morally responsible 
and permissible. This conception of a good life, however 
basic, may be challenging when children have been 
severely traumatized, especially if that trauma has affected 
or disrupted their developmental processes. 
For one thing, a very common effect of trauma, at least in 
Western cultures in which time is understood as a linear path 
from distant past through present and into distant possible 
future, is referred to as the “foreshortening of the future.”15 
What this means is that traumatized (Western) children’s 
picture of the future may be no more than months or at most 
a couple of years, and they will have difficulty imagining 
themselves surviving/living to adulthood. Consequently, 
conceptualizing and planning for a good life, which in this 
culture seems to depend on being able to imagine a future, 
will simply be something they are not able to do and may 
not even be able to grasp the meaning of. 
More than that, as important recent work in the 
neurosciences has shown, trauma affects the development 
of the brain, its neural pathways, and the connections among 
the different brain areas. What this means, for example, is 
that a traumatized child may have a much more difficult 
time than others in developing abilities like recognition of 
the relationship between causes and effects, or what are 
often thought of as the “intuitive” fundamentals of logic 
(another reason, in my judgment, to reject the claim that 
Western logic is intuitive, but that is another paper). This can 
be incredibly frustrating for parents, as these abilities are 
often taken to be simply “natural” and thus not considered 
to be something that is at stake when things go wrong. It 
may mean that no matter how many times you patiently 
(or not so patiently) go over the idea that if they do X, 
consequence Y will follow, and they do not want to have 
consequence Y, they will still do X and not be expecting or 
looking for the consequence. It may mean that they have a 
much more difficult time learning certain basics at school, 
both in terms of content they need to master, but also in 
terms of behavior: no matter how we struggled to help our 
children with homework, for example, once it was actually 
done, they were just as likely to leave it in their backpacks 
as to turn it in on time, because they didn’t really see that 
as part of the exercise, and didn’t recognize bad grades at 
the end of the semester as actually connected to anything 
they did with their homework months before. They simply 
couldn’t see that it mattered.16 
These are frustrating problems for both parents and 
children, but the effects of inability to plan, to decide on 
a good and reasonable goal and then plan out the steps 
needed to get to the goal (and how to achieve each of those 
steps), seems to me only to become a bigger problem as 
children begin to grow to adulthood. As adults, we need 
to be able to manage our lives, and being able to plan 
and move through our plans in appropriate steps seems 
fundamental to that management. Living independently 
was a goal that was not difficult to “sell” to our children 
(they could hardly wait), but the idea that you have to 
have a plan to make it work continues to be much harder. 
Being able to get and keep a job is basic to this kind of 
planning, but for some who have been traumatized, there 
may be nothing straightforward or easy about doing so. 
Keeping a job requires recognizing that there are direct 
consequences, usually negative, for not showing for a shift, 
or for blowing up at the boss, or for walking out because 
some fellow worker was giving you bullshit. 
Of course, beyond recognizing that there will be 
consequences, keeping the job requires that you be able 
to care about the consequences as well. Again, for some 
who have been traumatized, this may be difficult to do. 
Being traumatized in circumstances of abuse, for instance, 
means that you have been violated and humiliated, 
terrorized and made to feel utterly helpless, utterly unable 
to assert yourself as an effective agent in any way at all. 
This experience may make it seem paramount to a survivor 
that they work to assert control in all circumstances that 
they can, even when doing so is actually going to work 
against their own interests in either the short or long 
term. That experience of helplessness can make it so that 
being in control of a situation, or of what consequences 
one will suffer, may seem more important than suffering 
any kind of consequences. This is one explanation of why 
some traumatized persons will work to “sabotage” their 
own interests. For example, when our children were still 
young, we learned that it was better to keep secret from 
them certain possibilities for good activities. We stopped 
telling them when a big trip was planned because their 
insecurities drove them to feel so anxious about whether 
they would do something bad and “lose” the opportunity 
to participate that they would inevitably go ahead and 
do the bad thing, just so that they could control when it 
was going to happen. They lost that opportunity, but they 
relieved their anxiety about it, and that seemed to be more 
important. Again, that was partly about the problematics of 
the future: any goal more than a few days out was too far 
away to be as important as a present anxiety. 
What implications does this discussion have for 
philosophy? One is to remind philosophers that we tend 
to take for granted a certain kind of normative experience 
of the world, and forget to include in our analyses those 
experiences that are not normative, but that are statistically 
significant, as experiences of trauma clearly are. Any 
parents whose children are non-normative in almost any 
way know, for example, how our system of education is 
constructed to work best for those with a certain range 
of abilities and life experience, and how that system has 
very little room or help for “others,” often in spite of the 
efforts of caring teachers. In fact, in our roles as teachers, 
philosophers need to remember that the tendency to take 
a normative experience for granted affects our own ability 
to teach. As much as any teachers, we need to become 
much more aware of the needs of diverse learning styles, 
and to begin recognizing our responsibility to build into 
our classrooms more of the tools of, for example, trauma-
informed pedagogies. 
On a larger scale, if philosophy were taking seriously the 
experiences of the seriously traumatized, it would be able 
to render much more helpful analyses of, for example, the 
behaviors of other groups of “others.” Having had many 
such discussions with people unfamiliar with our children’s 
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experiences, I know that it is easy for many people to 
dismiss their difficulties with platitudes such as “that’s 
a problem that every kid has to struggle with” or even 
harsher “observations” such as “maybe they just need to 
learn not to be so lazy.” That makes me think about other 
groups to whom such “observations” have traditionally 
been attached, groups that tend to be marginalized on 
the basis of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and/or dis/ 
ability status, etc. But more understanding of trauma is 
leading experts in the field to theorize that oppressions, for 
example, are traumatizing. Is that, then, what we are often 
seeing when we look at members of marginalized groups 
and their struggles to “manage” their lives, to “live up to” 
the norms of the dominant culture? It makes far more sense 
to me to believe that oppressed groups struggle with the 
effects of trauma than that any group of people can truly 
be characterized as simply “stupid” or “lazy.” Philosophy 
could be applying its strengths here and helping instead of 
allowing injustices to continue. 
TRAUMA MAY AFFECT DESIRE 
I noted in the last section that one effect of trauma may 
be that it can create in a survivor a desire to be in control 
that overrides any better kind of judgment about what 
to do in some circumstances. That is not the only way in 
which trauma can affect desire, and may not be the most 
problematic. I have discussed elsewhere at some length 
the ways that desire can be affected17 but will repeat some 
of it here because it is so important for parents to realize 
that depending on what kinds of trauma children have 
suffered, their desires may become warped in ways that 
can deeply affect their relationships with adults as well as 
with other children. 
I am speaking, of course, especially of sexual abuse of 
children. As noted above, when children are abused during 
their formative years, their developmental work is affected 
by trauma such that they form a sense of self through that 
trauma and its effects. One thing this may mean for sexually 
abused children, especially those abused over a prolonged 
time and/or by caretakers or close family members, is 
that they can come to understand sex as a “normal” part 
of relationship in general. If their basic relationships are 
sexualized, they may simply grow to understand that sex 
is how relationships are. If this is the case, they may then 
expect sex in relationships in general, and may attempt to 
sexualize any relationships that they enter into, with either 
other children or with adults. 
If such a child is adopted, there is every likelihood that 
they would attempt to reestablish patterns of relation that 
they are familiar with in their new family situation; this is 
often referred to as “acting out sexually” and sometimes 
diagnosed as “sexual reactivity.” But what new parents 
need to understand is that they have to be able to respond 
to it not with disgust or revulsion but with understanding 
and tactics of support and correction. Normatively trained 
adults tend to find it extremely disturbing, or even 
downright unbelievable, that children, including very 
young children of three or four, are capable of having 
sexual feelings and expressing them toward others in 
direct and unmistakable ways. What those children will 
need from their new parents, however, is acceptance and 
commitment to the work that will be required to help them 
move from inappropriate sexual expression to control over 
their very real sexual feelings and urges, in order to grow 
into a more appropriate stance toward those desires. 
It is, presumably, obvious how important this is to the life of 
an abused child. If inappropriate sexual desires and activity 
are ignored and allowed to continue, the child may never 
learn to moderate those desires on their own, and will be 
likely to be frustrated by failed relationships throughout 
their life. Not understanding that sex is not a part of every 
kind of close relationship, they may attempt to impose sex 
on others (although it is also important to realize that not
everyone who is sexually abused as a child abuses others 
as an adult), or drive others to reject them because of their 
tendency to inappropriately sexualize relationships. They 
are also more likely than others to be sexually victimized, as 
their “air” of sexual awareness tends to draw the attention 
of sexual predators, and they may not see their danger until 
it is too late. 
One implication for philosophy regards the so-called liberal 
sexual paradigm, in which the tendency is to assume that 
anything done between consenting adults is fine,18 and 
which in some articulations, like that of Thomas Nagel, 
claims that “bad sex is generally better than none at all.”19 
Again, because mainstream philosophy tends to assume 
a certain kind of normative experience, including a level 
of autonomy that may actually be unusual, the philosophy 
of sex has tended to assume both that consent is simply, 
obviously possible, and that once it has been “given” that 
no other worrisome questions remain to be asked. From 
my perspective, the fact of childhood sexual abuse and its 
effects means that consent in matters of sex is probably 
often nowhere near as free or as meaningful as it is taken 
to be. For those survivors who are helped to successfully 
recover from much of their experiences, it may be the case 
that they are capable of free and meaningful consent. But 
some do not recover, or do not recover fully or in every 
aspect, and a forceful demand for consent (which, let’s not 
kid ourselves, is too often how “consent” is manufactured) 
may easily defeat their autonomy. Further, given that we 
know that childhood sexual abuse is among the most 
underreported of crimes, we must also recognize that 
many survivors may have had little to no support or help 
in recovering at all, such that as adults they are still to 
some greater or lesser extent affected by the evils of that 
experience. Among these may well be that they have little of 
what it takes to stand up for oneself in the face of forceful, 
or “impassioned,” requests/demands for consent. We can 
take these implications of trauma seriously to indicate the 
need to revise, or at least complicate and problematize, the 
liberal model of sexual ethics in favor of one that requires 
a heightened responsibility to take care that our sexual 
actions do no harm, instead of just assuming that they 
cannot because we do not wish to believe that they do, as 
such a belief would require constraining them. The work of 
people like Catherine MacKinnon, one of the first to point 
out the insufficiency of consent for ethical sex,20 and more 
recently Rebecca Kukla, who is developing a much more 
comprehensive model of consent within a framework of 
broader sexual communication,21 is definitely moving in the 
right direction. 
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One final implication I will mention here is one that feminist 
philosophers and others have been urging for philosophy 
as a field for a long time now, and that is the importance of 
taking personal lives and personal experiences seriously, 
as well as learning how to properly value the lives and 
experiences of non-normative “others.” I do not believe that 
I would be able to articulate these reasons for philosophy 
to take trauma seriously if I had not had so much personal 
experience with it. My own experiences with trauma 
started me down my non-traditional philosophical path, 
but living with and through the experiences of my children 
made it impossible for me to ignore these implications for 
philosophy. How could I claim to understand the world if 
I did not understand the world my children were literally 
living in and held captive by? How could I claim to know 
the truth about who they were, and who I am in relation to 
them, if I did not know something at least of the truth of 
their experience? How could I think that I understood what 
is the good life for my children when I did not understand 
the extent to which the options for life had shrunk for 
them due to their trauma? Although I realize I have made 
far too many mistakes and have so much more to learn, I 
have at least begun to see how as a philosopher I cannot 
ignore marginalized experiences and still claim to be 
anything like an authority on the real, on knowing, on the 
good. Philosophy, and philosophers, need to learn how to 
believe in the realities of “others” in order to more properly 
understand reality in general, and to be able to do our own 
proper work. 
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Secure Base.
7.	 Block, et al., “Failure to Thrive as a Manifestation of Child Neglect.” 
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9.	 Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling and Loving Perception.” 
10. Summit, quoted in Corwin, “An Interview with Roland Summit.” 
11.	 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 120–26; for a compelling 
example, see Fraser, My Father’s House. 
12. W. E. B du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk. 
13. Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 155. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 47. 
16. Of course, another huge reason why traumatized children have 
trouble with schoolwork is simply that the effects of trauma, 
including hyperarousal, keep their attention focused on trying 
to figure out where the next threat is coming from. This can 
leave little attention or energy for paying attention to actual 
schoolwork, which obviously is much less important from their 
perspective than the need to be aware of where trouble is going 
to come from next. 
17.	 Burchard, “What’s an Adoptive Mother to Do? When Your Child’s 
Desires Are a Problem,” 138–70. 
18. Soble, “The Analytic Categories of the Philosophy of Sex,” 16. 
19.	 Nagel, “Perversions,” 42. 
20. MacKinnon, Butterfly Politics. 
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On Muddling Through 
Amy Allen 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
When Lauren Freeman approached me to write about my 
experiences combining parenthood and philosophy for this 
newsletter, I hesitated. Her invitation asked me specifically 
to talk about succeeding in academic philosophy while 
being a mother of four. I was reluctant in part because I 
worried that there’s no way to write a piece like this without 
sounding like someone who thinks of herself as a success, 
either as a parent or a philosopher or both—which not only 
makes me sound like a jerk, but also seems like tempting 
fate. I changed my mind only when Lauren told me the 
horror stories she had heard from other senior women in 
the field: women who claimed, as part of an invited panel 
on “succeeding as a mother in the field” at a conference for 
women in philosophy, that there was no way to combine 
motherhood with a successful career in academia, that they 
regretted having children before they had tenure, or even 
at all. Lauren persuaded me that it is important for those 
who can do so to tell a more positive story, to help others 
see what is possible, so I (still rather tentatively) agreed. 
My misgivings also stemmed from the fact that I am all 
too aware of the very many privileges that I had and still 
have, all of which enabled me to combine motherhood with 
philosophy to whatever degree of success I have attained 
in either domain. I was fortunate enough to land a tenure-
track job relatively quickly—though, it must be said, not 
right away, and my first child was already almost three 
years old when that happened—and when I did, the job 
came with a scandalously low teaching load and a generous 
parental leave policy. While I was on the tenure track, I also 
had a very supportive female associate dean (shout out to 
Lenore Grenoble, wherever she is!). She helped me at a 
crucial pre-tenure moment, when I was pregnant with my 
third child, to take my maternity leave, pre-tenure research 
leave, and an external fellowship back to back. All of these 
advantages gave me two of the most precious gifts any 
aspiring academic with young children could ask for: 
flexibility and time. Without them, who knows how things 
might have turned out, or how I would feel now about my 
choices? 
So I’m well aware of how lucky I’ve been. I also know that 
I’m far from unique. In my department at Penn State, I’m 
one of three women faculty with four children each; all 
three of us have tenure, one is an endowed chair, and one 
is department head. Although our department may be an 
outlier in this respect, I mention this in order to emphasize 
that there are other success stories out there as well. 
Still, that’s not to say that it has been easy. My oldest child 
was born two weeks after I defended my dissertation. I 
started my first job—a visiting assistant professorship at a 
small liberal arts college where I was replacing a faculty 
member who was going on parental leave—when he was 
three months old. I recognized, but didn’t have much 
time to appreciate, the irony of the circumstances. We 
needed the income, and especially the health insurance 
(my oldest was born with a heart condition that required 
extensive treatment), so I took the job and didn’t look back. 
My second child was born when I was on the first year of 
the tenure track, the third in the middle of my pre-tenure 
period. My youngest was born several years after I got 
tenure, just as I was finishing my second book. Parenting 
young children is a challenge in the best of circumstances; 
doing it while in the midst of an academic job search 
and then later while working toward tenure is incredibly 
stressful, even overwhelming at times. My husband and I 
certainly upped the degree of difficulty by deciding to have 
four children—and yes, that was a conscious decision—as 
we still remind ourselves whenever we feel overwhelmed 
with juggling the demands of career and family. 
I suspect it is obvious to most readers of this newsletter that 
the factors that make it so difficult to combine parenthood 
with academic work are structural. Some of those are 
pretty generic, having to do with the lack of support for 
paid parental leave and the lack of access to high quality, 
affordable childcare in the United States. Others are more 
specific to academia, most notably, the fact that we have 
to run the gauntlet of the tenure track during our prime 
childbearing years. To be sure, academia also offers one 
tremendous structural benefit over other professions: a 
greater degree of autonomy over one’s work schedule. (I 
think this is a general benefit of academic work, but it is 
perhaps especially useful for those who have significant 
caregiving responsibilities, including parents of young 
children.) Still, I think it is fair to say that the deck is stacked 
against would-be academic parents, structurally speaking, 
and there is no such thing as an individual solution to a 
structural problem. Unless and until we get widespread 
structural change, the best individuals can hope for is to 
muddle through. 
As a result, I would never presume to give advice to those 
who are hoping to combine parenting with an academic 
career. The most I can say is a bit about the things that I 
did that helped me to muddle through. And I would hope 
that readers will refrain from judging too harshly individual 
decisions made in an effort to live a good life under 
conditions of structural oppression. 
We got as much daycare as we could afford. We were 
lucky to have access to very high-quality daycare, but it 
was expensive enough (especially for infants) that in the 
beginning “as much daycare as we could afford” meant 
three days a week, and even that was a stretch financially. 
In those first few years, my children went to daycare on my 
teaching days, and the other days I “worked from home,” 
which usually meant that I got up at 5 a.m. to grade or 
do class prep and then caught up on email during their 
naptime. There were definitely times when it wasn’t clear 
that it made financial sense for us to spend so much money 
on daycare, given that, at the time, the cost represented a 
huge percentage of my husband’s take-home income. Still, 
although he is a terrific father and very involved parent, my 
husband never had any interest in staying home full time, 
so we pressed on. Now, twenty years later, the payoff of 
that strategy is clear: having invested the time and energy 
early on, we both enjoy satisfying and successful careers. 
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Relying so much on daycare required me to get over my 
working-mother guilt. I’m still not sure where that guilt 
came from—perhaps from having been a teenager in the 
1980s, at the height of the post-second-wave anti-feminist 
backlash—but I had definitely internalized the idea that 
women should feel bad about putting their kids in daycare 
so that they could focus on their careers. (Bonus side effect: 
reflecting on this and similar experiences helped to shape 
my own views about the importance of feminist ideology 
critique, which was useful for my research). I grappled with 
that guilt a lot in the first few years. I even felt insecure 
enough in my choices that I stopped speaking to my former 
college roommate after she (unthinkingly, I suspect) made 
a comment about how it is selfish for women to put their 
children in full-time daycare. (This was probably sometime 
in the early 2000s.) Whenever a female student of mine 
would say something like “I don’t care which parent stays 
home with the kids, but one of them definitely should”— 
the “postfeminist” version of my college roommate’s more 
traditional judgment—I bristled. (This came up more than 
once in my women’s studies classes throughout the early 
2000s, in the context of discussions of socialist feminist 
critiques of the gender division of paid and unpaid labor.) 
Looking back, I’m not sure exactly how or even precisely 
when I got over the guilt, but I did. Perhaps it was because 
it became increasingly clear how good daycare was for 
my kids—they had caring and experienced teachers, they 
learned a lot and made friends, they developed extremely 
healthy immune systems (as I said, we were fortunate to 
have access to high-quality childcare, which I know is not 
everyone’s experience). Perhaps it was because I got more 
invested in my work as the years went on. Probably I was 
just too busy juggling work and family to notice that I felt 
guilty anymore. 
Having my first child so early in my academic career forced 
me, I think, to become ruthlessly efficient with my time and 
realistic about my standards. If I had only two hours left 
before I had to leave to pick my kids up from daycare, then 
I finished that abstract in two hours. Generally speaking, I 
didn’t continue to work in the evenings after getting home 
from my on-campus office. This was not so much out of 
a principled decision to concentrate on family time in the 
evenings, but rather because I was so exhausted after 
dinner, baths, and climbing Mount Bedtime (as my friend 
Johanna Meehan aptly puts it) that by the time that was 
finished there was no way I could summon the energy and 
focus required for intellectual work. Sometimes I’d get up 
early to try to work for an hour or two before the kids were 
awake; occasionally, this strategy would backfire because 
they would hear me up moving around and just wake up 
earlier, but often enough it worked. Still, this meant that 
my work hours were relatively constrained, so I had to 
learn very early on how to be as efficient and productive 
as possible within the time that I had. I think that skill has 
served me well even as my kids have gotten older and the 
demands on my time have shifted. I also long ago gave 
up on the ideal of perfection, either as a philosopher or 
as a parent. I’ve always been more of a finisher than a 
perfectionist—and I think that academia ruthlessly punishes 
perfectionists, whether they have children or not—but still 
I had to learn to let go of some of my unrealistic standards 
and expectations. Of course, that’s not to say that I don’t 
take pride in my work nor is it to say that I don’t strive to 
have good relationships with my kids (a task that is shifting 
now that they are starting to leave home). It is just to say 
that I learned that the best way to alleviate the more or less 
constant feeling of failure experienced by many working 
mothers was to let go of impossibly high standards in both 
domains. After all, if there is no such thing as an individual 
solution to a structural problem, then it makes no sense to 
berate oneself for failing to do the impossible. 
As I said, I offer these reflections not as advice but rather 
as a report of my own experience, as I understand it. I 
realize that some of it may no longer be relevant—at any 
rate, I really hope that working mother guilt is a thing of the 
past—and lots of it is unique to me. Still, when people ask 
me—and it is mostly women who do this, usually younger 
women who are just starting to make their way in the 
profession—how do you do it? This is more or less what I 
tell them. 
Parenting, Feminism, and Academic Life: 
My Happy Story 
Samantha Brennan 
UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH 
I’m Dean of the College of Arts and Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Guelph in Canada. In recent years, I co-
founded and co-edited Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, an
online, open access journal. Last year, I ended my three-year
term as a member of the Canadian Philosophical Association
executive (vice president, president, and past president.)
I ride my bike long distances, I go back country canoe
camping, and I race small sailboats. I also have three adult
children. It amuses me that it’s the last bit that makes people
say “wow.” I often get asked, “How did you do it?” and I try
to tell people that I didn’t do it alone. I’m not a single parent.
If I was, then the “wow” would be justified. I did it as part
of a team and no other members of the team ever got the
“Wow. How do you do you do it?” reaction. I think that says
something about our expectations of mothers. 
I’ve been reluctant to tell my happy story of combining an 
academic career with parenthood, largely because I know 
most people, especially most women, haven’t had it so 
easy, and I hate for my story to be heard as “if I can do it, so 
can you.” But I have been struck, especially in comparison 
to women friends who became parents while practicing 
medicine or law, how much family friendlier my career 
was than theirs. I’ve also been struck by some pretty big 
differences between the shape of my life and that of my 
peers who struggle to find the balance between family life 
and an academic career. Don’t get me wrong. There is a lot 
about parenting that I’ve found challenging, but very little 
of that relates to my job. 
My kids, all adults now, are 21, 23, and 27. My daughter 
Mallory, the eldest, was born while I was in grad school, and 
my two sons were born not post tenure, but after I’d written 
and published enough to make tenure promotion pretty 
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clear. The decision to have a child in grad school made 
sense to me then. I was at home, with a SSHRC doctoral 
fellowship, writing my thesis. I still think now, as I did then, 
that I had a lot of time on my hands. As someone who 
worked almost full-time while going to school full-time as 
an undergrad, grad school felt positively relaxing timewise. 
What has changed is that I think I was lucky when it came to 
the “baby in grad school” decision. I had an easy, healthy, 
happy baby. She slept so much that I occasionally woke her 
up to take a break from my thesis. She didn’t cry much and 
loved being read aloud to no matter what the content, so 
I used to read journal articles on moral philosophy aloud 
to her. There may or may not be therapy bills later. She 
attended her first feminist philosophy retreat at six weeks 
of age, at Sandra Barty’s Michigan cottage to hang with the 
other feminist grad students. Mallory attended her first APA 
at nine months, and provided a lot of stress relief for worn-
out grad students on the job market. In a way, having a 
child early set the pace. Starting at three months, she went 
to work every day with my partner and came home at lunch. 
I started work when they left and wrote furiously until noon. 
I wrote a lot of my thesis on that schedule. I’ve always had 
a good sense of being at work—kids are in daycare, school, 
etc.—and good sense of being off. My new challenge will 
be seeing if I can stop work leaking more into my life as I 
move into academic administration at the same time as the 
kids all leave the nest. Wish me luck! 
I hear lots of women talk about how hard it is to be a mother 
and a professor but mostly the stuff that strikes me as hard 
isn’t intrinsic to either parenthood or academic careers, 
it’s about trying to do that in a country (the United States) 
with no parental leave, inadequate daycare, far away from 
extended family, usually being married to partners who 
don’t do their share, with unrealistic standards for how 
much work parenting requires. I think I’ve lucked out on 
almost all of these fronts. 
Here are ten thoughts I have about what worked well for 
me and why. YMMV, as they say. 
First, it’s significant that my partner in parenting had less 
workforce attachment than I did and do. He left his job to 
follow me from grad school to my first academic position 
and took advantage of the spousal tuition benefit to return 
to university. When he first went to work after graduating 
he worked mostly 9–5, Monday to Friday. I don’t agree with 
everything Rhona Mahoney has to say, but when I read 
Kidding Ourselves: Breadwinning, Babies And Bargaining 
Power (Basic Books, 1996) it made sense of certain facts 
about my life. It turns out I had taken her advice directed at 
women who want an equal share of household and family 
work, “educate up, marry down.” “Down” is harsh and 
it’s not true in all respects, but in terms of income, hours 
worked, and education it’s been I who have had more. 
Second, I had a family in a country with real parental leave 
and good daycare. You can do a lot with paid parental 
leave and good daycare. It goes a long way. The university 
daycare and preschool were pretty important to me in the 
early years. It wasn’t cheap and there was a waiting list. 
We got in because my partner went back to school and 
university undergraduates got priority access to daycare. 
We were also eligible for provincial daycare subsidies 
because between my student loan debt and Jeff being a 
student, our income was low enough to qualify in the early 
years. I could go visit my children for lunch if I had the time 
and we commuted to campus together. My university also 
had good policies around this. The tenure clock stopped 
automatically for my leave and though I didn’t need the 
extra time, I appreciated having it. 
Third, I wasn’t the first woman faculty member in my 
department to have children. Indeed, Kathleen Okruhlik 
was chair when I was hired and dean shortly after, and 
she also had children. This was a switch for me. Dalhousie 
University, my first philosophy department, when I was an 
undergrad, had just one woman on faculty, and she was 
married but didn’t have children. My second department, 
University of Illinois at Chicago, where I went to grad 
school, had six women on faculty, but none of them had 
children until Dorothy Grover adopted her son in my final 
year. I think it made a difference not being first at Western. 
Even with this, though, the students didn’t always react well 
to seeing me on campus with small children. The funniest 
comment I’ve ever received on a teaching evaluation was 
“Professor Brennan cares more about her children than she 
does about us.” Right. A senior colleague once stopped 
by while I was having lunch in my office with my daughter 
and said he had no idea how I did it. His wife could have 
never managed being a professor while taking care of the 
house and the kids. (I didn’t say, though I thought it, “that’s 
because she’s married to you.”) 
Fourth, you might have already noticed that I use the word 
“parent” rather than “mother” as I tried to sidestep a lot 
of gendered baggage that came with having children and 
living in a house. I used to think there would come a point 
in my life when I’d care about curtains and cutlery, but that 
hasn’t yet arrived. I’m still not a big fan of cooking—see 
Sam dislikes cooking and she’s not alone. There’s a lot I 
didn’t do and still don’t do that lots of people think of as 
part of parenting for women. I’m glad I got through before 
the years of Pinterest and the mommy bloggers. 
Fifth, my family is super supportive. My parents moved to 
the city where I was a professor to live with me and help 
with the kids when we were about to put a third child 
into daycare. We looked at the daycare bill. We looked at 
my mother’s current paycheck. We looked at how good 
she was with the kids and how much she missed them 
when she was back in Nova Scotia. We looked too at how 
exhausted and overworked we were. It just made sense 
all round. For more than twenty years we’ve lived side-by­
side, in connected living spaces, helping each other out. 
“Help” is, of course, an understatement. My mother worked 
full-time keeping house, providing full-time care, watching 
the kids before and after school. She was paid for this 
work and went from full time to part time, from focusing 
mainly on the kids to mainly on the house, and just retired 
altogether last year. (True confession: She still does the 
laundry. However, she has grandkids who shovel snow and 
lift heavy things. We’re still a team.) 
My father and my father-in-law did all the driving. At one 
point we’d send out Sunday night emails with chauffeuring 
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assignments for each grandfather. They loved it. The kids 
loved it too. Grandfathers, it turned out, will go for drive­
thru fries after school. While they drove, I got to commute 
by bike. 
Jeff’s sister also moved just a few blocks away when the 
kids were young, and she was the aunt to whom the kids 
ran away when they’d had enough of their parents and 
their in-city grandparents. 
Sixth, we’ve always thrown a lot of money at childcare. My 
kids spent a lot of time on campus in various camps and 
sporting clubs. Often it was pricey but it felt like money 
well spent. Why camps when we had the grandparents? 
We wanted to keep everyone happy for the long haul. We 
used to joke that it was easy to take care of any two of 
the three children together, but the three all at once were 
too much. During the summer one child at a time went to 
camp usually. Lots of the camps weren’t really designed for 
working parents. Often, they ended at 2:30. That’s where 
the grandfathers came in. 
Seventh, the doors of our house were wide open. My 
Facebook description says that I am joyful about living as 
part of a large, extended family with porous boundaries 
and long tentacles. We’ve had a lot of friends, in addition 
to the extended family, who’ve played a significant role in 
the lives of our children. 
As a young adult in my twenties, in grad school, I knew 
I wanted children in my life but I wasn’t, yet, committed 
to the idea of becoming a parent. I was an idealist and 
I imagined, as I think many young people do, that my 
generation would do things differently. I thought of co­
operative parenting, of communal living, and of alternative 
family arrangements. Instead, those friends having 
children also got married, and parenthood looked like this 
incredibly private, intimate thing. There was no easy access 
to the children of other people, and it seemed as if what I 
wanted was a more open model of parenting. I’d need to 
be the parent, inviting others in, rather than the other way 
round. In addition to our three biological children we’ve 
also opened our home through foster parenting, for a short 
period of time, to other children as well. During the teenage 
years, there was usually an extra child living with us. Often, 
they were friends of my gay son who had been thrown out 
of their own homes for a while or permanently. I was sad to 
find out how much this still happens. 
Eighth, I know other parents did stuff that I didn’t do even 
beyond the “mothering” point above. Now I see young 
academic couples who on principled grounds don’t use 
daycare or after-school care. I can’t imagine what that 
would be like. Deans tell stories about academic couples 
who say they need to end work at 4 p.m. every day so 
both parents (both!) can pick up the children. Both? After-
school care? My partner started dubbing these extremely 
intensive parenting practises—no screens, only organic 
food, no daycare—as “artisanal parenting.” These are the 
same young parents who only drink craft beer and listen 
to music on vinyl. He asks, “Do they knit and carve all their 
kids’ toys too?” Maybe. 
Nine, we travelled as a family on sabbaticals, and that is 
something I definitely recommend as both a great research 
experience and family bonding experience. Our kids had 
gotten to the ages where they spent more time with friends 
than with one another. Moving to a place where we were 
all new and learning our way around together made us feel 
more connected as a family. Our children became friends 
with one another again. 
Tenth, babies and toddlers were easy compared to 
teenagers but not for the reasons most people think. In 
many ways, I loved having a house full of teenagers. So 
energetic, so earnest. But it was work. Babies and toddlers 
have pretty simple needs. I also think lots of different 
people can meet those needs. My kids, when young, loved 
being with lots of different adult caregivers. And even if it 
was me providing the care I could have my mind on other 
things. You can walk a baby in a stroller and think about 
philosophy. You can read toddler books and think about 
something else. Teenagers wanted and needed my actual 
full-on attention. One morning I was woken by a teenage 
child sitting at the edge of my bed. “It’s five o’clock. You 
sometimes get up at 5 so I figured it was okay to wake 
you. I haven’t been able to sleep. I’ve been thinking. Why 
is the world so shitty? Why is life worth living?” We got up 
and made waffles and drank orange juice and talked about 
some hard stuff. They all wanted to talk about friendship and 
about relationship problems. And about ethical problems 
and about politics. I spent all night at the ER once with a 
high school-aged kid, not mine, who had taken too much 
of something and wasn’t breathing properly. He wouldn’t 
tell me his last name and my kids claimed to not know it. 
They just went to school together. I was giving a talk at the 
Canadian Society for Practical Ethics the next afternoon. I 
did it on just a few hours of sleep. 
I actually wish there had been parental leave for parents of 
teenagers. I needed it. 
With teenagers it wasn’t the kind of parenting you can pay 
someone else to do. You’re on, a lot of the time, and it’s 
messy and complicated and I don’t think I thought too 
much about how messy and complicated life is when I 
decided to have children. 
Oh, they also talked my parents’ ears off. 
I know this is not your usual woman-academic-with­
kids story. My family is more easily recognizable to other 
immigrant families with its multigenerational lifestyle. My 
parents were able to move from the east coast to Ontario 
in part because there was no other family in Nova Scotia. 
They’d moved from England to Canada in the 1960s and all 
of their extended family is in England or Australia. Last fall, 
my mother and I (my dad died a few years ago) celebrated 
fifty years in Canada. It helps too that my parents weren’t 
wealthy. The deal where my mum took care of my kids 
was good all round. We all benefited. They got a lot more 
time with the grandkids. We got time to ride bikes and sail 
boats. And I had, and still have, a happy work-life balance 
as a philosopher. 
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Bridging the Divide: Thoughts on 
Parenting as a Grad Student 
Carol Gray 
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 
I am a feminist, an activist, an attorney, a graduate student, 
a wife, and a mother. There are a few other labels I could 
add, but the point is, like others who are parents and 
graduate students, I constantly feel torn between these 
two roles. There is never enough time to do either role as I 
would like to do them, and I regularly feel guilty for falling 
short in both arenas. But parenting has been one of the 
most enriching experiences of my life, and I believe it can 
fit well with graduate work most of the time. Here I will offer 
some stories and tips on how to navigate and sometimes 
bridge parenting and graduate work. 
FINDING THE TIME 
Though grad school demands one’s full attention, one 
cannot put parenting on hold. When I started my PhD in 
political science, my son, Cameron, was nine years old. He 
is now fifteen years old. His childhood has passed while 
I’ve been in grad school. Perhaps the greatest challenge 
for parenting in graduate school is finding enough time to 
be the kind of parent I want to be and to complete the 
volumes of work required for graduate school. Before 
I started grad school, I would read aloud with my son 
before bed, taking turns reading as we plodded our way 
through Oliver Twist, Little Women, Little Men, and others. 
Grad school started when we were in the middle of David 
Copperfield and we never finished the book. I gradually 
shifted to singing Cameron a song before bed instead 
of reading because that 45–60 minutes of reading meant 
one hour less sleep. I just couldn’t risk getting less sleep 
because of the 15–20 hours of driving I was doing every 
week commuting to school. Before grad school, I tried to 
arrange my adjunct teaching schedule such that I could be 
home when my son got home from school so I could hear 
about his day. But grad school meant I was away so much 
more . . . missing so much more of his life. When I was at 
school, I’d try to find a break right after the time when the 
school bus dropped Cameron at home with his father so I 
could call and hear about school over the phone. I learned 
about many important events by voicemail (“Mommy, I 
qualified for the State Geography Bee today!”). Phones have 
been my lifeline for parenting. When I couldn’t attend his 
parent/teacher conference in person, I worked out with my 
husband to have me on speakerphone as I called in from 
school. When a doctor’s appointment was during a seminar 
I was taking, I explained to my professor in advance that I 
would need to step out of the seminar at the time of the 
appointment after my husband texted me that he was in 
the doctor’s office. And there I was again on speakerphone 
asking the many questions I would want to ask that my 
husband, who is quite reserved, would not want to ask. 
One of the hardest things is when there’s just no way 
around the conflict. The class I taught as a GA was on the 
night of my son’s band concert. When I’d arrive late for 
soccer games, I dreaded the question Cameron inevitably 
asked after the game: “Were you there when X happened?” 
[sometimes a goal or great play at the beginning of the 
game]. When I’d have to admit I didn’t get there until after 
that, his facial expression would drop in disappointment 
and I would sink with guilt. 
Harder still was the guilt of losing my patience because 
I was just so tired and stressed with the workload. I had 
the good fortune of having a mother who almost never 
raised her voice with me. I fell short so many times with 
Cameron in this regard, regularly apologizing afterwards 
and recommitting to doing better next time. But doing 
better was usually contingent on getting at least 7-8 hours 
sleep, a rarity for me in grad school. I struggled against 
chronic sleep deprivation because of school, my almost 
1.5-hour commute each direction, and trying to keep up 
with parenting responsibilities. Fortunately, my husband 
and I share parenting duties. He drives Cameron to soccer 
practices and theater rehearsals; I drive him to piano and 
oboe lessons and orchestra rehearsals. Sometimes I am so 
tired that I take a nap during the oboe lesson or I have to 
pull over to sleep when driving to or from school. I keep 
one of our inflatable camping bedrolls in my drawer at my 
office and nap at school sometimes to be able to drive 
home safely. 
The teenage years made the effects of sleep deprivation 
even harder. My politics have always been to teach my 
son to question authority. During the teenage years, that 
authority was usually me. My husband was always the easy­
going one, leaving the discipline to me. Cameron inherited 
my strong will and tenacity. His determination and litigious 
debate style of arguing (. . . I wonder where he got that from 
. . .) was a formidable test for my sometimes threadbare 
nerves. 
As I’m entering the job search phase of my graduate years, 
parenthood has meant that I can’t apply for any jobs that 
are more than an hour or so from our home. Our son is in a 
good high school, so our lives are very much rooted to the 
school system, the soccer team, the local theater program, 
the orchestra where he plays the oboe, etc., etc. Uprooting 
teens in high school isn’t advisable. I decided long ago that 
I may need to be jobless for a year or two after I finish my 
PhD until my son goes away to college and I can then be on 
the national job market. 
Though juggling grad school and parenting has been 
challenging, I have found some strategies to be helpful. 
Here are my tips and the stories behind them. 
BRING YOUR CHILD TO SCHOOL 
To try to minimize the alienation of having my school world 
so separate from my son’s world, I’ve looked for ways to 
expose him to my school world. I look for events at the 
university that would be good family entertainment. A 
couple times during the summer, my husband, son, and 
I travel more than an hour each way to attend a musical 
at my university. With my student ID, I get two student 
tickets, so the entertainment is both fun and affordable. 
When there is a snow day at my son’s school, I bring him to 
school with me. For classes that I’m a student in, I speak to 
the professor in advance to make sure they are ok with me 
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bringing my son. They have all been very accommodating. 
This has meant that when I’m at home talking about a class, 
I can say, “Cameron, that’s the class with Ernie that you went 
to, remember?” A couple times I have taken Cameron to 
classes I’m teaching, particularly if it’s a fun activity. I create 
a jeopardy game to help my students prepare for quizzes, 
and my son sometimes comes to be the score keeper. 
Cameron likes to meet my students and my students seem 
to like to meet him. 
SCHEDULE CLASSES AROUND FAMILY
ACTIVITIES 
I made a point of scheduling classes that would maximize 
my family time. Thankfully, the professor who oversees 
graduate students at my university has been very 
accommodating, always scheduling my teaching for classes 
that meet one night a week. This meant I only missed one 
evening with my family and was still home in time to see 
Cameron before he went to sleep. In terms of classes I 
took as a student, I sometimes opted not to take classes 
I would have enjoyed because they met at 6:30 p.m. and 
would have meant I didn’t see my son at all that day. I also 
managed to avoid Friday classes several semesters, which 
meant I was available to volunteer as a chaperone for my 
son’s school field trips. 
MAKE IT UP TO THEM 
It is inevitable that grad school will mean that during crunch 
times, I just don’t see much of my son and husband. I may 
miss my son’s bedtime routine because I have a paper 
due at 10 p.m. and even that 15 minutes at bedtime is 
more than I can spare. The summer I was taking my two 
comprehensive exams, I planned a five-day vacation with 
my family at the beginning of the summer, then studied 
for the rest of the summer and went to a hotel to take my 
exams so that I could be away from family distractions. 
Leaving them for those exam days seemed far better than 
failing and having to go through more grueling months of 
studying. Thankfully, my study plan worked and I passed 
both exams the first time. I told my advisor at the end of 
that summer that the following summer I had to make it 
up to my family. And I did. We spent weeks driving across 
country visiting national parks. We listened to many books 
on tape from Sherlock Holmes to The Adventures of Origami 
Yota, and all of the Harry Potter books. 
Our national park odyssey meant that I made little progress 
on my dissertation that summer, but it was one of the best 
things I’ve done in my life. When I hear my son talk to 
friends about his big national park summer, I know I made 
the right choice. Creating those childhood memories will 
hopefully help him forgive me for all the times I wasn’t 
there or wasn’t as patient as I should have been. One thing 
I have accepted is that it will probably take me longer to 
complete my PhD because I’m trying to be a good parent 
at the same time, and that takes time. Fortunately, I’m still 
expecting to be able to finish my PhD within the years of 
funding provided by a fellowship that I’ve received. I’m 
also fortunate that I’m on this journey with my husband so 
we are not dependent on just my income. 
TRY TO KEEP UP FAMILY TRADITIONS; BUT CUT
YOURSELF SLACK WHEN YOU CAN’T 
We’ve tried to keep our regular family traditions despite 
the intensity of graduate school. Every year I take my son 
trick-or-treating and help support him in creating his own 
Halloween costume. We plan a birthday party at some 
new location each year (e.g., at a hiking trail, a science 
museum, a corn maze, etc.). We have been pretty good 
about keeping Friday night as our “family movie night,” 
rotating who in the family gets to pick the movie of the 
week. (One professor in my department suggests that all 
grad students and professors take one day off from work 
each week to be able to come back fresh, rejuvenated, 
and more productive.) But sometimes we just haven’t had 
the energy and time to keep up with family traditions. One 
year, we didn’t get a Christmas tree because it was so late 
in the season and we were going away soon after Christmas 
anyway. We all realized we were just too tired, and it was 
too much work, so we would be happier not adding that 
“one more thing.” 
FIGURE OUT WAYS TO BE TOGETHER 
Children, like parents, often just want to find time and ways 
to be together. Sometimes I’ve been able to do this while 
doing things I had to get done for school. When I had to 
drive the one hour to school to return library books that 
were due, I invited Cameron to come and we’d go out to 
pick up some food afterwards. Sometimes we’d go to the 
science museum and I would bring my articles along to 
read while he learned and explored. At least we were there 
together. Now that Cameron is in high school, he has a lot 
of homework like me, so we plan homework outings where 
we study at the local bookstore that doubles as a library. 
One of the ways I’ve been able to maximize time with 
my family has been by doing my homework in the car 
while commuting. I get some books in Kindle form and 
I email myself PDFs of articles. Then I use the voice-over 
feature of my iPhone to have a monotonous mechanical 
woman’s voice read my assignments to me. With courses 
that are electives, I sometimes request the syllabus before 
registering to see how many of the books I can get in Kindle 
format so I can know if I will be able to complete reading 
while commuting. 
To an outsider it might seem that my roles as parent and 
grad student are compartmentalized. I usually don’t talk 
in my graduate seminars about my role as a mother. I 
usually don’t talk at my son’s soccer games about what 
I’m learning about Fanon and decolonialism or how to 
rethink feminism in a context that is not dominated by 
white, Western thought. My hour and 15-minute commute 
from Massachusetts to the University of Connecticut is my 
transition between these two worlds. But in truth, I’m almost 
always living in both worlds at the same time. And therein 
lies the challenge as well as the richness of parenting in 
grad school. 
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Anthropologists from Mars 
Leigh Viner 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST 
It’s a Sunday evening and students start appearing at our 
door, bearing cheese, crackers, grapes, beer, books tucked 
under arms, bringing friends, some nervous, some excited, 
some cool and confident. They greet me and chatter with 
each other as we unwrap the snacks and pour drinks. 
Everyone finds a spot in the living room on couches or cross-
legged on the floor, and we start to discuss the text we’ve 
chosen that month. My son comes in, listens for a while, 
chats with the students, grabs some cheese and crackers, 
then leaves. One evening at the end of Reading Group, he 
invites everyone to his room and we have a round of Rock 
Band with our new colleague, the Kant scholar, providing 
a karaoke rendition of Radiohead’s Creep. It was hilarious 
and wonderful, the essence of community. 
One summer, a student loaned me his Sex and the City DVD 
collection. I binge-watched the whole series during break, 
my twelve-year-old son seemingly not paying attention 
on the couch with his laptop. Years later, when he was 
in college, he rewatched the series with his partner and 
housemates, and I discovered that he knew and loved 
every character, their relationships, friendships, and story 
arcs. When asked by one of his professors to program 
the university’s international film festival, he quietly and 
without fanfare chose only films directed by women. 
My son is grown up now, and living in New York City with 
his partner. But over the years, I described parenting him 
as feeling like an anthropologist from Mars, with him as 
my assistant. Philosophers, like artists, always seem to be 
simultaneously inside and outside of society’s conventions, 
inside and outside of our own experiences. And my good 
fortune at finding a full-time position at a regional campus 
of a state university, with its emphasis on teaching and 
service, allowed me to provide a simple but stable life for 
us, with plenty of free time to take naps and walks, watch 
movies, play music, and talk about life together. 
The philosophers that I read, teach, and write about are the
ones whose ideas fuel and shape my life and imagination,
and are therefore the ones who have shaped my parenting as
well. Too many to list, but generally, they’re the philosophers
who value art, play, freedom, dignity, and openness. I was
trained in the history of philosophy, with a focus on the
ancient Greeks. Then, through teaching, I explored and grew,
following my curiosity and the needs of the program. But it
was my son and my students who led me to feminism. Like
all women, I’ve had to deal with injustices and indignities
over the years, which I usually tried to ignore or rise above.
But, coming to a new understanding of those experiences,
seeing them as they were reflected back to me through the
eyes of people I love and care for, and who love and respect
me, made it necessary to confront those issues differently,
more directly, more deeply, and more honestly, both for my
sake and for theirs. So the simplest and most powerful truth
is we learn at least as much from our children and from our
students as they do from us, if we’re doing it right. 
Raised in Philosophy 
Eli Kukla 
MCGILL UNIVERSITY 
I am a “pure-bred” philosophers’ kid; both of my parents are
philosophers. I am also a second-generation philosophers’
kid, as my grandfather is also a philosopher. So, growing
up, I was even more surrounded by philosophy than most
philosophers’ kids, and my immersion in the discipline has
affected seemingly every aspect of my life and personality.
My philosophical upbringing is seen on the surface level of
my personality. It shows in my sense of humor, my rhythm
of speech, my style of argumentation, and in the ways in
which I ask questions. It manifests all the way down to the
fundamental way in which I think, reason, consider evidence,
and evaluate claims. Being raised by philosophers has also
shaped how I move around the world and my relationship
with academia and college campuses in general. 
We who have been inducted into philosophical norms and 
habits (I say “we” because of my social and intellectual 
integration into the field, though not my academic one, as 
not only am I not a philosophy PhD or grad student, but I’m 
a linguistics major at McGill) have such a distinctive manner 
of speaking and communicating. Our senses of humor, our 
verbal ticks, our communicative cues: it’s all so unique to 
philosophy and makes us instantly recognizable. You may 
even be seeing these communicative cues while reading 
this, what with my long digression explaining the context of 
my use of the first person when talking about philosophers. 
The very rhythm and flow of how I speak was shaped from 
the beginning by philosophers, and it’s a rhythm and flow 
of speech that I have personally found to be ubiquitous 
among—and exclusive to—philosophers. We preface our 
speech to provide specific contexts to what we’re saying. 
We have a distinctive pattern of changing the speed at 
which we speak, speaking very quickly for certain parts of 
our sentences and then pausing to carefully consider which 
word needs to come next. We digress to try to clarify and 
to justify specific seemingly minor aspects of what we’re 
saying. When trying to convince someone of something, 
we continue to give reasons for our arguments long after 
they’ve already agreed, just to show that we have every 
counterargument and varying aspect of the issue covered. 
Speaking “Philosopher” almost feels like speaking a 
specific dialect. For example, philosophers often have 
a distinctive way of having friendly arguments which 
contrasts with how we have non-friendly arguments. The 
friendly argument does not come from a place of hostility 
or anger, but is instead used as a kind of marker that the 
person you’re arguing with is smart and interesting and 
has things worth saying. Non-philosophers, however, 
often can’t tell the difference between these two kinds of 
arguments, and therefore confuse the friendly argument 
with a non-friendly argument. This means that people 
who don’t speak the “Philosopher” dialect can sometimes 
perceive philosophers as overly confrontational or critical, 
similar to how non-New Yorkers hear the New York dialect 
and conclude that New Yorkers are rude and harsh. 
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These are all things that as philosophers, we may never 
realize we do until it’s pointed out to us, but once we 
recognize the pattern of the “Philosopher” dialect, it 
makes others with a philosophy background instantly 
identifiable. I know that for me, growing up surrounded 
almost exclusively by philosophers, it took me until around 
grade school to realize that no other people, neither my 
peers nor my teachers, talked like that, and that I had a 
distinctly unique or odd cadence to my speech, from their 
perspective. 
The most paradigmatic example of our dialect that I’ve ever 
heard was a quote from my grandfather, also a philosopher, 
who is currently living in an eldercare home in Toronto. 
He suffers from very serious Parkinson’s, so any kind of 
communication is extremely difficult. We asked him, not 
really expecting an answer, “So, how do you like the nurses 
here? Are they doing a good job?” to which he, speaking 
slowly and laboriously and fighting through the Parkinson’s, 
managed to say, “I haven’t interacted with them enough to 
formulate a proper inductive base yet.” 
Not infrequently, I’ll be faced with one of those boring 
conversation-starter questions by friends or something. 
You know the type, someone will disinterestedly say 
something like “if you could be any animal, what 
animal would you be?” to which I, in the way that only 
philosophers do, would respond with something like “well, 
I don’t really have an epistemic framework from which to 
answer your question,”—this would usually be met with 
a chorus of groans and eye rolls—“Do I get the animal’s 
brain and thoughts? In which case I don’t care what animal 
I am because whatever animal I choose wouldn’t have the 
capabilities to appreciate its being that animal . . .” and I’d 
usually go on from there. 
These patterns and rhythms of speech, argumentation, 
humor, and questioning have all been things that 
were imparted to me by virtue of growing up around 
philosophers. I’ve used the dialect metaphor a couple times, 
not only because of my personal interest in language and 
linguistics, but because I think it’s a really apt comparison. 
Like imparting a dialect, teaching me to speak and reason 
in this way wasn’t a conscious choice of my parents, 
but rather an inevitable consequence of my growing up 
around them. However, there were other ways in which my 
parents chose specifically to use philosophical principles 
and thinking to parent me. My mother in particular was 
very careful not to prescribe rules or assumptions without 
proper and convincing evidence. So there was never an 
attempt to control my behavior with reasons or excuses like 
“because I said so” or “that’s just the way it is.” 
Most people, at some point in their lives, reach a point 
where they question many of their assumptions about life. 
People question religion, sexuality, monogamy, traditional 
family structures, gender, et cetera. But for me, being 
raised by philosophers, I never started out with any of 
these assumptions to begin with. I never reached a point 
where I questioned religion, because I wasn’t given any 
convincing arguments for the existence of a God in the 
first place. I never had to question the value of monogamy 
because I was never raised to assume that it was the only 
way for a relationship to be, even though it’s the norm. I 
was exposed to all sorts of non-traditional family structures, 
various sexualities, gender identities, and beliefs and left 
to decide for myself their value. It was never assumed (by 
my mother, anyway) that I was straight or that I was cis, 
and she never treated me as though those were a given. (I 
discovered for myself over time that, at least as of writing 
this, I am not straight, but I do happen to be cis.) 
This parenting method of teaching me not to accept things 
without valid reasons did give me a fierce disdain for 
unquestioned authority, much to the dismay of many of my 
teachers throughout grade school. I would particularly anger 
certain teachers by my unflinching refusal to participate in 
the morning Pledge of Allegiance during elementary and 
middle school. Multiple times, I was told to stand up to say 
the pledge and would be met with flustered disbelief or 
confusion when I would argue back about the racism and 
neo-colonialism of dogmatic American Exceptionalism, or 
my many reasons for not wanting to perform support for 
the United States or American interests. 
Of course, my argumentation got more sophisticated over 
time, and by eighth grade I was much better able to express 
why I refused to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance 
than I was during fourth grade (the first time I had to say 
it). However, although I didn’t have the vocabulary or 
sophistication yet to explain why I had problems with the 
pledge, I knew that there was something about it that I 
found weird, unnecessary, and creepy. I knew this because 
of how my philosopher parents raised me to never accept 
something at face value, and to question unsubstantiated 
authority and assumptions. 
Socially, being a philosopher’s child gave me an interesting 
and unique community and set of relationships all over the 
world. I remember a while ago I was trapped unexpectedly 
in Toronto due to a snow storm, and philosophers from 
the University of Toronto took me in on short notice late 
at night. The experience got me thinking about how many 
connections I could have through philosophy all over the 
world. There are very few cities where I could be trapped 
and have no connections to anyone. Philosophy, as a 
field, is just the right size to enable this. Larger fields like 
English or biology don’t have the same kind of intimacy as 
philosophy. Philosophers tend to know each other, either 
personally or by their work, and seem to be quite well 
connected over social media. With a smaller and less well-
represented field, there is that same interconnectedness 
and intimacy as in philosophy, but you wouldn’t be able to 
count on connections in every city in the same way. 
Growing up accompanying my mom while she gave various 
talks or went to conferences in so many cities, I’ve come 
to view college campuses, and even more specifically 
philosophy departments, as little centers of my community 
all around the world. I’ve visited campuses in Bogotá, 
Johannesburg, Hong Kong, Beirut, Paris, and more, and 
in each of these places I’ve found some sense of home 
and belonging in them. I like to think of my relationship 
to campuses and philosophy departments sort of like 
Chinatowns. Almost everywhere seems to have one, and 
no matter how foreign or unfamiliar a place may feel, 
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Chinatowns all tend to have a similar feel and sense of 
welcoming familiarity. Being raised a philosophers’ kid has 
allowed me to have this feeling of a familiar community 
enclave almost anywhere I go. 
Being a philosophers’ kid also certainly helped me easily 
integrate into university life, and it helped me absolutely 
crush my first formal philosophy class I ever took, Social 
and Political Philosophy. But for me, being a philosophers’ 
kid is more than that; it’s a sense of self. Philosophy to me 
is more than a career or a department; philosophy is an 
identity. 
Children, Parenting, and the Nature of 
Work 
Lauren Freeman 
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 
This morning at breakfast, in the context of absolutely 
nothing, my five-year-old daughter looked at me, 
incredulous, and said, “Wait, you’re a teacher and a mother? 
How do you do everything? That’s so much work!” 
I just stared. I was dumbfounded at how her question 
and comment so clearly hit upon the truth. I was both 
surprised and grateful that she recognized that. I hadn’t 
been complaining about a deadline that I’d missed this 
week, or how behind I was in preparing for my classes 
and grading, nor had I so much as mentioned all of the 
seemingly insurmountable tasks I’d set out for myself that 
day. In fact, it was in a very rare moment of silence at our 
breakfast table that for some reason unknown to me, she 
came to that realization. 
It made me think about a somewhat similar episode from 
several months earlier. I was invited to be a community 
visitor at my son’s tiny elementary school. I’d visited 
the previous year, with great success, and I agreed to 
return to do some philosophy with the children. It is a 
classical school, a rare place where I can ask a room of 
five- to eight-year-olds, “Who is considered to be the first 
Western philosopher?” and without skipping a beat, they 
all screamed out, “SOCRATES.” Floored (that either they’d 
remembered my time with them from last year, or that they 
were drawing upon their own four-month study of Ancient 
Greece), I followed up with “and who was his most famous 
student?” “PLATO!!!” they all yelled, smiles abound. After 
making a silly joke distinguishing Plato from Play-doh (they 
found it to be funny), I continued to ask who Plato’s most 
famous student was and all I could hear, in joyous unison, 
was, “ARISTOTLE.” 
This led to our discussion of the good life. Within that 
context, we talked about the value of community and the 
nature and value of work. In order to do this, we read a 
children’s classic, Leo Lionni’s 1967 book, Frederick. 
The protagonist is Frederick, an idiosyncratic little field 
mouse. All through autumn, while his friends and family 
are busy collecting food and supplies to last them through 
the cold winter, Fredrick is off by himself, doing his own 
thing—to some, doing nothing. He collects rays of the sun 
for when it’s cold; colors, for when it’s dreary; and words, 
for when conversation runs out. 
Predictably, by the end of winter, all of the food and 
supplies that the field mice had collected in autumn are 
gone. They start to wither. But Frederick warms them by 
summoning rays of the sun in their imaginations (“or is it 
magic?”), brightens their days by reminding them of the 
glorious colors of nature, and recites verse, invigorating 
their minds, getting them through until spring. 
Frederick, we learn by the end, is a poet. 
After I finished reading the book, I asked the children a 
series of questions about the nature and value of work, in 
order to test their intuitions about these ideas. As adults 
reading this book in a capitalist society, we tend to think 
that “work” is what you get paid to do, what you can 
“cash in on” in terms of tangible or monetary rewards. The 
questions I was asking were meant to problematize for the 
children the nature of valuable work by bringing them to 
think about what kind of work is valuable in itself (and not 
just for some monetary or extrinsic gain). 
To my shock and joy, the children had very different 
intuitions than I thought they’d have. In fact, to my utter 
delight, the majority of them had profoundly feminist 
intuitions. 
They all believed, from the outset and without any 
convincing from me, that Frederick’s work—collecting rays 
of the sun, and colors, and words—was inherently valuable. 
Moreover, when I played the devil’s advocate and asked 
them to convince me that Frederick’s work was valuable 
(I was essentially asking them to construct an argument 
to this effect), as if it was the most obvious thing in the 
world, they told me that it’s absolutely necessary to collect 
rays of the sun, for how else will the mice stay warm in the 
cold winter? They also told me that it’s entirely necessary to 
collect colors, for we need them to brighten our lives in the 
grey of winter (they looked out the window). And, finally, 
they pointed out to me what was obvious to them (this is 
a classical school after all; every Friday they spend half an 
hour learning and reciting poetry together), that poetry 
is an important part of the good life and valuable work. It 
seemed almost absurd to them that I was belaboring this 
point. To them, it was all commonplace. 
Their argument about work, if I may be so bold as to 
reconstruct it, was that care work is work and that it’s 
inherently valuable. Frederick was caring for his friends 
and his community; it was Frederick who got the field 
mice through the winter by invigorating their imaginations. 
And the children recognized this kind of work as being of 
supreme value. 
I then brought the discussion back to their own lives. I asked 
them what work they see around them in their families and 
communities that they think is valuable. And again, to my 
delight and surprise, so many of them remarked upon how 
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their parents do the really hard work of raising them and 
caring for them and their families. What struck me is that 
children really and truly valued the care work that is done 
for them and only secondarily mentioned the “real jobs” 
that their parents have. 
The other day I was teaching a class in my feminist 
bioethics course and we were talking about vulnerability 
and dependency. We were talking about the various ways 
in which feminist bioethicists draw attention to the ways in 
which the work of caregiving in our society, that primarily 
and not accidentally tends to fall on the shoulders of 
women, is neither rewarded, nor recognized, nor valued. 
But then I thought of my daughter’s comments at breakfast, 
and the intuitions and strongly held beliefs of the children 
in my son’s school, and the deep value they see in the care 
work that surrounds them, and, like Frederick, I thought 
that maybe the rays of light to be found in the future will 
sustain us. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Learning from My Daughter: The Value 
and Care of Disabled Minds 
Eva Feder Kittay (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
Reviewed by Lisa Tessman 
BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY 
Eva Feder Kittay’s Learning from My Daughter is, in my 
view, her best work to date. As I read, I felt I was being 
guided through a varied terrain—some of it familiar, 
some unfamiliar—by someone who is much wiser than I 
am. Kittay’s experience—of loving and caring for both a 
daughter with severe cognitive and physical disabilities and 
a son who is not disabled—motivates and informs the book 
in crucial ways, while her philosophical mastery allows her 
to think through and convey with clarity the insights that 
this experience yields. The book made me realize that, as 
someone who has not raised a disabled child, I have much 
to learn from Kittay’s experience. But I also realized that 
having had the experience of raising any child—and thus 
the experience of loving exactly the child I have, and loving 
her exactly the way she is—I can understand and assent 
to pretty much everything Kittay proposes in her book, for 
it all follows in a sort of obvious and irrefutable way from 
such love. 
The book is divided into three parts. I found Part I to be 
the most profound—it is truly on what matters. Part II is a 
superb example of powerfully argued analytic philosophy. 
Part III is a significant and innovative contribution to care 
ethics. 
For readers like myself who accept and appreciate some 
of the basic premises of Harry Frankfurt’s work (in, for 
instance, “The Importance of What We Care About” and 
The Reasons of Love), Part I of Kittay’s book can be read 
as a tremendous deepening of the Frankfurtian position. 
For Kittay, as for Frankfurt, what really matters depends on 
what matters to us, which is to say what we love and care 
about. The value of a person’s life is not to be found in any 
of its objective properties; rather, it is through valuing that 
we confer value. The life lived by a person with disabilities 
matters—in exactly the same way that an able person’s 
life matters—because they value their own life, and also 
because their life matters to those who love them. It really 
is this simple. Valuing her daughter, Sesha, has given Kittay 
a different, more expansive, answer to the question of 
what matters than that offered by traditional philosophical 
accounts that center narrowly on Reason. 
Sesha’s life is a good life—but saying this requires a 
reexamination of the concept of the normal, because given 
the tendency to conflate the good life and the normal life, 
it might seem that a life that is not normal also cannot be 
good. When “the” good life is based on either a statistical 
norm or an ideal modelled by those who “exceed” the 
statistical norm in some way, people like Sesha appear to 
be living lives of lesser value. One might think that to resist 
the conflation of the good life with the normal life, disability 
advocates would want to abandon norms altogether and 
adopt, perhaps, an entirely subjective account of what a 
good life is. Kittay argues against this, instead examining 
why a desire for the normal persists, and finding that the 
desire for the normal is “a desire to have one’s own worth 
and that of one’s children confirmed” (33). The subjective 
experience of what constitutes a good life remains central 
in Kittay’s account—and so what Sesha cares about is what 
matters the most to the question of what makes her life 
good—but because value is also constructed socially, it 
is important for what we each value to also be valued by 
others, or put differently, for others to recognize the value 
of what we value. Within her family, Kittay created a “new 
normal,” but because recognition from those beyond the 
family is also vital, Kittay argues that, socially, we need 
to create “more capacious norms . . . that embrace more 
varieties of flourishing and that generate their own source 
of desirability” (41). 
Part II of the book takes up a set of questions about 
whether or not one is morally permitted (or required) 
to use reproductive technology to select either for or 
against disabling traits. While Kittay affirms that there 
can be good reasons to select against an impaired fetus 
in certain cases—making it permissible—they are not the 
reasons cited in the most common arguments; and thus, 
one of her main points is that there are problematic ways 
to approach the topic, found in some arguments for the 
claim that it is obligatory to select against disability. The 
idealizing methodologies behind these arguments tend to 
trigger the wrong intuitions, which then appear to confirm 
the assumption that the lives of people with disabilities 
are less good than the lives of people without disabilities. 
This sends a message that is both wrong and harmful to 
people with disabilities—that their lives are of lesser value 
and that they are not welcome in the world. Disability 
theorists have developed the “expressivist objection” not 
only to this type of argument, but also to any argument that 
supports the permissibility of selecting against disability. 
While Kittay endorses the expressivist objection when it 
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is applied to the kind of argument she has critiqued, she 
insists that not all reasons for engaging in prenatal testing 
and selection express the view that the lives of people with 
disabilities are of lesser value. In particular, she believes 
that a woman who is carrying a fetus may permissibly 
select against disabling traits if she decides that, while the 
life of a child with disabilities is as valuable as any other 
human life, when she takes into consideration whether she 
is capable of caring for a child with disabilities, whether 
she is willing to subordinate the rest of what she cares 
about, including her work and her other commitments, 
to the needs of a child with disabilities, whether it is the 
right time in her life to undertake this kind of care, how 
it will affect her other children, and so on, there may be 
good (all things considered) reasons to avoid carrying 
a fetus with disabling traits to term. Of course, disability 
is stigmatized, and not enough resources are directed to 
supporting people with disabilities and those who care 
for them—and it is in the context of these injustices that a 
pregnant woman must make her decision about whether to 
raise a child who is likely to have disabilities. This should be 
remedied. But even if it were, there are additional burdens 
to consider, including the emotional difficulty of caring 
for someone who is extremely vulnerable and dependent. 
In keeping with a feminist commitment to reproductive 
choice, a woman must be able to choose—without moral 
disapprobation—whether or not she accepts the burdens 
of any particular pregnancy. Nevertheless, Kittay reports 
on an important disagreement with her non-disabled son 
who gives several arguments in support of the expressivist 
objection. There is one point that he raises from his 
perspective as the sibling of a person with disabilities: 
a parent who selects against an impaired fetus runs the 
risk of communicating to any of their existing children that 
they are not loved unconditionally—they, too, would have 
been aborted had they had impairments. Kittay argues 
that loving unconditionally—whatever child one ends up 
with—is compatible with aiming to select against disabling 
traits (as long as one does so for the sorts of good reasons 
named), for all attempts at selection must be made with full 
awareness that our control is limited: whom we love, and 
whom we care for, is very much a matter of luck. An existing 
child is indeed to be loved unconditionally; a fetus, on the 
other hand, is not yet in-relation until someone accepts the 
role of caring for them in a dependency relation. 
While everyone is dependent at some points in their life, 
people with disabilities as severe as Sesha’s are utterly 
dependent for their entire lives. Caring for Sesha has thus 
given Kittay a view of dependency writ large and has 
led her to deeply appreciate the complexities of caring. 
Kittay’s analysis of the dependency relationship, and her 
development of care ethics in Part III of the book, builds on 
the insights of Part I by putting the subjective experience of 
what matters—which Kittay terms a person’s “CARES”—at 
the center of care ethics. Recognizing the fact of human 
dependency focuses us on the importance of care, for 
“when we cannot attend to our CARES on our own, we are 
dependent on others” (152). In Kittay’s account of what care 
is (which is a normative, and not just descriptive, account, 
namely, it presents what care ought to be), to care for 
someone is to promote their flourishing, while at the same 
time being attentive to the flourishing of other parties, such 
as the carer, as well as those outside of the relationship. 
Care is to be given to those who cannot flourish without it. 
Importantly, the flourishing to be promoted is “flourishing 
as endorsed (implicitly or explicitly) by the one cared for,” 
and the carer promotes such flourishing by attending to 
the “genuine needs” and “legitimate wants” of the cared-
for, where genuine needs must have “both an objective 
and a subjective basis” and legitimate wants are limited to 
those that can be satisfied without harming others (139). 
To care for someone, then, I cannot just do what I think 
is good for them; I must do what they themselves take to 
be good for them; put differently, I must care about their 
CARES. This is what makes it clear that the “completion 
of care”—namely, its reception as care—is necessary 
(though not sufficient) for something to count as care 
in the normative sense. If the purported “care” is not 
something that is at least eventually welcomed or “taken 
up” by the intended recipient, then it becomes evident 
that it was not something subjectively valued and did not 
contribute to their flourishing. For recipients of care that 
are not subjects, one just has to observe what seems to 
make them flourish—such as when one waters a plant 
and sees that this keeps it from wilting. But when the 
recipient of care is a subject, there must be some form of 
subjective endorsement of the care as care (where what 
counts as endorsement varies depending on what sort of 
agency the subject is capable of exercising). This means 
that care is not always possible—such as in the case of an 
intended recipient who refuses to accept any care. It also 
means that luck plays a large role in whether or not one 
can successfully care, because there are some unavoidable 
epistemic limitations to intuiting or predicting what will 
end up counting as care. When the recipient of care is a 
non-verbal subject, it can be hard to know what they do 
and do not endorse. Furthermore, “it may be questionable 
whether the endorsement is something that we ought to 
respect when it appears to go contrary to the person’s 
best interests. A resistance to an action intended as care 
may be due to a failure to comprehend the nature of the 
care” (200). In clear-cut cases, one should act to promote 
well-being even if the recipient does not welcome the 
care (though they still might eventually appreciate it in 
retrospect); for instance, a child, or an adult with cognitive 
impairments, might not understand that taking medicine 
will actually promote their well-being long term. But what 
Kittay highlights is that many cases are not clear-cut and it is 
difficult for someone who intends to care to avoid mistakes: 
How seriously should one take the wishes of someone 
who is limited in what they can understand (either from 
immature or impaired cognition or judgment)? Should their 
wishes be overridden whenever they seem to conflict with 
some objective list of what is necessary for flourishing? 
The danger here is of paternalism that overreaches, or of 
substituting one’s own subjective sense of what the good 
life is for that of the recipient. 
What I find most illuminating about Kittay’s newest 
contribution to care ethics is the way that it dissolves what 
I had previously understood to be a conflict between the 
value of autonomy and the value of care. According to 
my prior view, respecting someone’s autonomy would 
frequently come into conflict with caring for them. I had 
PAGE 34 SPRING 2020 | VOLUME 19  | NUMBER 2 





in mind, for instance, a non-disabled teenager who does 
not yet reliably act on sound judgments about what is 
good for them, due perhaps to their inexperience, or to 
impulsiveness, or to their susceptibility to the influence 
of others. Then, I thought, a parent must choose between 
either failing to respect the teenager’s autonomy by not 
permitting them to make their own decisions, or failing 
to care adequately for them by not protecting them from 
their own bad decisions. But at least, I thought, by violating 
their autonomy a parent could adequately care for them. Of 
course, such scenarios are possible—the teenager might, 
years later, engage in the “completion of care” by coming 
to acknowledge how the parent’s decision contributed to 
their flourishing. But Kittay alerted me to a third, and very 
likely, possibility: the parent’s version of flourishing and 
the child’s might genuinely differ, and not because the 
child’s version is deficient in any way; the parent might act 
to promote the version of flourishing that they themselves 
endorse, instead of the version of flourishing that their 
teenage child endorses (now or ever). Thus, the parent 
might intend to care but instead undermine flourishing as 
endorsed by the one who is to be cared for. Not only has 
the parent failed to respect the child, they have also failed 
to care. 
At the core of this insight is the dependence of value on 
valuing: what is valuable in life depends on what we care 
about, and we do not all have the same CARES. Perhaps 
the parent of a child who in some clearly manifest way 
falls “far from the tree”—to use Andrew Solomon’s (2012) 
metaphor—is forced to recognize this when they confront 
their child’s difference from the “normal,” though as Kittay 
points out the news of one’s child’s difference is not always 
welcome and may be experienced as “a profound shock 
. . . an upheaval of everything” (27). But for a parent as 
loving as Kittay clearly is, the shock wears off and the 
flourishing of the child—flourishing that is endorsed by the 
child in whatever way is possible for them, and that may be 
quite different from what flourishing is for the parent—is 
what comes to matter, thus making care, in Kittay’s fully 
normative sense, possible. Parents whose children appear 
more similar to themselves may be slower to grasp this 
basic point because the child’s similarity to them may 
support the parents’ illusion that they can substitute what 
they themselves value for what their child values. But if 
they never grasp it, they will miss out both on the joy of 
the completion of care—its reception as care, which signals 
successful caring—and on the anguish of becoming aware 
of their own unwitting failures of care. 
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Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social 
and Psychological Perspectives 
Edited by Benjamin R. Sherman and Stacey Goguen (New 
York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2019). 
Reviewed by Claire A. Lockard 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
In a situation of oppression, epistemic relations 
are screwed up. 
– José Medina1 
Although editors Benjamin R. Sherman and Stacey Goguen 
do not frame Overcoming Epistemic Injustice as a response 
to José Medina’s characterization of the state of many 
epistemic communities, I read the book as offering a set of 
responses to the screwed up nature of epistemic relations. 
Some contributors to the edited volume detail the ways in 
which epistemic relations are even more screwed up—and 
difficult to remedy—than we might at first think.2 Others 
develop analyses that offer finer-grained detail about the 
specific mechanisms by which epistemic relations are 
screwed up.3 And others offer strategies for epistemic 
agents to begin repairing these screwed up epistemic 
relations.4 
In their introduction to the book, Sherman and Goguen cite 
two concerns that, in their view, are discussed in epistemic 
injustice literature, but do not always come into focus as 
sharply as they should. First, they claim that discussions 
in epistemic injustice literature sometimes focus on 
uncovering and analyzing conceptual and metaphysical 
problems at the expense of focusing on what, in practice, 
we might do to ameliorate these problems (8). Although 
these conceptual and metaphysical problems are not left 
aside in the volume, Sherman and Goguen explain that “we 
were motivated by a more direct interest: we want to do 
better, and we solicited chapters that offer suggestions on 
how” (8). Second—and following from this desire to “do 
better”—each chapter in the volume deals, “at some level 
or another, with empirical research, to better understand 
what goes wrong, and how to improve (8).” “Empirical” 
is fairly broadly construed; Sherman and Goguen 
explain that “authors were invited to tie their ethical and 
epistemic arguments to empirical work and case studies” 
(11). Underlying both of these motivating concerns is 
the assumption that epistemic injustice can be, to some 
degree, overcome—an assumption that is reflected upon 
and problematized by various contributors throughout the 
book. 
Overcoming Epistemic Injustice is organized into four parts, 
each of which explores problems of epistemic injustice in 
different contexts: in our own psychological tendencies, 
in healthcare systems, in legal and carceral institutions, 
and in education and sports. The contributors address a 
broad array of topics, including but not limited to whether 
individual epistemic agents can ever adequately assess 
and correct our own biases and prejudices;5 the utility of 
Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic virtue for resisting 
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epistemic injustice;6 the intersections between epistemic 
injustice literatures and conversations in psychology, 
phenomenology, critical race theory, and care ethics;7 
and the limitations of epistemic injustice for theorizing 
the extent to which our systems of knowledge rely on the 
existence and perpetuation of ignorance, unknowing, and 
forgetting.8 
In my review, I follow the book’s two central organizing 
principles in order to tease out elements of the volume 
that perform this “doing better” and to identify places 
where the volume might have gone further in its aims. The 
book’s authors offer wide-ranging analyses and examples 
of epistemic injustice, with many different approaches 
to diagnosing and treating the problems they explore. In 
my view, Overcoming Epistemic Injustice offers its most 
generative conceptual and practical resources when 
contributors problematize the volume’s own explicit aims 
of overcoming, in favor of lingering with the unjust ways of 
knowing, forgetting, and learning that persist even—and 
perhaps especially—when we work to uncover them.
“DOING BETTER” AS A FRAMING DEVICE 
After finishing the book—and particularly in light of the 
contributors’ accounts of epistemic injustices in so many 
different contexts and cases—I wondered about the framing 
put forth in the introduction. Can epistemic injustice be 
overcome? Many scholars of epistemic injustice, both 
within and beyond this volume, answer in the negative, 
while refusing to let us rest easy with this pessimism.9 
Who is overcoming epistemic injustice: privileged knowers 
who perpetuate epistemically unjust knowledge practices, 
or marginalized knows who must navigate and resist 
these practices? How can or should conversations about 
these types of overcoming interact? Contributors take 
different approaches to who is overcoming—for some, 
the overcoming agent is the privileged knower who learns 
to recognize and ameliorate credibility deficits, help 
fill hermeneutical lacunae, and generally work toward 
epistemic justice within their own knowledge practices 
and those of their communities. For others, the overcoming 
agent is the victim of epistemic injustice, who develops 
strategies and tools for resisting the harms perpetuated by 
unjust knowledge practices. These different approaches 
to the notion of “overcoming” are perhaps part of a 
broader—and productive—tension in epistemic injustice 
literature between the need to resist the kind of optimism 
that (re)produces unjust epistemic norms and practices, 
and the need to recognize opportunities for exposing and 
ameliorating these very norms and practices. And there is, 
of course, an important distinction to be made between 
overcoming an injustice and getting better at resisting it. 
Still, I worry that the book’s move toward improvement and 
progress, both in its framing and in some of its content, risks 
recentering privileged subjectivities and offers a comforting 
narrative of progress at the expense of exploring themes of 
epistemic resistance in more detail, or analyzing structures 
that actively work to preserve epistemic injustice. 
In her contribution to the volume, “The Episteme, Epistemic 
Injustice, and the Limits of White Sensibility,” Lissa Skitolsky 
explores precisely this worry. In her view, contrary to the 
claims made by many scholars of epistemic injustice, “we 
do not need to perfect our own power of moral perception” 
(206) in order to resist epistemic injustice; in fact, unjust 
knowledge systems construct subjects as limited knowers 
who cannot hope to fully-recognize the ways in which our 
sensibilities are formed by them (206). It might be that 
testimonial injustice runs far deeper than much of the 
literature on epistemic injustice has acknowledged—power 
relations and social oppression are already operating at 
the level of our perception and social imagination (211). 
Thus, for Skitolsky, self-reflection and self-correction are 
far more fraught tools for correcting epistemic injustice 
than we tend to assume. She contends that “the problem 
of epistemic injustice is not essentially related to a lack 
of knowledge but rather to an affective disposition that is 
reinforced by our perception of what is ‘real’” (212). Rather 
than focusing on our own progress toward testimonial 
justice, people with structural privilege should work to get 
better at sensing their/our own epistemic, interpretive, 
and perceptual limits (212). To adopt Skitolsky’s framing, 
my concern is that questions about the impossibility of 
overcoming epistemic injustice—and the injustices that we 
risk by assuming that we can—are underexplored in this 
volume. 
There are, however, some notable exceptions. Indeed, one 
difficulty of reviewing this volume is the impossibility of 
generalizing about its contents—this might also be one 
of the volume’s strengths. In her afterward to the book, 
Miranda Fricker, whose work grounds a great many of the 
contributors’ analyses, wonders about the overcoming of 
epistemic injustice. In her view, “an in-principle pessimism 
is in order as regards this broader ideal of epistemic 
justice, for only pessimism will keep us safely alert to the 
ordinary injustices that, I believe, are bound to reoccur and 
reinvent themselves in new contexts and new mutated 
guises” (304) Some contributors to Overcoming Epistemic 
Injustice remind readers that even if we want to claim, 
perhaps contra Skitolsky and Fricker, that epistemic justice 
is possible within our current episteme, there may be 
some specific epistemological contexts that foreclose the 
possibility of overcoming. For instance, in their contribution 
to the volume, “Carceral Medicine and Prison Abolition: 
Trust and Truth-Telling in Correctional Healthcare,” Andrea 
Pitts contends that carceral systems distort the capacity for 
trust between incarcerated individuals and their healthcare 
providers (226)—these “patterns of distrust found in 
correctional healthcare settings cannot be alleviated by 
merely addressing the interpersonal dynamics between 
patients and providers” (231). Instead, Pitts argues for 
a prison abolitionist model in order to address these 
patterns and to develop new strategies for broader 
resistance to carceral systems. While I do worry about the 
collection’s emphasis on overcoming and getting better, I 
appreciate the moments in the text where overcoming and 
improving are rethought and reframed as opportunities for 
transformation and reimagination. 
A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO THE EMPIRICAL 
In addition to providing strategies for ameliorating 
epistemic injustice, the contributions to Overcoming 
Epistemic Injustice also offer empirical evidence to support 
the claims and arguments being made. The volume takes 
quite a broad approach to what it means to offer empirical 
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evidence. For instance, contributors to part one (“Managing 
Psychological Tendencies”) cite work from psychology. In 
“Gaslighting as Epistemic Violence,” on the other hand, 
Veronica Ivy [Rachel McKinnon] offers a detailed case 
study of a trans woman’s experience with competitive 
women’s cycling—by recounting the woman’s experience 
with mobbing and gaslighting, Ivy [McKinnon] is able 
to expand her earlier account of gaslighting in order to 
highlight its epistemically violent nature and its connection 
to PTSD (290). And Katrina Hutchison analyzes a study that 
she herself conducted about the epistemic dysfunctions 
that women surgeons experience when they interact with 
patients (183)—her analysis allows her to offer a broader 
conception of what “counts” as epistemic injustice beyond 
Fricker’s often-cited examples of credibility deficit.10 
This broad approach to the empirical even allows for 
exploration of concerns about the ways in which uses of 
empirical evidence might be quite good at helping uncover 
and address issues like implicit bias, but be less-equipped 
to identify and analyze what Lori Gallegos de Castillo calls 
the “elaborate conceptual apparatuses”11 that dominant 
knowers often use to explain away these biases. 
Perhaps because of the broad approach to what it means 
to offer empirical evidence, there are also a broad array 
of philosophical traditions and methodologies represented 
throughout the volume. Contributors engage literature 
from, among other traditions, postructuralism, virtue 
epistemology, critical race theory, care ethics, empirical 
psychology, and feminist philosophy. While epistemic 
injustice literature is generally taken to have a more 
analytic orientation, Overcoming Epistemic Injustice 
includes a few continentally leaning contributions, and 
some that fall outside this methodological binary. Some 
readers might feel frustrated that even the general unifying 
theme of “utilizing empirical methods” does not tie the 
book’s chapters together very neatly. Like the overarching 
theme of overcoming, the overarching empirical analyses 
are taken in many different directions. But I am inclined to 
feel excited by this methodological pluralism—questions 
or concerns I had with some approaches were addressed 
in later essays, which opens space for the contributions— 
even the ones that are quite different in their aims and 
theoretical commitments—to be put in productive dialogue 
with one another. 
This methodological pluralism also makes Overcoming 
Epistemic Injustice a promising pedagogical tool. When 
teaching about epistemic injustice, we might use selections 
from this book to tie material to work in psychology, 
sociology, criminology, law, bioethics, etc. Even more 
importantly, the book’s focus on the empirical results 
in it also being filled with examples of what epistemic 
injustice looks like “on the ground.” I can imagine pairing 
contributions in Overcoming Epistemic Injustice with some 
of the foundational essays in the field. For example, in 
her essay, “When Testimony Isn’t Enough: Implicit Bias 
Research as Epistemic Exclusion,” Lacey J. Davidson 
discusses the prevalence of implicit bias literature in white 
social epistemologists’ accounts of racism. Davidson uses 
Kristie Dotson’s work on epistemic exclusion and Jeanine 
Weeks Schroer’s work on the public uptake of stereotype 
threat discourse to characterize the epistemic injustices 
that emerge when philosophers are drawn to this data at 
the expense of engaging with literature that centers people 
of color’s experiences with racism. She cites work by 
Patricia Hill Collins, George Yancy, Nancy McHugh, Charles 
Mills, and María Lugones as offering these conceptual 
resources—some long before implicit bias literature 
emerged. Davidson worries that the privileging of implicit 
bias research over accounts like those offered by the 
theorists above functions as a way to avoid engaging with 
testimony that people of color have long been offering 
about the experience and operation of racism, in favor 
of using a particular kind of scientific evidence to think 
about white people’s racial biases (274). Reading Dotson 
and Davidson’s work together provides an example of an 
application of Dotson’s account of epistemic exclusion; 
furthermore, it illustrates a commitment to addressing 
epistemic injustices within the field of epistemic injustice 
research itself. 
The methodological pluralism of the volume could have 
been even further enhanced by what might be called 
citational pluralism. Although contributors work from 
a variety of different philosophical traditions, many 
essays take Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice as 
their theoretical starting point. Although Fricker’s work 
has been highly influential in thinking about epistemic 
injustice and oppression and many authors frame their 
analyses using additional resources that complement 
and complicate Fricker’s account, Fricker’s dominance in 
the volume is striking. Sherman and Goguen point out in 
their introduction that there is a long history of work on 
questions about the social, ethical, and political stakes of 
epistemology, and that this can be found in a variety of 
philosophical traditions (1). While Fricker’s importance in 
framing contemporary discussions of epistemic injustice 
should not be overlooked, the reliance on her work already 
sets contributors along particular paths, at the expense 
of engaging additional (and in some cases, marginalized) 
resources. 
This repeated citation of Fricker is not the result or fault 
of any individual author; instead, it is a reflection of the 
broader epistemic injustice literature. Veronica Ivy [Rachel 
McKinnon] reminds us of what is at stake when we repeat 
what Sara Ahmed calls “citational paths”12 that begin with 
Fricker (and no earlier): 
while Fricker is widely acknowledged as the first 
to name and circumscribe epistemic injustice in 
these terms—and there’s been remarkably wide 
uptake of her view—there’s a long history in black 
feminist thought, and other feminists of color, 
that should be seen as also working on issues of 
epistemic injustice.13 
My comments here are not intended to be critical of 
Fricker’s work specifically, nor are they an indictment of 
this volume’s editors or contributors; rather, they are an 
invitation for those of us writing on questions of epistemic 
injustice to engage with the broader (and earlier) literatures 
on the topic. I have in mind, for example, Mariana Ortega’s 
2006 essay “Being Lovingly, Knowingly, Ignorant: White 
Feminism and Women of Color.” Ortega worries about the 
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active ignorance of white feminists, despite women of 
color—like Audre Lorde and María Lugones—pointing out 
the whiteness of many feminists’ conceptual frameworks, 
questions, knowledge claims, and methodologies. I also 
have in mind Kristie Dotson’s “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting 
Epistemic Oppression”—here Dotson cites women of color 
who discussed “the problem of biased hermeneutical 
resources”14 long before the terms “epistemic injustice” or 
“hermeneutical injustice” were coined, including Patricia 
Hill Collins, Gayatri Spivak, and Patricia Williams (44).15 
QUESTIONS OPENED BY OVERCOMING
EPISTEMIC OPPRESSION 
Where in our lives and communities do we find epistemic 
and hermeneutic injustices? How do testimonial and 
hermeneutic injustices operate in our healthcare, 
educational, and carceral systems? How can individual 
knowers work against our own biases in order to work 
toward testimonial justice? How do epistemically unjust 
systems interact with the epistemically unjust behaviors 
or attitudes of individuals? What does (or should) it mean 
to “overcome” epistemic injustice? Why might the very 
assumption that privileged knowers can perform this 
overcoming be, itself, fertile ground for epistemic injustice 
to reassert itself? 
These are only a few of the questions posed and explored 
by the contributors to Overcoming Epistemic Injustice. 
While the book’s orientation toward overcoming is one 
that, in my view, ought to be problematized (and indeed, 
it is problematized at several important points by several 
different authors within the volume itself), its uses of 
case studies and examples make it a generative resource 
for those seeking on-the-ground accounts of identifying 
and beginning to address, as Medina puts it, screwed up 
epistemic relations. These questions are far from settled 
by the book, and this opens space for further philosophical 
investigation of the ways in which epistemic oppression, 
violence, and injustice structure our lives—and how these 
injustices might be rendered otherwise. 
NOTES 
1.	 Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial 
Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, 27. 
2.	 See Pitts’s “Carceral Medicine and Prison Abolition,” Skitolsky’s 
“The Episteme, Epistemic Injustice, and the Limits of White 
Sensibility,” and Davidson’s “When Testimony Isn’t Enough.” 
3.	 See Freeman and Stewart’s “Epistemic Microaggressions and 
Epistemic Injustices in Clinical Medicine,” Kidd and Carel’s 
“Pathocentric Epistemic Injustice and Conceptions of Health,” 
and Ivy [McKinnon]’s “Gaslighting as Epistemic Violence.” 
4.	 See Sullivan and Alfano’s “Negative Epistemic Exemplars,” 
Goguen’s “Positive Stereotypes,” and McWilliams’s “Can 
Epistemic Virtues Help Combat Epistemologies of Ignorance?” 
5.	 See McWilliams’s contribution, “Can Epistemic Virtues Help 
Combat Epistemologies of Ignorance?” 
6.	 See Madva’s contribution, “The Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue.” 
7.	 See Vasilyeva and Ayala-López’s “Structural Thinking and 
Epistemic Injustice,” McDonald’s “Returning to the ‘There Is,” 
Skitolsky’s “The Episteme, Epistemic Injustice, and the Limits of 
White Sensibility,” and Johnson’s “Teaching as Epistemic Care,” 
respectively. 
8.	 See Skitolsky’s contribution. 
9.	 See, for example, Medina’s The Epistemology of Resistance, 
or Kristie Dotson’s “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic 
Oppression.” 
10. There are many additional approaches to the empirical that I am 
unable to summarize in detail here. I have cited a few here that, 
in my view, illustrate the wide range of approaches taken by the 
volume’s contributors. 
11.	 De Castillo, “Unconscious Racial Prejudice as Psychological 
Resistance: A Limitation of the Implicit Bias Model,” 275. 
12. Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life, 15. 
13. Ivy [McKinnon], “Epistemic Injustice,” 438. 
14. Dotson, A Cautionary Tale,” 29. 
15.	 See also Ortega’s bibliography for “Being Lovingly, Knowingly 
Ignorant,” as well as Veronica Ivy [Rachel McKinnon]’s endnote 
7 in “Epistemic Injustice” for additional examples of women-of­
color feminists exploring questions of epistemic injustice and 
ignorance. 
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Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against 
Family 
Sophie Lewis (New York, NY: Verso, 2019). 224 pp. $26.95. 
ISBN 9781786637291. 
Reviewed by Jina Fast 
NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
Sophie Lewis in her book Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism 
Against Family doesn’t seek to enter the feminist debate 
on surrogacy, but rather to completely reset the terms of 
it. Over the past fifty years, the ethics of surrogacy have 
often focused on two aspects: the rights of couples who 
desire access to reproductive technologies to extend 
genetic lineage and construct family on the basis of 
shared biology, and the economic and bodily rights of 
the surrogates who make possible said reproduction 
for the intended parents. Often these rights are posed 
as being in an inherent tension, which considerations in 
ethics are meant to mitigate or solve as best they can. 
Lewis, by contrast, working from a queer, cyborg, feminist 
perspective and within a reproductive justice framework, 
rejects the possibility of an ethical surrogacy practice within 
a cissexist, heterosexist, capitalist, and anti-black racist 
global system. Yet, she argues not for its abolition, but 
for its radical expansion to build solidarity between paid 
and unpaid gestators. Practically, radical expansion, Lewis 
maintains, would better approximate access to reproductive 
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justice for surrogates through making concrete the practice 
of “surrogates running surrogacy,” which is rhetoric often 
deployed by fertility clinics without concrete realization. 
However, the desired end of surrogates working without 
bosses is not the limit of Lewis’s argument; rather, she 
sees this as a step in the ultimate project of dismantling 
capitalism and its alienating effects on the many forms of 
labor marginalized groups perform within this economic 
model. For Lewis, the abolishment of capitalism would 
eradicate the very meaning of the word “surrogate” as the 
boundaries between the original or intended parent and 
the surrogate or substitute parent are made fluid (145). 
Importantly, while Lewis argues that the practice of 
surrogacy requires radical transformation, she is quick 
to reject the radical feminist approach steeped in savior 
politics. Surrogates, for one, do not empirically benefit 
economically, legally, mentally, or physically from the 
banning of the practice of surrogacy. Rather, the effects, 
unintended or not, tend to further obscure the work that 
surrogates do and compromises their lives as they are 
subjected separation from their families, forced travel 
across borders, inductions, and c-sections in order to fulfill 
a market demand amid restrictions on their economic 
opportunities. Centered here in Lewis’s concerns are the 
people who work as surrogates, but her argument quickly 
expands as surrogacy functions primarily as a metaphor 
for the way kinship under capitalism is structured by 
possession. 
The strengths of Lewis’s text are many and include (1) 
her analysis and rhetorical disruption of the language 
surrounding surrogacy, which has failed to be seriously 
considered in other contemporary works on the ethics of 
surrogacy, (2) the novel application of a queer, cyborg 
feminist theory to the issue of surrogacy, and (3) the extent 
to which she enables thinking anew about heterosexist and 
patriarchal conceptions of the family freed from a capitalist 
and neo-liberalist logic. Regarding the first, Lewis takes 
as her target arguably the most famous surrogacy center 
in the world, Dr. Nayna Patel’s Akanksha Infertility Clinic 
in Anand, Gujarat, India. Patel’s work has been previously 
highlighted in both popular coverage and scholarly work. 
For example, she has been interviewed on the English 
BBC World program HardTALK, featured on a Vice News 
segment, and centered in the documentaries Google 
Baby (2009) and House of Surrogates (2013). In terms of 
scholarship, Lewis relies on the extensive ethnographic 
work of scholar Amrite Pande reading her interviews with 
the surrogates who live and work at Patel’s clinic with the 
language Patel uses to describe the work of surrogacy and 
herself as the lead clinician. Here, Lewis reveals the many 
contradictions and obscurities linguistically performed 
that have semiotic and concrete effects. For example, Dr. 
Patel frames herself as choosing the work of surrogacy in 
order to facilitate “women helping women,” but her clinic 
is for-profit. Thus, the work at Akanksha is not charitable, 
but is oriented toward the goal of creating profit for the 
owners of the clinic, of which Patel is one. Yet, by using 
this language repeatedly and having others endorse her 
through this rhetoric, Patel is able set her clinic up as 
different from other surrogacy clinics that are “womb­
farms” (91). Furthermore, through framing in pseudo-
feminist language the surrogate process as “women 
helping women” she is able to “ritualistically unburden 
her customers’ doubts about the ethics of the exchange” 
(91). One does not have to be a Surrogate Exclusionary 
Radical Feminist to have doubts about surrogacy, as the 
racialized, classist, and nation-state of origin global politics 
can be quite obvious. Paying for surrogacy is expensive, 
thus one’s socio-economic class, which is further tied to 
racialized identity, one’s nation-state of origin, gender, 
and even religious and ethnic identity (for example, in 
India many of the surrogates hired by Hindu couples are 
Muslim). Yet, the language deployed here does even more 
work by obscuring surrogates’ labor as work by reframing 
it as “helping” and reinforcing genetic off-spring as a gift 
beyond quantification. That both of these notions are 
patently false is both beyond and undoubtedly the point. 
The surrogate is paid, though arguably not fairly, and there 
is a market for surrogacy and other forms of reproductive 
technologies, which shows the value of genetic offspring 
is monetarily quantified within a capitalist economic order. 
The second notable strength of Lewis’s work is her use 
of queer theory and cyborg feminism to show that radical 
feminists’ efforts to thwart surrogacy is theoretically 
incoherent and practically disastrous. Queer theor(ies) 
are especially suited to support Lewis’s argument that 
surrogacy, like pregnancy and sex work, can be experienced 
in multiple ways. It is far from, as radical feminist groups 
like FINRRAGE claim, always experienced as oppressive 
and constituted by a loss, namely, loss of the child once 
delivered. Here, Lewis also extends a common critique of 
the white feminist framework of Margaret Atwood’s famous 
text The Handmaid’s Tale (1985), which serves the anti-
surrogate pseudo-feminist message through rendering 
all surrogacy as enforced and indicative of oppressive 
gender politics. Yet, as is the case in most components of 
human life, there are multiple meanings possible at once 
constituting the same act or experience, thus universal 
and universalizing claims lead to misunderstanding and 
harmful effects. For many surrogates, pregnancy and 
childbirth are literal work for which they are paid, and 
the fetuses gestated are never imagined to be theirs to 
care for in the way that they care for the children in their 
families. Pande’s scholarly work complicates this notion 
a bit in that surrogates interviewed often imagine some 
kind of relationship with the child postpartum, though 
not a relationship akin to “parent” or “mother,” but a 
relationship that will not materialize, nonetheless. But 
this doesn’t necessarily hurt Lewis’s argument in that 
the notions of “mother” and “parent” themselves are not 
naturally determined relationships and contain within them 
contradictions and multiple meanings. For one, a child 
might have multiple mothers, or the role of “the mother” 
might be split between multiple people. Thus, on Lewis’s 
reading the surrogate exclusionary radical feminist (SERF) 
argument reinforces at least three problematic dictums. 
First, it reinforces the idea that surrogacy is not “work” and 
thus erases the labor that constitutes gestating and birthing. 
Inevitably, this reinforces part of Dr. Patel’s marketing 
concept, namely, that surrogacy is a “different kind of 
work” and a “labor of love.” Second, SERFs re-naturalize 
parenthood as a cis-hetero project that entails cisgender 
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women gestating “their own” fetuses. Finally, the common 
SERF refrain reinforces a white savior politics, and SERFS 
themselves as white saviors, as it sets up brown and black 
surrogates of the global south as victims unable to act or 
make choices for themselves and their families. Lewis’s 
work, by contrast, provides space for a consideration of the 
voices of surrogates themselves, who do not understand 
themselves as oppressed or as victims in need of being 
saved. 
For solutions to these problems, Lewis reads theorists like 
Donna Haraway (1991) and Maggie Nelson (2015) together 
and argues that we first must accept that authorship can 
only ever be co-authorship with others and even with 
technologies. One never makes themselves or undertakes 
a project solely on their own. Rather, it requires being made 
by and with others as we learn from others, co-operate with 
others, and recognize others. Understanding pregnancy 
and the care of children in this manner would, Lewis 
asserts, remake in revolutionary fashion our collective 
understanding of responsibility, family, parenthood, 
and even gender. Pregnancy here is understood as 
always being a form of alienation (128) whether chosen, 
accidental, or surrogate; but it is an alienation that is 
simultaneously an intimacy. One is alienated from one’s 
body as one becomes ever closer to the goings on of the 
body; one becomes closer to one’s projects as one is split 
from oneself quite literally in becoming multiple. It is, to 
put it succinctly, an inherently queer experience. But it 
is a queer experience that can be aided by and the pain 
lessened through technological advancement. This last 
point, that pain can be lessened through advancements 
in reproductive technologies and science, Lewis notes, is 
especially prescient as we consider the discrepancies in 
care to which white pregnant people and black pregnant 
people have access and the effects of such discrepancies 
that manifest well beyond the experience of pregnancy. 
Finally, while Lewis provides further evidence that the 
family itself and the work that goes into producing “family” 
can be varied and multiple, she simultaneously argues for 
the destruction of the family. The family, for Lewis, is the 
space where capitalism, neo-liberalism, heterosexism, and 
patriarchy intersect necessarily to maintain the oppression 
and alienation of marginalized groups. Queer reformation 
strategies that focus on remaking the family through laws 
protecting queer unions, childbearing, and kin-making 
will not be enough in the end to transform the oppressive 
politics of capitalism as long as the family remains tied to 
notions of privacy and ownership. For Lewis, the only way 
to end exploitative surrogacy is to reimagine these ideas of 
privacy and ownership, which themselves can be abolished 
only concomitantly with the abolition of capitalism. 
While I thoroughly enjoy Lewis’s work in Full Surrogacy 
Now and her arguments are sound, her considerations at 
times fall short in their practical application to the work 
of peripartum gestation and care. As revealing as it is to 
follow the author in her deconstructive analysis of the 
performative language surrounding surrogacy, as well 
her positive argument that frames all work as gestational, 
it doesn’t follow that there are multiple people who can 
do (some of) the work of literal gestation of a fetus and 
postpartum breastfeeding. Pointedly, the collapse of 
the “can be” or “ought” and the “is” here is somewhat 
troubling. To be fair, and with full disclosure in mind, 
perhaps part of my hesitancy to accept that the work of 
gestating fetuses can be, and thus is, like any other work 
is due to the fact that I have recently participated in the 
gestational work of pregnancy and am still engaged in 
the work of breastfeeding. It doesn’t feel like work that 
could be done by another, and while support makes each 
of these forms of work easier, there is a materiality to the 
embodied experience of peripartum work that is arguably 
missing here. 
Nevertheless, Lewis has a way out. Through the construction 
of her argument, she can hypothetically respond to any 
practical or material concern by stating that the objector 
simply is unable to imagine the world—and thus surrogacy 
as practice—freed from the constraints of capitalism, neo­
liberalism, and heteropatriarchy. For example, Lewis may 
counter that my concern mentioned here simply reveals 
me to be like her father attached to the notion of shared 
genes as the source of family. I, she may note, am unable 
to conceive of the family, parenthood, care work, and so 
forth outside of the oppressive ideological and structural 
constraints that contemporarily bind and obscure the 
possibilities of imagination. And to be reflective, perhaps 
this is true, in the same way that it may be impossible to 
conceive the being of womanhood outside of patriarchy, 
or what blackness is outside of the constraints of white 
supremacy. The fact that projects exist with the intention 
of imagining womanhood outside of the male gaze, 
and blackness outside of the white gaze, suggests that 
surrogacy, parenthood, and gestation in general can be 
reimagined and remade as well. 
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Reproductive Justice: An Introduction 
Loretta J. Ross and Rickie Solinger (California: University of 
California Press, 2017). 360 pages. ISBN 978-0520288201. 
Reviewed by Kathryn Lafferty-Danner 
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 
Reproductive Justice: An Introduction, by Loretta J. Ross and 
Rickie Solinger, provides a comprehensive and compelling 
argument for using a reproductive justice framework to 
address issues that incorporate reproductive policies but 
extend beyond the “pro-choice/pro-life” dichotomy that 
is typical in American cultural discourse. Beginning in the 
1990s, women of color and low-income women began to 
push back on the use of the word “choice” within white 
feminist discourse, demonstrating the serious limitations to 
the “choice” framework for many marginalized communities. 
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Also, the “choice” framework, as it has been used, focused 
nearly entirely on preventing motherhood and less on 
the full spectrum of reproductive health care services 
and the intersecting issues that surround reproduction. 
Combining their scholarly and activist backgrounds, 
Loretta J. Ross and Rickie Solinger work to create a 
useful introduction to the topic for scholar and activist 
audiences alike, crafting a complex, comprehensive, and 
intricate theoretical framework with a practical application. 
Beginning in 1994, twelve women of color formed an 
alliance called Black Women on Health Care Reform and 
began vocalizing the myriad ways in which white feminism 
dominated discussions in the pro-choice movement and 
in 2003, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Health 
Collective held a national conference where they sought 
to define reproductive justice. Reproductive Justice: An 
Introduction builds off of the work set out in the first book 
about reproductive justice, Undivided Rights: Women of 
Color Organize for Reproductive Justice (2004), written by 
Jael Silliman, Marlene Gerber Fried, Loretta Ross, and Elena 
Gutiérrez. 
Ross and Solinger define reproductive justice as having 
three primary principles: “(1) the right not to have a child; 
(2) the right to have a child; and (3) the right to parent 
children in safe and healthy environments” (9, emphasis 
original). The term “reproductive justice” comes from 
combining reproductive rights and social justice, creating 
a coherent and wide-ranging term that encompasses 
a variety of social justice concerns that intersect with 
reproductive rights issues. With this definition, Ross 
and Solinger extend the very limiting discussion of pro-
choice/pro-life political and social discourse well beyond 
the common conversation that focuses on individual or 
personal choices, and demonstrate the ways in which 
reproductive policies and decisions dictate how whole 
communities are impacted by these policies. Reproductive 
justice focuses on communities having the resources to 
not only have an abortion and access to contraception, 
but also for individuals to have jobs where they are paid 
a living wage, live in environments that are free of racism, 
and enact laws and policies that take into consideration 
how some populations face multiple types of oppression 
simultaneously. 
Reproductive justice incorporates an intersectional 
perspective and focuses its theoretical lens on fundamental 
human rights that highlight and, at times, resist policies 
that are based on gender, racial, and class prejudices. 
Furthermore, a reproductive justice lens not only focuses 
on individual experiences of those who are the most 
marginalized, but on the ways in which state strategies and 
policies affect communities over time. This lens situates 
reproductive issues within both an individual context as 
well as within a larger social and historical context where 
they occur. Ross and Solinger’s examples illustrate how 
reproductive policies have affected whole communities, 
such as the racialized practice of sterilization and the impact 
the Hyde Amendment has had on lower-income women. 
In the first chapter, Ross and Solinger detail the foundational 
theory of reproductive justice, showing the ways in which 
it utilizes and expands the human rights framework, and 
demonstrate how fundamental human rights are not 
separate from reproductive health care. Building off of 
a broadly defined human rights framework, Ross and 
Solinger argue that the right to bodily self-determination 
is perhaps “the most foundational human right” (56). 
Reproductive justice differs from reproductive health 
and reproductive rights in that it calls for us to identify 
how reproductive oppression is the result of multiple, 
interlocking oppressions and is intertwined with the global 
human rights system as a legal framework. They argue 
that healthcare, including reproductive healthcare, is not a 
“commodity for purchase” (17) but is a human right that is 
foundational to bodily self-determination. 
The second chapter describes the challenges and 
possibilities for building on current reproductive justice 
work and highlights some of the ways in which reproductive 
justice can help build an inclusive, unified human rights 
movement. Ross and Solinger claim that personal, 
firsthand storytelling within reproductive justice acts as a 
powerful tool, providing insight into an individual’s unique 
situation and that can help us to understand how others 
think as well as make decisions. They use the metaphor 
of “shifting lenses” (59) to describe the ways in which 
no single story can describe everyone’s experience and 
discuss the idea of “polyvocality” (59), or using many 
voices with different perspectives that come together to 
make a unified movement for human rights activism and 
theory. Historically, narratives have been used to give voice 
to those who are often silenced by racial or gendered 
oppression, such as women speaking out about rape in 
the 1970s that started a global movement to end violence 
against women. Reproductive justice advocates the use of 
narratives as a “key strategy for making social justice claims 
to change the world” (60) by building powerful coalitions 
through storytelling. There is also a useful discussion of 
the differences between reproductive rights, reproductive 
health, and reproductive justice, noting how reproductive 
justice calls for a holistic and integrated analysis that 
pushes against the structural conditions within which 
individual bodies, labor, sexuality, and reproduction are 
regulated (68–73). The reproductive justice framework 
centers on the power dynamics that are at play and seeks 
to work across social justice issues, demonstrating the 
capacity for reproductive justice to be thought of as not
only focusing on reproductive concerns, but also on other 
issues that intersect with reproductive issues, creating a 
multi-racial, multi-issue, and polyvocal movement. 
Ross and Solinger move into discussions of contraception 
and access to reproductive health in the third chapter, 
providing further distinctions between reproductive justice 
and other reproductive frameworks. They discuss how 
Roe v. Wade, often hailed as one of the largest wins for 
feminists, is couched in privacy claims and is considered a 
“negative right,” the right to be left alone by the government 
and for offices not to interfere in personal healthcare 
decisions. Reproductive justice seeks to reframe access 
to reproductive health services as a positive right, a right 
that includes not only choice in medical decision-making, 
but that also extends this positive right to reproductive 
services outward, to networks of support that provide all 
women with the ability to exercise their right to an abortion. 
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Ross and Solinger take on the legal aspects of abortion as 
well and note the ways in which legislation leaves out the 
social environments from which these discussions stem. 
For instance, legal aspects of abortion fail to recognize how 
economically burdensome obtaining an abortion in the 
United States can be for low-income individuals. Instead of 
insisting on the Court creating rights for humans, the authors 
contend that human rights are natural and inherited, simply 
based on the fact that we are all human. To demonstrate this 
claim, Ross and Solinger explain that reproductive human 
rights start with the “acknowledgement that a person has 
an inherent human right to control her own body and then 
seeks to use the political process to express this right and 
the judicial process to protect this right” (128). In other 
words, a reproductive human rights framework challenges 
the belief that rights begin with the judicial system and 
argues that social justice movements influence laws first. 
Instead of rooting the reproductive framework in the 
law, their position is that the most effective way to build 
reproductive autonomy is through the use of grassroots 
organizing, coalitions with other social justice-oriented 
organizations, and forming alliances across race and 
class lines. The Hyde Amendment, which prohibits public 
funding for abortion and was passed shortly after Roe, is 
one example they use to demonstrate the ways in which 
politics has more influence in health policy than actual 
health care and medical science. In addition, Ross and 
Solinger argue that accessibility is key to high standards 
of health care and that accessibility comes in the forms 
of physical accessibility, non-discriminatory services, 
economic accessibility, and the accessibility of information 
about those services. They demonstrate the ways in which 
these issues that are discussed within reproductive justice 
do not only focus on how it impacts the individual— 
although personal storytelling is one aspect—but on how 
these issues impact communities as a whole. 
The fourth chapter focuses specifically on the right of 
individuals to parent, particularly the right to parent their 
children in safe and healthy environments. Ross and 
Solinger demonstrate the ways in which giving birth has 
become less of a private affair and that motherhood has 
become politicized in different ways, particularly for 
women of color. They emphasize the interdisciplinarity 
of reproductive justice theory and practice, specifically 
showing the ways in which different issues, such as 
education, play a role in reproductive justice. They look 
beyond the choices that individuals make and discuss the 
social determinants of health and how the lived conditions 
of individuals can impact their reproductive health, 
such as how “social and economic resources can create 
advantages and disadvantages for parenthood based on 
income, education, social class, race, gender, and gender 
identity” (173). In this chapter, the concept of “sexual 
citizenship” is discussed, which is a term used to describe 
the ways in which authorities and the government either 
grant or deny sexual rights to some groups and not to 
others. For instance, women of color and immigrants are 
often portrayed as being “hyperfertile” as well as “welfare 
queens” and therefore should not have “too many” 
children because it would put a strain on social services. 
While there are many goals of reproductive justice, one 
of those goals, discussed extensively in this chapter, is 
the need to end reproductive coercion in medicine. They 
trace some of the historical and legal issues surrounding 
reproductive coercion and explain some of the ways in 
which women of color, disabled women, drug-dependent 
women, and other groups have been coerced into medical 
procedures they did not want or need. Ross and Solinger 
further explain that poor women are often seen as being 
poor decision-makers and, therefore, are denied dignity 
and shown to not be deserving of the same sexual and 
biological opportunities as others who are not poor. In 
this chapter, they focus heavily on five ways in which the 
reproductive justice framework intersects with other social 
issues, discussing immigration, incarceration, housing and 
gentrification, education, and environmental issues as all 
being related to reproductive justice. The authors do an 
excellent job explaining the ways in which reproductive 
justice is not a single issue; it extends out into countless 
other social issues and cannot be considered separate 
from other large, structural concerns in society. 
The epilogue to this text is useful to activists who want to get 
a closer look into some of the ways in which reproductive 
justice can be implemented within grassroots organizations. 
Women of color are the pioneers of reproductive justice, 
and this chapter shows the ways in which six different 
organizations (New Voices for Reproductive Justice, 
Colorado Organization for Latina Opportunity and 
Reproductive Rights, SisterLove, Native Youth Sexual Health 
Network, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice 
Collective, and the International Center for Traditional 
Childbirth) have worked to incorporate reproductive justice 
into community organizing. Noting the similarities between 
these six different organizations, which are located all 
over the United States, Ross and Solinger show how each 
organization takes an intersectional approach and builds 
alliances with other organizations. They also highlight how 
all of the organizations share the belief of examining the 
conditions of the specific communities they serve and the 
history of that community in order to get the resources they 
need in that community, acknowledging that each region 
and demographic will have different needs. 
This book is written for both activists and scholars. For 
activists, the book provides strategies and practices “to 
build a unified, radical, and inclusive movement” (58) with 
clear examples from successful organizations and practical 
uses for implementing a reproductive justice framework 
into community organizing. For scholars, this introduction 
is a useful resource in discovering ways to incorporate 
the reproductive justice framework into research and 
scholarship, appealing to both new and veteran scholars 
in a variety of fields, from public health to history. As a 
framework, reproductive justice is a tremendously expansive 
term that encompasses so many social justice issues to 
adequately cover in an introductory text; at times, it can 
become overwhelming for the reader. However, Ross and 
Solinger blend historical examples, legal rulings, personal 
stories, and a thorough explanation of the reproductive 
justice framework to alleviate that overwhelming feeling. 
They ask their audience to expand on the framework and 
incorporate it into research, community organizations, or 
other social justice movements. Reproductive justice, built 
by women of color and low-income women and centering 
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these marginalized voices, has become a new and useful 
way to envision radical and important changes to how we 
address the current issues we face as a society and how we 
can further human rights protections for all individuals as 
well as their communities. 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
NEW APA BLOG! WHAT IT’S LIKE TO BE AN
HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY
(HBCU) FACULTY MEMBER 
Keep an eye out for this new APA Blog! 
The purpose of the APA Blog on What it’s like to be an 
HBCU faculty member is to spotlight faculty members in 
our profession who work at historically black colleges and 
universities, which are minority serving institutions. The 
blog also aims to introduce and familiarize faculty 
members at majority-serving institutions with the distinct 
perspectives, experiences, and, sometimes, limitations, 
that are unique to students and faculty at historically black 
colleges and universities. If you have a recommendation 
for a faculty member at an HBCU, or other minority-serving 





FAB 2020 is the 13th World Congress of the International 
Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics. Due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, FAB 2020 will be moving to a virtual 
platform. 
Our World Congress brings together academics and 
practitioners from diverse backgrounds to explore and 
develop feminist perspectives on ethical issues relating to 
health. It is a vibrant and welcoming gathering that offers 
significant opportunities to share ideas, learn from others, 
participate in constructive debates and engage with a 
supportive network. 
The FAB 2020 congress theme is “Feminist Perspectives 
on Solidarity and Autonomy.” We anticipate a diverse 
array of stimulating presentations and discussions on this 
theme. There will also be opportunities to discuss feminist 
investigations in other areas of bioethics. 
For more information, visit the FAB website at https://www. 
fabnet.org/. 
CONTRIBUTORS 
Saray Ayala-López works as an assistant professor 
of philosophy at California State University, 
Sacramento. Their current work applies conceptual tools 
from different areas of philosophy (philosophy of mind 
and language, and epistemology), together with empirical 
insights from cognitive psychology, to understand morally 
interesting questions. They are especially interested 
in explanations (structural explanations are their favorite) 
and the absence of them, sex and gender in science, 
conversational dynamics and the many things we can do 
with words, cognitive externalism, conceptual ethics, and 
several questions within social ontology and epistemology. 
Amy Allen is liberal arts professor of philosophy and 
women’s, gender, and sexuality studies and head of the 
philosophy department at Penn State. She is the author of 
four books, including, most recently, The End of Progress: 
Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical 
Theory (Columbia University Press, 2016) and Critical 
Theory between Klein and Lacan: A Dialogue (co-authored 
with Mari Ruti) (Bloomsbury, 2019). Her current research 
focuses on critical theory and psychoanalysis.
Samantha Brennan is dean of the College of Arts and 
professor of philosophy at the University of Guelph. She’s 
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She works in normative ethics and feminist philosophy, 
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Melissa Burchard is professor and chair of philosophy at 
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